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ABSTRACT
EXPERIENCING IN JAPANESE:
THE EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION ACROSS CLAUSAL TYPES
MAY 2015
MASASHI HASHIMOTO
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Seth Cable

Adjectives of sensation and emotion (Experiencer adjectives) in Japanese can take only
the speaker as their experiencer subject in declarative root sentences and the addressee in
interrogative root sentences in conversation. This constraint, which I call the Experiencer
restriction, is lifted in other various clauses, however. This dissertation examines the Experiencer
restriction across clausal types under scrutiny, and presents two analyses of the phenomenon,
following the claim by Krifka (2001, 2004), Speas and Tenny (2003) and others that speech acts
are syntactically realized.
First, I introduce the phenomenon and give a brief review of its analyses which were
made before the proposal of the speech act projection (Chapter 1). Then I explain the Japanese
complementizer system and provide basic data on the Experiencer restriction across clausal types
(Chapter 2). A conceptual-structural analysis of Experiencers by Jackendoff (1990) and syntactic
analyses of Experiencers by Landau (2010) and others suggest that Experiencers are mental
locations. Based on that, I propose a situation semantic analysis of Experiencers as mental
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locations in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I apply the situation-based analysis to the Experiencer
restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses after arguing that Schlenker’s (2010, 2013a,b) unidimensional analysis explains properties of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses. In Chapter 5,
I turn to another possible analysis, according to which Experiencer NPs agree with an epistemic
modal head via a sentient feature [sen] and an index feature [n]. It can be seen as a revision of
Tenny’s (2006) feature checking analysis, which claims that a [+sentient] feature and a
[+discourse participant] feature are checked. I argue that the principle of parsimony favors the
situation-based analysis over the feature-checking one. In Chapter 6, I compare recent formal
analyses of the Experiencer restriction with my analyses.
This dissertation improves our understanding of situation semantics in connection to
mind-body dualism. Also, it shows that study of Experiencers in Japanese gives us an insight into
the syntax/semantics/pragmatics interface. It tells us not only properties of Experiencers but also
properties of speech acts and the speech act projection.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Experiencer restriction
In Japanese, attribution of a property represented by adjectives of general attribute
description1 such as omo- ‘heavy’ and ao- ‘blue’ is usually expressed in form (1), as in (2).2,3

(1)

a. NP-{wa/ga}

Adj-i.

NP-{Top/Nom} Adj-Pred.be.Pres
‘NP is Adj’
b. NP-{wa/ga}

Adj-k-at-ta.

NP-{Top/Nom} Adj-Pred-be-Past
‘NP was Adj’

(2)

a. sono taburetto-wa omo-i.
that tablet-Top

heavy-Pred.be.Pres

‘The tablet is heavy.’
b. tikyuu-wa ao-k-at-ta.
earth-Top blue-Pred-be-Past
‘The earth was blue.’

1

This term is due to Sode’s (2002) classification of Japanese adjectives, according to which adjectives in
Japanese are divided into adjectives of general attribute description and adjectives of feeling. I call the
latter Experiencer adjectives in this dissertation.
2
I use Kunrei romanization as the system of romanization for Japanese in this dissertation, except in
examples quoted from the previous literature.
3
In this dissertation, I follow Nishiyama’s (1999) analysis of the syntactic structure of Japanese adjectives,
which adopts Bowers’ (1993) proposal of the Predication projection.

1

With almost all adjectives which represent emotions and sensations (which I call Experiencer
adjectives), like uresi- ‘glad’ and samu- ‘cold’, however, form (1) can be used only if a property
is attributed to the speaker.4

(3)

a. watasi-wa uresi-i.
I-Top

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am happy.’
b. *kare-wa uresi-i.5
he-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres
(Intended:) ‘He is happy.’
(from Kunihiro 1965: 826)

Let us call this restriction the Experiencer restriction.7 Many researchers have mentioned the
restriction, and some (Kunihiro 1965, Teramura 1971, Kamio 1995, Azuma 1997b, Tenny 2006,
4

There are two exceptions (Nishio 1972:30, 199ff): suki- (‘likeAdj’) and kirai- (‘dislikeAdj’) can take a thirdperson subject, as in (i). In the following, these two adjectives are not considered.
(i)
kare-wa sore-ga {suki/kirai}-da.
he-Top it-Nom {like/dislike}-be.Pres
‘He {likes/dislikes} it.’
5
This judgment is correct in most situations. However, as Kuroda (1965) and others note, the sentence
becomes acceptable in some special cases. This point will be discussed in detail below.
6
The original is in Japanese. I added English glosses.
7
In this dissertation, I consider the restriction of the Experiencer argument of adjectives only. It should be
noted that the restriction of the Experiencer argument is usually observed with other predicates also, as
Teramura (1971:281) suggests. (i) is an example of a verb omo- ‘think’ (Nakau 1979 seems to be the first
that analyzed the restriction in this case), and (ii.a,b) are examples of idiomatic phrases.
(i)
{watasi/*kare}-wa [sono riron-ga
tadasi-i-to]
omo-u.
{I/*he}-Top
[that theory-Nom correct-Pred.be.Pres-C] think-Pres
‘{I think/*He thinks} that the theory is correct.’
(ii) a. {watasi/*kare}-wa hara-ga
tat-ta
yo.
{I/*he}-Top
stomach-Nom put.up-Past SFP
‘{I/*He} got angry.’
b. {watasi/*kare}-wa ki-ga
meit-ta yo.
{I/*he}-Top
energy-Nom lose-Past SFP
‘{I/*He} felt depressed.’

2

Fujii 2006, 2007 and others) have analyzed it. In this dissertation, I analyze this phenomenon in
more detail. Importantly, as discussed below, the restriction does not always hold, so a good
analysis should account for appearance and disappearance of the restriction in various
environments. Two guiding elements of my analysis are compositional possible-worlds semantics
and recent researches on the fine-structure of the left periphery which are pursued by Rizzi (1997),
Speas and Tenny (2003) and others and extended to Japanese by Tenny (2006) and Saito and
Haraguchi (2012) among others.
In the following, I give a brief review of previous research to give the reader the feeling
of the problem (section 1.2), and then explain the outline of this dissertation (section 1.3).

1.2 Previous research on the Experiencer restriction
To grasp the problem a bit better, let us look at analyses which were made before the rise
of the research of the fine-structure of the left (right) periphery of Japanese. (I discuss more
recent analyses by Tenny 2006 and Fujii 2006, 2007 and a formal analysis by Kamio (1995,
1997a,b) in Chapter 6.)
The Experiencer restriction was first noted by Kunihiro (1965) and Kuroda (1965)
independently, and then discussed by Koyama (1966), Minami (1967), Teramura (1971, 1973),
Nishio (1972), Kuroda (1973), Kuno (1973), Akatsuka McCawley (1978), Akmajian and
Kitagawa (1981), Aoki (1986), Martin (1988), Kamio (1995, 1997, 2002), Nitta (1991), Azuma
(1993, 1997a,b), Masuoka (1997), Tenny (2006), Fujii (2006, 2007) and others. Here, I take up
Kunihiro (1965), Teramura (1971, 1973), Nitta (1991), and Azuma (1997b) because they discuss
the Experiencer restriction in more detail than others (except those whose analyses are treated in
Chapter 6).
However, there seems to be more complexities with non-adjectives. Different from adjectives, nonadjectives do not show the Experiencer restriction uniformly (for a relevant data, see Kinsui 1989).

3

1.2.1 A sememic feature compensation analysis by Kunihiro (1965)
The first analysis of the Experiencer restriction is due to Kunihiro (1965). He claims that
Japanese Experiencer adjectives have a sememic feature of [first-person state], which makes a
non-first-person Experiencer argument unacceptable unless there is another expression which
compensates meaning mismatch of the sememic feature [first-person state] of an Experiencer
adjective and a non-first-person Experiencer argument.
For example, an Experiencer adjective, uresi- ‘glad’, allows a first-person Experiencer
but not a third-person Experiencer, as shown in (3). According to Kunihiro, uresi-’s sememic
feature [first-person state] requires the Experiencer be a first-person, so (3b) is unacceptable.
However, if an expression no-da (“it is that”) is added to such a sentence, a non-first-person
Experiencer become acceptable, as in (4).

(4)

a. *kare-wa sabisi-i.
he-Top lonely-is
(Intended:) ‘He is lonely.’
(Kunihiro 1965: 84 n.168)

b. kare-wa sabisi-i no-da.
he-Top loely-is it.is.that
‘It is that he is lonely.’

In the case of (4), no-da, which represents “affirmation by the first-person”, compensates the
violation of the first-person requirement. Definitely it is important to clarify which elements
compensate the violation and which not, but Kunihiro does not say anything specific.

8

I added English glosses.

4

What is problematic about this analysis is that there are cases where the Experiencer
restriction is lifted without an element which seems to compensate violation of the first-person
requirement. One example is relative clauses. As discussed in detail later, the Experiencer
restriction is active in non-restrictive restrictive relative clauses (Masuoka 1997), while it is lifted
in restrictive relative clauses (Koyama 1966).

(5)

a. Restrictive relative clause (RRC)
[RRC atu-k-at-ta

] hito-wa

umi-ni hait-ta

yo.

[RRC hot-Pred-be-Past ] people-Top sea-to enter-Past SFP
‘People who were hot entered the sea.’
b. Non-restrictive relative clause (NRRC)
[NRRC atu-k-at-ta

] {boku/Tarô}-wa umi-ni hait-ta

[NRRC hot-Pred-be-Past ] {I/Taro}-Top

yo.

sea-to enter-Past SFP

‘{I/*Taro}, who was hot, entered the sea.’

On the one hand, if the Experiencer is an argument of an Experiencer adjective in a restrictive
relative clause, it can be third-person, as in (5a). On the other hand, if the Experiencer is an
argument of an Experiencer adjective in a non-restrictive relative clause, then it cannot be thirdperson, as in (5b). This fact is not accounted for by Kunihiro’s analysis. First, there is no ground
to claim that relativization involves a sememic feature related to first-person, so it is not clear
how compensation of the violation of first-person requirement is achieved with a restrictive
relative clause. Second, if restrictive relative clauses can compensate the violation of first-person
requirement, it is not clear why non-restrictive relative clauses cannot.

5

1.2.2 A performative analysis by Teramura (1971, 1973)
Teramura (1971, 1973) analyzes the Experiencer restriction, employing Austin’s (1962)
speech act theory and Ross’s (1970) performative analysis. In his analysis, Teramura supposes
that simple clauses such as (3), reproduced below, are under an unpronounced higher structure for
the mood of expression of feeling, and claims that the mood of expression of feeling restricts the
Experiencer to the speaker.

(3)

a. watasi-wa uresi-i.
I-Top

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am happy.’
b. *kare-wa uresi-i.
he-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres
(Intended:) ‘He is happy.’

Furthermore, he notes that sentences like (6) are good and claims that it is so because this type of
sentence is in the past tense and not in the mood of expression of feeling.9 Specifically, he claims
that when a sentence is in the past tense, it cannot be in the mood of expression of feeling, and
proposes that such a sentence is in the mood of assertion and the mood of assertion does not
restrict the Experiencer.

9

As explained in detail later in Chapter 2, Teramura’s claim is not exactly correct. The acceptability of
sentences with a non-first-person Experiencer is dependent on the situation where the sentence is presented.
For example, if (6) is in third-person narrative, it is acceptable as Teramura notes. However, if it is in
conversation, it is not acceptable. The reason of why the past tense is apparently relevant to the
acceptability is that third-person narrative usually uses the past tense. The relevance of the distinction
between conversation and third-person narrative to the Experiencer restriction was first noted in Kuroda
(1965).

6

(6)

kare-wa uresi-k-at-ta.
he-Top glad-Pred-be-Past
‘He was glad.’

A big problem of this analysis is that there is no reason to expect that sentences like (3b)
are always under the mood of expression of feeling. It would be more natural to suppose that
when one tells another person’s feeling, one’s saying is accompanied with the mood of assertion.
In other words, it is not clear why only the past tense is related to the mood of assertion.10 (See
Azuma (1997b) for other problems of Teramura’s analysis.)

1.2.3 An epistemological analysis (Kuno 1973, Nitta 1991)
Nitta’s (1991) account of the Experiencer restriction consists of the following two
statements. A similar account is given by Kuno (1973) also.

(7)

(i) Experiencer adjectives are “predicates which directly express internal states” (Nitta
1991:8611).
(ii) “Since it is only the speaker that can directly know [his own] internal states, it is only
the speaker that can report them.” (Nitta 1991:86)

A problem of this analysis is about statement (ii). (ii) presupposes that, at least in Japanese, one
cannot report information which is not directly known to him. But it is incorrect: One can report

10

Contrastively to Teramura, Kuroda (1973) and Tenny (2006) analyze sentences like (6), which do not
impose the Experiencer restriction, as sentences without an assertive speech act. This point is treated in the
following chapters.
11
Quotations from Nitta (1991) are translations from Japanese by myself.

7

(without help of evidential markers) information which he knows indirectly even in Japanese (this
point is highlighted especially in Kamio’s (1990, 2002) work). Example (233) illustrates it.

(8)

(Scenario: The speaker saw that there were puddles here and there in the ground.)
ame-ga

hut-ta

yo.

rain-Nom fall-Past SFP
‘It rained.’

Therefore, this type of epistemological analysis does not work.

1.2.4 A ‘loose Spec-head agreement’ analysis by Azuma (1997b)
To account for the observation that the Experiencer restriction is inactive or weak in
some cases, Azuma (1997b) proposes that assertive sentences12 show the Experiencer restriction
as a result of ‘loose Spec-head agreement’ at a projection called MP, which is a projection headed
by modal elements like darô (‘probably, seem’).13,14 According Azuma (1997b:45), the Spec-head
agreement is of a different type from the strict one for gender, number, and person agreement in
French and other languages, in that requirement of agreement is loose. She suggests that it is easy

12

Here, the phrase ‘assertive sentences’ is my translation of the Japanese term, nobetate bun (bun means
sentence(s)), used in Azuma’s study (the term is used also in Nitta 1991). The notion of nobetate seems to
overlap the notion of assertion in the speech act theory largely, as suggested by Azuma’s statements such
that the nobetate bun describes states [eventualities] (Azuma 1997: 21) and that the nobetate bun transfers
information from the speaker to the hearer (Azuma 1997: 23). It should be noted, however, that she also
claims that sentences in third-person narrative is in the mood of nobetate (Azuma 1997: 97). It is in is in
line with Teramura’s (1971, 1973) proposal, but it is in contrast to Kuroda’s (1973) and Tenny’s (2006)
proposal that sentences in the nonreportive style are not accompanied with speech acts (this point is treated
in detail in the following chapters).
13
The projection for darô is called ModP in my analysis in the following chapters, following Koizumi
(1993) and others.
14
Azuma proposes that not assertive sentences but sentences with the mood of expression of feelings
follow an ordinary strict Spec-head agreement.
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for first-person topics to agree with the MP head for assertion of feeling, while it is difficult for
third-person topics to agree with the same MP head (Azuma 1997b:45).
A big problem of this analysis is its lack of a detailed, formal explanation of the proposed
agreement mechanism. Because of the lack, we cannot check its validity in detail. However, even
without going into the details, it seems that the analysis is problematic: If the agreement which
causes the Experiencer restriction is loose in the sense that the requirement of agreement is loose
as Azuma states, then it cannot account for the basic fact that in some cases the Experiencer
restriction is obligatory, as in the following example which contains a sentence-final particle yo.15

(9)

{watasi/*kanozyo}-wa uresi-k-at-ta
{I

/*she}-Top

yo.

glad-Pred-be-Past SFP

‘{I/*She} was very glad.’

1.3 Organization of this dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I first explain background
assumptions on the fine-structure of Japanese right periphery, and then present basic data on the
Experiencer restriction in various environments. In Chapter 3, I give an analysis of the
Experiencer restriction based on possibilistic situation semantics. Using the analysis, I account for
15

My judgment is sometimes ‘stricter’ than Azuma’s: some sentences which Azuma judges as ‘??’ are
unacceptable for me. The difference in judgment, however, does not affect the core of the argument given
above. It is that there are unacceptable sentences even for speakers like Azuma, as shown in the following
judgment by her (she uses # instead of * to indicate that they are pragmatically unnatural (Azuma
1997b:50n.18). I added English glosses).
(i)
{watasi/#anata}-ga haha-ga
koisi-i.
(Azuma 1997b: 44(60b))
{I/#you}-Nom
mother-Nom missAdj-Pred.be.Pres
‘I miss (my) mother/#You miss (your) mother.’
(ii)
{boku/#kimi/#Ken}-{ga/wa} te-ga
ita-i.
(Azuma 1997b: 45(65))
{I/#you/#Ken}-{Nom/Top} hand-Nom hurtAdj-Pred.be.Pres
‘{My/#Your/#Ken’s} hand hurts.’
The point is that it is not clear how the loose Spec-head agreement leads to the strict unacceptability in
these examples.
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appearance and disappearance of the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses in
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I give another analysis of the Experiencer restriction, which employs the
feature-checking mechanism. Then, in Chapter 6, I consider recent formal analyses of the
Experiencer restriction by Kamio (1995, 1997a,b), Tenny (2006), and Fujii (2006, 2007). Chapter
7 concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION: BASICS

In this chapter, I present some basic facts on the Experiencer restrictions in Japanese after
presenting background information which is necessary to describe them. First, because the
Experiencer restriction in embedded clauses is sensitive to the choice of complementizers, I give
an overview of the Japanese complementizer system in the framework of the cartographic
approach to the left (right)-periphery (Rizzi 1997, 1999 and others). Next, because the
Experiencer restriction in non-embedded clauses is sensitive to the choice of narrative styles
(Kuroda 1973), I give an overview of the so-called reportive and nonreportive narrative styles.
Based on these backgrounds, I present some basic observations on the Experiencer restrictions in
Japanese.

2.1 Complementizers in Japanese
Japanese has three complementizers, to, no, and koto. To is sometimes called a
quotative16 and no and koto are often called nominalizers. No and koto have rather similar
properties (see Suzuki 2005 and Hiraiwa 2010 for example), and the syntactic status of no is
clearer than that of koto17, so I mainly consider to and no here.

16

I use the term quotative in a broad sense, to mean an element which introduces a direct discourse or an
indirect discourse.
17
Inoue (1976), Uchibori (1996, 2000), Watanabe (1996) and others suppose that koto is a complementizer.
Syntactically, koto (≈ ‘fact’, ‘thing’) is a formal noun which lacks a substantial meaning (Kuno 1973), and
koto-clauses overtly have the form of complex NPs. For a semantic analysis of koto, see Hara, Kim, Sakai
and Tamura (2013).
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2.1.1 Quotative to
Quotative to originated from a demonstrative for ‘that’ (Yamanaka 1976, Nihon Daijiten
Kankōkai 1976), as the English complementizer that did. Different from its English counterpart,
however, quotative to can introduce direct discourse as well as indirect discourse. As shown in
(10), to-clauses embedded under verbs of saying are ambiguous: in (10a) boku-no uti “my home”
refers to the home of Taro, the local speaker, while in (10b) the same expression refers to the
home of the speaker of the whole sentence.

(10)

a. Tarô-ga

“Hanako-wa boku-no uti-ni

Taro-Nom Hanako-Top I-Gen

i-ru”-to

it-ta.

home-at be-Pres-TO say-Past

‘Taro said, “Hanako was in my home.”’
b. Tarô-ga

[Hanako-wa boku-no uti-ni

Taro-Nom Hanako-Top I-Gen

i-ru-to]

it-ta.

home-at be-Pres-TO say-Past

‘Taro said that Hanako was in my home.’
(Based on Saito 2010:85(1a,b))

Also, it is notable that to can introduce interjections and sentence fragments (Oshima 2006):18,19

(11)

Tarô-wa “tye”-to it-ta.
Taro-Top tut-TO say-Past
‘Taro said, “tut.”’

18

This is not special to Japanese to. As Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) pointed out to me, Malayalam quotative
complementizer ennǝ combines with interjections and with indirect discourse (Jayaseelan 2008, 2014).
19
Oshima states that sentence fragments are hallmarks of direct discourse as well as interjections, and use
them to support the claim that to can introduce direct discourse. However, sentence fragments do not
always indicate presence of direct discourse, as exemplified in the following example (Seth Cable, p.c.):
(i) We asked Dave who he loves, and he said his mother.

12

Because interjections are hallmarks of direct discourse, the grammaticality of (11) indicates that
to can be a quoter of direct discourse.
In line with Saito and Haraguchi (2012), I assume that the ambiguity is due to the
ambiguity of to. There are two to’s: one introduces direct discourse (toDD) and the other indirect
discourse (toID).20,21 When we consider the Experiencer restrictions in embedded clauses, toDD is
irrelevant, so it is important to use examples in which it is clear that toDD is not used. One device
which distinguishes toID and toDD is (interpretations of) pronominal elements, as exemplified in
(10). Another device is long-distance phenomena across the clausal boundary of to-clauses. For
example, wh-expressions are often used for this purpose (e.g., Kuno 1988). The Japanese whexpressions (indeterminates) like dare ‘who’ need to be bound by an operator like the
interrogative marker ka, as shown in (12). If such a wh-expression and ka are separated by the
clausal boundary of a to-clause as in (13), the to must be toID.

(12)

a. Hanako-wa [dare-ga

ki-ta-ka-to]

it-ta.

Hanako-Top [who-Nom come-Past-Q-TO] say-Past
‘Hanako said who came.’
‘Hanako said, “Who came?”’
b. *Hanako-wa

[dare-ga

ki-ta-to]

it-ta.

(with lowering intonation22)

Hanako-Top [who-Nom come-Past-TO] say-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako said who came.’

20

For different views, see Maier (2009) and Sudo (2012).
Saito and Haraguchi do not use the subscripts ‘DD’ and ‘ID’. In the most part of this dissertation, I drop
the subscript because it is clear from the context.
22
With raising intonation, a null interrogative marker is available in the matrix clause and so the sentence
becomes grammatical with the interpretation, ‘Who did Hanako say came?’
21

13

(13)

Hanako wa [dare ga kita] to
who

itta ka.

(Kuno 1988:76(1.5c))

came that said Q

‘Who did Hanako say came?’

2.1.1.1 The syntactic category of to which introduces indirect discourse
In this dissertation, I adopt the cartographic approach proposed by Rizzi (1997, 1999),
Cinque (1999) and others.23 In the cartographic approach, the CP-layer is split into several
projections to account for the distribution of complementizers, topic, and focus elements. In Rizzi
(1997), the following structure of the CP-layer is proposed.

(14)

Rizzi (1997)
[ Force [ (Top(ic)*) [ Foc(us) [ (Top(ic)*) [ Fin(ite) [ IP ] ]]]]]

Here, Force specifies the clausal types such as “a question, a declarative, an exclamative, a
relative, a comparative, an adverbial of a certain kind, etc.” (Rizzi 1997:283), and Fin(ite)
specifies (at least) finite and non-finite clauses. Rizzi (1999) considers the positions of the Italian

23

There are different analyses of to from the cartographic approach, though a detailed comparison between
the cartographic approach and those different analyses is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For
example, Fukui (1995) proposes that to is not a C but a postposition. One of his motivations for this claim
is that to can co-occur with an interrogative marker, ka, as exemplified in (16). He argues that it means that
to cannot be C, since ka occupies C and two elements cannot be in the same syntactic position. In the
cartographic approach, CP is split into several projections, so Fukui’s reasoning loses its power.
Motomura (2003) proposes that to is not a C but an inherent Case marker which is accompanied
with a Content role. Content role is a thematic role assigned to an expression which represents the thing
said (Pietroski 2000). She gives the same argument as Fukui (1995) to claim that to is not a C, and she
points out an observation that to-clauses cannot be subjects, different from English that-clauses. She claims
that it is because to-clausal subjects would have two Cases, an inherent Case and a structural nominative
Case (note that Japanese does not allow Case stacking). In the cartographic approach, it is explained by
supposing that to-clauses cannot be assigned a Case (Saito and Haraguchi 2012). Because the subject
position is a Case position, to-clauses cannot appear there.
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complementizer che (‘that’) and the Italian interrogative complementizer se (‘if’) and revises the
above structure slightly:

(15)

Rizzi (1999)
[ Force [ (Top*) [ Int(errogative) [ (Top*) [ Foc [ (Top*) [ Fin [ IP ]]]]]]]]

Here, Int(errogative) is the position which se occupies. It should be noted that it does not mean
that interrogative and declarative forces are expressed by different heads, Int and Force,
respectively. Rizzi supposes that when se occupies Int, there is a phonetically null Force head,
which represents the force, based on selectional reasons and distribution of Spanish
complementizers, que (‘that’) and si (‘if’). The Spanish complementizer que can embed a clause
headed by the interrogative complementizer si (Plann 1982, Lahiri 1991), and Rizzi claims that
que occupies Force, while si occupies Int.
What is important in the analysis of Japanese to is that it also can embed a clause headed
by the interrogative marker ka, as in (16).

(16)

Hanako-wa [ [ boku-no

heya-ga

4-kai-ni

ar-u-ka]-to]

kii-ta.

Hanako-Top [ [ I(male)-Gen room-Nom 4-floor-on be-Pres-KA]-TO] ask-Past
‘Hanako asked if my room was on the fourth floor.’

It should be noted here that the first-person pronoun boku is used only by male speakers, but
Hanako is a female name. Hence, the fact that this sentence is acceptable indicates that the firstperson pronoun refers not to Hanako (the local speaker) but to a male speaker, who must be the
speaker of the whole sentence. It confirms that to in this example introduces indirect discourse,
not direct discourse.
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Example (16) shows that to which introduces indirect discourse occupies a position
higher than ka, the complementizer for questions. Saito (2010, 2011) and Saito and Haraguchi
(2012) propose that to which introduces indirect discourse is a complementizer for paraphrases of
direct discourse, following Plann’s (1982) analysis of the Spanish complementizer que. They base
their analysis on Rizzi’s (1997), and assume that the Japanese interrogative complementizer ka
occupies Force. As a consequence of the assumption, they propose that there is a head higher than
Force in the CP-layer24, and call it Report. Schematically, they propose the following structure.

(17)

Saito (2011), Saito and Haraguchi (2012)
[[[[[ TP ] Fin ] … ] Force ] Report ]
(ka)

(to)

On the other hand, if we base on Rizzi’s (1999) analysis, the Japanese complementizer system
would be as follows.

(18)

Structure in line with Rizzi (1999)
[[[[[ TP ] Fin ] … ] Int ] Force ]
(ka)

(to)

Which analysis is better suited for the Japanese right-periphery, (17) or (18)? It should be
noted that the above-mentioned authors do not make their grounds very firm. In Rizzi (1999), the
reason that Int is supposed under Force is that the Italian complementizer che (‘that’) is assumed
to be Force. But the assumption that che occupies Force is introduced without supportive

24

It is, however, not obvious that the projection for to is in the CP-layer. Maybe the projection for to is
outside of CP (see Jayaseelan 2014 for such a claim for Malayalam complementizer ennǝ).
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arguments. In Saito and Haraguchi (2012), the reason that Report is placed above Force is that to
appears to the right of the Japanese interrogative complementizer ka, which is assumed to be
Force. The assumption that ka occupies Force is based on the following consideration: “Ka is the
complementizer for questions, and hence, is plausibly a Force head” (Saito and Haraguchi
2012:109). In this dissertation, I follow Saito and Haraguchi and suppose that to and ka occupy
Report and Force, respectively. A reason for choosing their analysis over Rizzi’s (1999) is that
the semantic function of Int is not clear in Rizzi’s analysis, where Int does not represent the
interrogative force. Another reason is that the matrix clause is expected to have Force but to
cannot appear in the matrix clause. If to is not Force but Report, then the fact that to cannot
appear in the matrix clause does not conflict with the supposition that the matrix clause contains a
ForceP.
Now, let us add Speech Act Projection (SAP) to structure (17). SAP is the projection for
specification of illocutionary forces. It is based on the claim by Krifka (2001, 2004), Speas and
Tenny (2003) and others that illocutionary forces can be syntactically represented and so
embeddable (Krifka does not assume a specific syntactic projection for speech acts, while Speas
and Tenny argue for such a projection).25 Note that, although Speas and Tenny suppose that
Rizzi’s Force specifies illocutionary forces, Rizzi himself does not mention illocutionary forces in
his (1997, 1999) papers on ForceP. In Rizzi’s papers, ForceP is a projection for specification of
clausal types such as declarative, interrogative, and relative clauses, as quoted in (19):

25

The idea that the illocutionary force is syntactically realized can be traced back to Ross’s (1970) socalled ‘performative analysis’. The main difference between the performative analysis and the recent
proposals is that the former supposes that illocutionary forces are realized as an ordinary (though
unpronounced) higher clause such as ‘I say to you that’, and so they should wrongly contribute to the truthconditional meaning, while the latter suppose that illocutionary forces are realized as a functional
projection, so they do not need to contribute to the truth-conditional meaning (see Krifka 2001).
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(19)

“Complementizers express the fact that a sentence is a question, a declarative, an
exclamative, a relative, a comparative, an adverbial of a certain kind, etc., and can be
selected as such by a higher selector. This information is sometimes called the clausal
Type (Cheng 1991), or the specification of Force (Chomsky 1995). Here well will
adopt the latter terminology.” (Rizzi 1997:283)

Based on this characterization of ForceP, I suppose that ForceP represents a sentence radical, and
it is not the projection for specification of illocutionary forces.26 The projection which is related
to illocutionary forces is SAP.27 It is the place where speech act operators such as ASSERT
appear. Since ForceP does not contain an illocutionary operator, SA must be located above Force.
The previous studies slightly differ on the precise position of SAP. Speas and Tenny
(2003) propose that SAP selects Evaluative Phrase (Sentience Phrase). Tenny (2006) follows the
proposal, and furthermore claims that SAP can be headed by a sentence-final particle yo. Saito
and Haraguchi (2012) suppose that sentence-final particles head SAP and claim that SAP which

26

This position is maintained by Jayaseelan (2008:46f): “However it is perhaps a mistake to identify
Rizzi’s notion of Force with the illocutionary force of speech act theory. In Jayaseelan (2001b) I argued
that the “question meaning” of a direct question—namely a request for information—is actually a matter of
pragmatics. The syntax itself only presents a disjunction, a partition of a domain of discourse […]
Disjunction (then) is the force of a question clause; which was indeed our rationale for deciding to generate
the disjunction operator as the head of ForceP. This ForceP must be present in an embedded clause no less
than in a matrix clause.”
27
The speech act projection appears also in Cinque (1999), Speas (2004), Speas and Tenny (2003), Tenny
(2006) and others. On the one hand, Cinque claims that his speech act mood projection is not the Force
projection, and that his speech act projection is lower than Force. If so, his speech act projection is not
Force nor SAP in this dissertation. On the other hand, Speas and Tenny (2003:317) (Tenny 2006 follows
this analysis) write as follows: “We follow Rizzi (1997), Ambar (1999, 2002) and Cinque (1999) in
claiming that syntactic structures include a projection whose head encodes illocutionary force. This head is
overt in languages that have sentence particles, clitics or morphemes indicating whether the sentence is a
statement, question, etc. We’ll adopt Cinque’s terminology, calling this projection Speech Act Phrase,
projected from a Speech Act Mood head.” It seems to indicate that their SAP is a fusion of ForceP and SAP
in this dissertation.
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is headed by a sentence-final particle wa28 selects TP while SAP which is headed by yo/ne/na has
no selectional requirement.
Abstracting away subtle differences among the proposals, I assume the following
structure in this dissertation.

(20)

[[[[[ TP ] Fin ] … ] Force ]

(SA)

] (Report) ]

(ka) (wa, yo, ne, sa, …)

(to)

(ASSERT)
(INTERROG)

Following Tenny (2006), I assume that sentence-final particle yo occupies the SA head. For
concreteness, I suppose that other sentence-final particles such as wa and ne are also SA heads, as
Saito and Haraguchi (2012) do. Because these particles can appear simultaneously and they all
modify speech acts, SAP would be split into several projections in a finer analysis. Elements in
parentheses in (20) can be missing. As for Report, matrix clauses do not have it, and embedded
clauses do not need to have it, as exemplified by the following examples:

(21)

Matrix clause
Tarô-no imôto-ga

ki-ta-(*to)

Taro-Gen sister-Nom come-Past-(*Rep)
‘Taro’s sister came.’

(22)

28

Embedded clauses

It is different from the topic-marker wa.
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a. Tarôi-wa [ReportP [ karei-no imôto-ga

ki-ta]-to]

it-ta.

Taroi-Top [ReportP [ hei-Gen sister-Nom come-Past]-Rep] say-Past
‘Taroi said that hisi sister came.’
b. Tarôi-wa

[karei-no imôto-ga

ki-ta-ka]

it-ta.

Taroi-Top [hei-Gen sister-Nom come-Past-Q] say-Past
‘Taroi said if hisi sister came.’

(23)

Tarôi-wa [ReportP [ karei-no imôto-ga

ki-ta-ka]-(to)]

kii-ta.

Taroi-Top [ReportP [ hei-Gen sister-Nom come-Past-Q]-(Rep)] ask-Past
‘Taroi asked whether hisi sister came.’

(21) shows that to cannot be added to a matrix clause, and (22a,b) and (23) show that a verb iw‘say’ and a verb kik- ‘ask’ can combine not only with a to-complement clause but also with a kacomplement clause, which is smaller than ReportP.
With regard to SA, it is present in some clauses but missing in other clauses, as discussed
in section 2.2.29

2.1.1.2 Verbs which take to-complement clauses
To-complement clauses typically appear with verbs of communication, but some other
propositional attitude verbs also can combine with them. Saito (2010) gives a partial list of verbs
that select for to-complement clauses. The following is a slightly augmented version of the list.

(24)

29

Verbs which take to-complement clauses

It is in accordance with Krifka’s claim that some embedded clauses have illocutionary forces.
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Omo-u ‘think’, kangae-ru ‘consider’, sinzi-ru ‘believe’, sir-u ‘know’, i-u30 ‘say’,
sakeb-u ‘scream’, syutyoo-su-ru ‘claim, insist’, tazune-ru ‘inquire, ask’, kik-u ‘ask’,
kitaisu-ru ‘expect’, kanzi-ru ‘feel’
(based on Saito 2010: 92 (21a), augmented by myself)

2.1.2 Nominalizers no and koto
Different from complementizer to, complementizer no and koto form phrases which are
case-marked, similarly to nominals. For example, as a pronoun sore ‘it’ in object position is
accompanied with the accusative case marker -o in (25a), a no/koto-clause in (25b) is marked
with -o. Therefore, these two elements are often called nominalizers.

(25)

a. Tarô-wa sore-o

sit-tei-ta.

Taro-Top that-Acc know-Perf-Past
‘Taro knew it.’
b. Tarô-wa

[[TP Hanako-ga boku-no uti-ni

Taro-Top [[TP Hanako-Top I-Gen

i-ru]-{no/koto}]-o

home-at be-Pres]-{NO/KOTO}]-Acc

sit-tei-ta.
know-Perf-Past
‘Taro knew that Hanako was in my home.’

Concerning koto, there are two popular analyses: (i) it is C (Inoue 1976, Uchibori 1996,
2000, and Watanabe 1996, among others) and (ii) it is a noun which has bleached meaning (called

30

This verb is the most basic and commonest among verbs of speech. Its stem is iw-, but exceptionally it is
pronounced as yu- before u. For that reason, the verb is also written as yu-u.
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a ‘formal noun’) (Hara, Kim, Sakai and Tamura 2013, and others). In the former analysis, kotophrases are CP, while in the latter analysis, koto-phrases are complex NP.

2.1.2.1 The syntactic category of no
Nominalizers can embed a TP, as exemplified in (25b). Now, let us see that clauses
headed by a nominalizer no are Finite Projections (FinPs) (Hiraiwa and Ishihara (2002), Endo
(2010), Sato (2012), Saito and Haraguchi (2012) and others).
First, the nominalizer no can precede the interrogative complementizer ka, but it cannot
follow ka, as shown in (26a,b):

(26)

a. Hanako-wa [ForceP boku-no heya-ga
Hanako-Top [ForceP I-Gen

4-kai-ni

ar-u-no-ka]

kii-ta.

room-Nom 4-floor-on be-Pres-NO-Q] ask-Past

‘Hanako asked if my room was on the fourth floor.’
b. *Hanako-wa [ForceP boku-no heya-ga
Hanako-Top [ForceP I-Gen

4-kai-ni

ar-u-ka]-no-o

kii-ta.

room-Nom 4-floor-on be-Pres-Q]-NO-Acc ask-Past

(Intended:) ‘Hanako asked if my room was on the fourth floor.’

Second, the nominalizer no can precede darô ‘seem, probably’ (e.g., Kishimoto 201131),
which is supposed to project an epistemic modal projection (ModP)32, as in (27), but it cannot
follow darô, as in (28).

31

The acceptability of darô under nominalizer koto is not as clear as under nominalizer no.
The label for the projection for darô varies among researchers: ModalP (Koizumi 1991, 1993), ModP 2
(Inoue 2007), E-ModalP (Ueda 2007), E-ModP (Kizu 2009), and ModP (Kishimoto 2011, Sato 2011).
32
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(27)

Hanako-wa boku-no uti-ni
Hanako-Top I-Gen

i-ru-(no)-darô.

home-at be-Pres-(NO)-Mod

‘It is probable that Hanako is in my house.’

(28)

a. Tarô-wa [Hanako-ga

boku-no uti-ni

Taro-Top [Hanako-Nom I-Gen

i-ru-(*darô)-no]-o

sit-tei-ru.

home-at be-Pres-(*Mod)-NO]-Acc know-Perf-Pres

‘Taro knows that (*it is probable that) Hanako is in my house.’
b. Tarô-wa [ForceP [Hanako-ga

boku-no uti-ni

Taro-Top [ForceP [Hanako-Nom I-Gen

i-ru-(*darô)-no]-ka]

kii-ta.

home-at be-Pres-(*Mod)-NO]-Q] ask-Past

‘Taro asked if (*it was probable that) Hanako was in my house.’

Based on the fact that no appears to the right of T and to the left of the interrogative
complementizer ka, and the epistemic modal darô, I suppose that no is a Finite head (Fin),
following Hiraiwa and Ishihara (2002) and others. The syntactic structure of the Japanese right
periphery is as follows.

(29)

[[[[[ TP ] Fin ] Mod ] Force ] SA ] Report ]
(no) (darô)

(ka) (SFP)

(to)

2.1.2.2 No-clauses and predicates which take them
The following is a partial list of predicates which take no-clauses (some of them can take
to-clauses also).

(30)

i. Verbs which take no-clause complements
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wasure-ru ‘forget’, kookai-su-ru ‘regret’, mi-ru ‘see’, mat-u ‘wait’, tamera-u ‘hesitate’,
kyohi-su-ru ‘refuse’, ukeire-ru ‘accept’, kitai-su-ru ‘expect’, kanzi-ru ‘feel’
ii. Adjectives which take no-clause subjects33
akiraka-da ‘is clear’, kanô-da ‘is possible’, kantan-da ‘is easy’, muzukasi-i ‘is difficult’,
taihen-da ‘is a big deal’
(from Saito 2010: 92 (21b))

2.2 Reportive/nonreportive styles and the Experiencer restriction
2.2.1 Reportive and nonreportive styles
Japanese uses different grammatical styles for conversation and third-person narrative
(Kuroda 1973, Tenny 2006). One style, which is called the reportive style, is used in conversation,
first-person stories, and narrative in non-first-person stories with a narrator who is not omniscient.
The latter style, which is called the nonreportive style, is used in narrative in non-first-person
stories with an ‘omniscient narrator’ who does not participate in the stories nor is referred to, i.e.,
stories without a narrator.34,35
A difference between the reportive and nonreportive styles is that the reportive style
allows sentence-final discourse particles (such as wa, yo, sa, ne), while the nonreportive style
does not. In other words, sentence-final discourse particles cannot be used in non-first-person
stories without a narrator.
Another difference concerns the interpretation of the Japanese long-distance reflexive
zibun in the reportive and nonreportive styles. Kuroda (1973) claims that when placed in the

33

In contrast to no-clauses, to-clauses cannot be a subject. See footnote 23 for related discussion.
I argue in section 2.2.3 that conversation sometimes allows nonreportive style.
35
The claim that non-first-person stories with an ‘omniscient narrator’ actually do not have a narrator is
argued for by Benveniste (1959), Kuroda (1973), and Banfield (1982), among others. Cf. Ryan (1981).
34
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object position in some adverbial clauses, zibun cannot be coreferential with the matrix subject in
the reportive style.36

(31)

a. Johni-wa [Billj-ga

zibun{*i/j}-o home-ta

toki] Mary-no soba-ni

i-ta

yo.

Johni-Top [Billj-Nom self{*i/j}-Acc praise-Past when] Mary-Gen side-Loc be-Past SFP
‘Johni was by Mary when Billj praised {*himi/himselfj}.’
b. Johni-wa [Billj-ga

zibun{i/j}-o home-ta

toki] Mary-no soba-ni

i-ta.

Johni-Top [Billj-Nom self{i/j}-Acc praise-Past when] Mary-Gen side-Loc be-Past
‘Johni was by Mary when Billj praised {himi/himselfj}.’
(adapted from Kuroda 1973:385(33),(34))

(31a) has a sentence-final discourse particle, so it is clearly in the reportive style. In this case,
zibun cannot be coreferential with John, the matrix subject. (31b) has no sentence-final discourse
particle, so it can be either in the reportive style or in the nonreportive style. In this case, zibun
can be coreferential with the matrix subject.
The observation that different grammatical styles are used for conversation and non-firstperson narrative is not limited to Japanese. According to Benveniste (1959), French distinguishes
conversation and non-first-person narrative by person and tense.37 As for person, it is obvious: je
and tu are used for conversation, but not for non-first-person narrative. As for tense, conversation
allows all the tenses except the aorist tense (i.e., the simple past). The aorist tense is usable only
in the non-first-person narrative.
36

Zibun has three uses: reflexive (anaphoric), empathic (perspectival), and logophoric (Oshima 2004). It is
important to note that Kuroda’s claim is about the reflexive use of zibun. Logophoric zibun can be
coreferential with the matrix subject in the reportive style, as in (i).
(i) bokui-wa [Billj-ga zibun{i/j}-o home-ta
toki] Mary-no soba-ni i-ta
yo.
Ii-Top
[Billj-Nom self{i/j}-Acc praise-Past when] Mary-Gen side-Loc be-Past SFP
‘Ii was by Mary when Billj praised {mei/himselfj}.’
37
Benveniste (1959) calls the two different styles in French two plans d’énonciation (‘planes of utterance’),
discours and histoire.
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2.2.2 The two grammatical styles and the Experiencer restriction
Kuroda (1973) notices that in a simple clause the Experiencer restriction is active in the
reportive style, but not in the nonreportive style, as exemplified in (32).

(32)

a. (Scenario: In conversation)
{boku/*kimi/*kare}-wa sono koto-ga
{I/*you/*he}-Top

uresi-k-at-ta

(yo).

that thing-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past (SFP)

‘{I am/*You are /*He is} glad about that.’
b. (Scenario: In third-person narrative)
kare-wa sono koto-ga
he-Top

uresi-k-at-ta

(*yo).

that thing-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past (*SFP)

‘He was glad about that.’

(32a) is uttered in conversation, so it is in the reportive style,38 and it shows the Experiencer
restriction. Note that it can contain a sentence-final discourse particle. (32b) is uttered in thirdperson narrative, so it is in the nonreportive style, and it does not show the Experiencer restriction.
Note that it cannot contain a sentence-final discourse particle.

2.2.3 The nonreportive style in conversation
Experiencer verbs such as omo-u ‘think’ also show the Experiencer restriction (Teramura
1971, Nakau 1979), and the restriction is lifted in narrative of third-person stories (Kudo 1995),
as the Experiencer restriction of Experiencer adjectives is lifted in third-person narrative.
38

It is, however, not always so, as I show in the next subsection.
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Interestingly, Kudo observes that the restriction is lifted also in some special type of conversation,
where the speaker gives an explanation of something, and that sentence-final discourse particles
cannot be used there.39 In the following example of conversation, omo-u appears with a secondperson Experiencer subject and no ‘hedging’ element which lifts the Experiencer restriction such
as a modal element, an evidential marker, or the perfective aspect marker -tei. A sentence-final
discourse particle cannot be attached to the sentence.

(33)

“Anata-no kekkon-ni

tuite-mo,

boku-nari-no

kaisetu-ga

ar-u.”

you-Gen marriage-Dat regarding-also I-own.way-Gen explanation-Nom be-Pres
‘About your marriage also, I have my own explanation.’
“Osie-te

kudasai.”

teach-Conn please
‘Please tell me.’
“Anata-wa nido-tomo onazi koto-o
you-Top

si-te

sippaisi-ta dake

twice-both same thing-Acc do-Conn fail-Past

na-n-da.

Anata-wa zibun-o

Pres-Evid-Pred.be.Pres you-Top

mamot-te

only

kure-ru

hito-ga

self-Acc protect-Conn Ben-Pres person-Nom
Sore-wa anata-ga, kozi’in-no

hosi-k-at-ta-n-da.

kurasi-o

wantA-Pred-be-Past-Evid-Pred.be.Pres that-Top you-Nom orphanage-Gen life-Acc
si-ta

koto-ni-mo

kankeiaru-ka-mo sirena-i.

do-Past KOTO-Dat-also related-Q-also
aite-ga

omawarisan-nara zibun-o

partner-Nom policeman-if

39

17-no anata-wa,

may-Pred.be.Pres 17-Gen you-Top
hogosi-te

kure-ru

self-Acc protect-Conn Ben-Pres

She calls this type of text ‘kaisetsu’-no tekusuto (‘text of explanation’).
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tekiyaku-da-to

omot-ta.

Keredo omawarisan-toiedomo

right.person-Pred.be.Pres-Rep think-Past but

policeman-even

syakaitekini-mo nikutaitekini-mo hotondo muryoku-ni
socially-also
yû

koto-o

physically-also
sit-ta

almost
toki,

tika-i-to

powerlessness-to close-Pred.be.Pres-Rep
…”

kimi-wa wakare-ta.

say.Pres KOTO-Acc know-Past when you-Top separate-Past
‘You only failed by doing the same thing in both cases. You wanted a person who
protected you. It may be related to the fact that you was brought up in an orphanage.
Seventeen-year-old you thought that if your partner was a policeman, he was just
the right person to protect you. However, when you knew that even a policeman was
socially and physically almost powerless, you separated. …’
(Kudo 1995: 96.40 I added boldface and underline.)

In the same environment, Experiencer adjectives behave similarly. For example, in
conversation (33), we can replace the third utterance with (34).

(34)

“Anata-wa nido-tomo onazi koto-o
you-Top

twice-both same

na-n-da.

si-te

sippaisi-ta dake

thing-Acc do-Conn fail-Past

Anata-wa zibun-o mamot-te

only
kure-ru

hito-ga

Pres-Evid-Pred.be.Pres you-Top self-Acc protect-Conn Ben-Pres person-Nom
hosi-k-at-ta.

17-no anata-wa,

wantA-Pred-be-Past 17-Gen you-Top

40

This conversation is a quotation from a novel, Ayako Sono (1966) Satogashi-ga Kowareru Toki [When a
Sweetmeat Breaks]. Tokyo: Kodansha.
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aite-ga

omawarisan-nara zibun-o

partner-Nom policeman-if
tekiyaku-da-to

hogosi-te

kure-ru

self-Acc protect-Conn Ben-Pres
omot-ta.

Keredo omawarisan-toiedomo

right.person-Pred.be.Pres-Rep think-Past but

policeman-even

syakaitekini-mo nikutaitekini-mo hotondo muryoku-ni
socially-also
yû

koto-o

physically-also
sit-ta

almost
toki,

tika-i-to

powerlessness-to close-Pred.be.Pres-Rep
kimi-wa wakare-ta.

…”

say.Pres KOTO-Acc know-Past when you-Top separate-Past.
‘You only failed by doing the same thing in both cases. You wanted a person who
protected you. Seventeen-year-old you thought that if your partner was a policeman,
he was just the right person to protect you. However, when you knew that even a
policeman was socially and physically almost powerless, you separated. …’

In (34), an Experiencer adjective hosi- ‘want’ appears with a second-person Experiencer subject
and no hedging element which lifts the Experiencer restriction. (Note that in (33) the Experiencer
adjective appears with an evidential marker -n, which lifts the Experiencer restriction.) A
sentence-final discourse particle cannot be attached in this case also.
Because absence of the Experiencer restriction and unavailability of sentence-final
discourse particles are hallmarks of the nonreportive style, I take it that Kudo’s observation
shows that the special type of conversation is the nonreportive style in conversation. With this
qualification, I continue saying sloppily that sentences in conversation are in the reportive style in
the rest of this dissertation.
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2.2.4 The syntactic analysis of the reportive and nonreportive styles
Following Tenny (2006), I suppose that the difference between the reportive and
nonreportive styles is due to the presence and absence of a SAP. Sentences in the reportive style
have a SAP, as in (35).

(35)

In the reportive style
SAP

ForceP
SA


TP
wa, yo, ne, …

Sentences in the nonreportive style lack a SAP, as in (36).

(36)

In the nonreportive style
ForceP

TP

Sentence-final discourse particle are SA heads, so they can appear only in the reportive style. In
the following chapters, I propose some mechanisms of how the presence and absence of a SAP
affect the Experiencer.

2.3 Basic data of the Experiencer restriction
In this section, I give some basic data of the Experiencer restriction.
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2.3.1 Simple root clauses, epistemic modals, and evidentials
In simple declarative root clauses, the Experiencer of Experiencer adjectives cannot be
the addressee(s) or those who are not discourse participants (Kunihiro 1965, Kuroda 1965 and
others), as exemplified in (37). As mentioned earlier, this restriction is active only in the reportive
style. The sentences in (37) end with a sentence-final discourse particle yo, so it is clear that they
are in the reportive style.

(37)

a. {boku/*kimi/*kare}-wa samu-i
{I/you/he}-Top

yo.

cold-Pred.be.Pres SFP

‘{I am/*You are/*He is} cold.’
b. {boku/*kimi/*kare}-wa sono koto-ga
{I/you/he}-Top

uresi-i

yo.

that thing-Nom glad-Pred.be.Pres SFP

‘{I am/*You are /*He is} glad about that.’
c. sono sûpu-wa {boku/*kimi/*kare}-ni-wa oisi-i
that soup-Top {I

yo

/*you /*him}-for-Top delicious-Pred.be.Pres SFP

‘The soup tastes good to {me/you/him}.’

A speaker cannot make an assertion about others’ feeling in a simple root sentence such
as (38), no matter how convinced about the truth of the proposition the speaker is. Even if the
speaker has strong evidence of his belief about someone’s feeling (for example, suppose that the
experiencer told her feeling to the speaker), the speaker cannot make an assertion about the
experiencer’s feeling as in (38).

(38)

(The speaker is not Hanako)
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*Hanako-wa uresi-k-at-ta

yo.

Hanako-Top glad-Pred-be-Past SFP
(Intended:) ‘Hanako was glad.’

To express a direct experience of others in a root clause, the speaker has several choices: (i) to
use a verbal suffix -gar which means “behave like” as in (39a), (ii) to use an indirect evidential as
in (39b), and (iii) to use an epistemic modal as in (39c).

(39)

a. Hanako-wa uresi-gat-ta

yo.

Hanako-Top glad-behave.like-Past SFP
‘Hanako behaved like being glad (= Hanako’s behavior suggested that she was glad).’
b. Hanako-wa sono hito-ga

kowa-k-at-ta

soo-da

yo.

Hanako-Top that person-Nom afraid-Pred-be-Past Hearsay-be.Pres SFP
‘Hanako was afraid of the person -HEARSAY.’
c. Hanako-wa sono hito-ga

kowa-k-at-ta

nitigaina-i

yo.

Hanako-Top that person-Nom afraid-Pred-be-Past must-be.Pres SFP
‘Hanako must have been afraid of the person.’

From here on, I say that clauses without these devices are ‘unmarked’ or ‘in the unmarked form’.

2.3.2 Embedded clauses under attitude verbs
In the case of embedded clauses under attitude verbs, some of them show the Experiencer
restriction, but others not. In most cases, what is relevant is presence of an assertive speech act.
The only exception is vivid memory report, which does not involve a speech act.
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2.3.2.1 Embedded clauses under verbs of saying
This section considers verbs of saying such as yu-u41 ‘say’, syutyôsu-ru ‘assert, claim’
and hôkokusu-ru ‘report’, and shows that to-clauses under these verbs restrict the Experiencer
argument of Experiencer adjectives to the local speaker, namely the referent of the subject of
these verbs, while no-clauses under these verbs not.
First, let us consider to-complement clauses. As shown in (40), the Experiencer in tocomplement clauses under verbs of saying is restricted to the local speaker (e.g., Fujii 2006:160161).

(40)

a. Hanakoi-wa [{kanozyoi/*Tarô/*watasi}-wa kanozyoi-no otôto-no
Hanakoi-Top [{shei/*Taro/*I}-Top
uresi-k-at-ta-to]

shei-Gen

koto-ga

brother-Gen event-Nom

{it/syutyôsi}-ta.

glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] {say/assert}-Past
‘Hanakoi {said/asserted} that {shei/*Taro/*I} was glad about heri brother.’
b. Taroi-wa Atsukoj-ni [Δi/*j watasi-no tomodati-ga nikurasi-i-to] itta.
Taro-Top Atuko-Dat [

my

friend-Nom hate-Prs-C

‘Taroi said to Atsukoj that {hei, *shej} hated my friend.’

said
(Fujii 2006: 160(5a))

Second, let us consider no-complement clauses. Most verbs of saying do not allow a nocomplement clause,42 but some do. For example, yu-u ‘say’ can take a no-complement clause in a

41

It is the same verb that is transcribed as i-u in (24). See footnote 30.
For example, sakeb-u ‘shout’, syutyôsu-ru ‘claim’, dangensu-ru ‘claim’ do not allow a no-complement
clause:
(i) *Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga
bôru-o nage-ta
no]-o {saken-da/syutyôsi-ta/dangensi-ta}.
Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom ball-Acc throw-Past Fin]-Acc {shout-Past/claim-Past/claim-Past}
(Intended:) ‘Hanako {shouted/claimed/claimed} that Taro threw a ball.’
These verbs of saying cannot take a no-complement in a negative sentence also.
(ii) *Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga
bôru-o nage-ta
no]-o {sakeba/syutyôsi/dangensi}-na-k-at-ta.
42
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negative sentence.43 Let us consider (41). (41a) contains an Experiencer adjective and an
Experiencer NP which does not refer to the local speaker. (41b) uses a gar-verb which
corresponds to the Experiencer adjective used in (41b). (41c) contains an Experiencer NP which
refers to the local speaker. I feel that (41a) is degraded, compared with (41b) and (41c). However,
the judgment is subtle and fragile.

(41)

a. ?Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kii-te)

kanozyoi-no itoko-ga

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen
uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

cousin-Nom

iw-ana-k-at-ta.

glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc say-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin was glad (to hear that).’
b. Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kii-te)

kanozyoi-no itoko-ga

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen
uresi-gat-ta-no]-o

cousin-Nom

iw-ana-k-at-ta.

glad-GAR-Past-Fin]-Acc say-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin behaved as being glad (to hear that).’
c. Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kii-te)

kanozyoi-ga

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen
uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

iw-ana-k-at-ta.

glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc say-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Hanakoi did not say that shei was glad (to hear that).’

Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom ball-Acc throw-Past Fin]-Acc{shout/claim/claim}-Neg-Pred-be-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako didn’t {shout/claim/claim} that Taro threw a ball.’
43
In a positive sentence, it is impossible to use a no-complement clause with yu-u:
(i) *Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga
bôru-o nage-ta
no]-o
it-ta.
Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom ball-Acc throw-Past Fin]-Acc say-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako said that Taro threw a ball.’
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One way to make the judgment of (41a) better and solid is to add adverbial hontôwa ‘actually’, as
in (42).

(42)

Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kii-te)

kanozyo-no itoko-ga

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen
uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

hontôwa

cousin-Nom actually

iw-ana-k-at-ta.

glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc say-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin was actually glad (to hear that).’

If one adds hontôwa to a root clause or a to-complement clause of a verb of saying, the
Experiencer restriction remains, as in (43), (44), and (45), so I suppose that hontôwa does not lift
the Experiencer restriction and that the degradedness of (41a) is not an effect of the Experiencer
restriction under investigation.

(43)

{watasi/#Tarô}-wa hontôwa uresi-k-at-ta

yo

{I/Taro}-Top

SFP

actually glad-Pred-be-Past

‘{I/#Taro} was actually glad.’

(44)

{kimi/#Tarô}-wa hontôwa uresi-k-at-ta
{you/Taro}-Top actually glad-Pred-be-Past

(ka)
Q

‘{Are you/#Is Taro} actually glad?’

(45)

#Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kiite)

kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing) shei-Gen
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hontôwa

cousin-Top actually

uresi-k-at-ta-to]

{it-ta/saken-da/…}.

glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…}
(Intended:) ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had been actually glad.’

Another verb of saying which can take a no-complement clause is hôkokusu-ru ‘report’.
Hôkokusu-ru allows a no-complement clause irrespective of the polarity, as shown in (46).

(46)

Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-no itoko-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-gat-ta-no]-o

cousin-Nom glad-GAR-Past-Fin]-Acc

hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta.
report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past
‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that heri cousin behaved as being glad.’

Hôkokusu-ru shows a pattern similar to yu-u ‘say’ with respect to the Experiencer restriction. To
see that, let us consider (47a), which contains an Experiencer adjective and an Experiencer NP
which does not refer to the local speaker. Although the judgment is subtle, (47a) sounds awkward
in an out-of-the-blue context, compared to (46), which contains a gar-verb, and (47b), which
contains an Experiencer NP which refers to the local speaker.

(47)

a. ?-??Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-no itoko-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

cousin-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc

hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta.
report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past
?-??‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that heri cousin was glad.’
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b. Hanakoi-wa [kanozyo-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Nom

uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o
glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc

hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta.
report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past
‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that shei was glad.’

However, (47a) becomes better if the adverbial hontôwa is added:

(48)

Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-no itoko-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

hontôwa uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

cousin-Nom actually glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc

hôkokusi-{/na-k-at}-ta.
report-{/Neg-Pred-be}-Past
‘Hanakoi {reported/did not report} that heri cousin was actually glad.’

These data indicate two things. First, in a to-complement clause under a verb of saying,
the Experiencer is restricted. Second, in a no-complement clause under a verb of saying, an
Experiencer is not restricted, though an interpretation in which the Experiencer is different from
the local speaker is not preferred.

2.3.2.2 Embedded clauses under attitude verbs such as think, believe, and know
To-complement clauses under an attitude verb such as thinking, believing, and knowing
allow an Experiencer who is not the referent of the subject of the verb, as shown in (49).44

44

Different from me, Fujii (2006, 2007) claims that to-complement clauses of omo-u ‘think’ restrict the
Experiencer. He first states as follows (Fujii 2006: 161): “when SubjExp predicates occur in the
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(49)

a. Hanakoi-wa

[{zibuni/kanozyoi-no itoko}-wa uresi-k-at-ta-to]

Hanakoi-Top [{selfi/shei-Gen

cousin}-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep]

{omot/sinzi}-tei-ta.
{think/believe}-Perf-Past
‘Hanakoi {thought/believed} that {shei/heri cousin} had been glad.’
b. Hanakoi-wa

[kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta-to]

cousin-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep]

sit-tei-ta.
know-Perf-Past
‘Hanakoi knew that heri cousin had been glad.’45

In this respect, they differ from to-complement clauses under verbs of saying, which do not allow
such an Experiencer.
Similarly, no-complement clauses under a verb of knowing do not restrict the
Experiencer of Experiencer adjectives, as shown in (50).46

complement clause of verbs like say, think or ask, the restriction on the interpretation of their subject arises
in such a way that the understood subject must be bound by the matrix subject or object.” (Note that
Experiencer adjectives are SubjExp (subject Experiencer) predicates.) Then he gives the following
example:
(i) Marii-wa [Hiroshij-ni [zibuni/j-ga
Nagoya-ga
natukasi -i -to] omotte] hosikatta
Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat self -Nom Nagoya-Nom nostalgic -Prs-C to.think wanted
‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’
(Fujii 2007: 15(36))
Example (i) suggests that his claim is that the Experiencer in to-complement clauses of omo-u must be
bound by one of the subjects or objects of superordinate clauses.
45
In to-complement clauses of the verb of knowing, sir-u ‘know’, the Experiencer cannot be the referent of
the subject of the verb. This phenomenon was first observed by Akatsuka McCawley (1978: 274). Its
mechanism has to be worked out in future research.
46
Verbs of thinking and believing do not select for a no-complement clauses.
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(50)

Hanakoi-wa [{zibuni/kanozyoi-no itoko}-ga
Hanakoi-Top [{selfi /shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta

no]-o

cousin}-Nom glad-Pred-be-Pres Fin]-Acc

sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi knows that {shei/heri cousin} was glad.’

2.3.2.3 Complement clauses of verbs of vivid remembrance
In the environments discussed above, clauses which restrict the Experiencer are those
which are immediately below an assertive speech act. But there is a case in which there is no
assertive speech act involved. Let us look at (51a,b). They contain verbs of memory report, oboeru47 (‘memorize’) and omoidas-u (‘recall’). (51a) shows that a non-de se individual cannot be an
Experiencer, and (51b) shows that a non-de se individual can be used as a non-Experiencer
subject in the same environment.

(51)

a. Hanakoi-wa [{zibuni/*Tarô}-ga uresi-k-at-ta

{no/ koto}]-o

(ariarito)

Hanakoi-Top [{selfi/Taro}-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past {Fin/NMLZ}]-Acc (vividly)
{oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta.
{memorize-Perf/recall}-Past
‘Hanakoi (vividly) {remembered/recalled48} that {shei/*Taro} felt glad.’
b. Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga

uresi-{gat/*k-at}-ta

{no/koto}]-o

(ariarito)

Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past {Fin/NMLZ}]-Acc (vividly)

47

The verb oboe-ru itself means ‘memorize’. With a perfective aspect morpheme -tei-, the verb (oboe-teiru) means ‘have remembrance’.
48
Here, ‘remember’ is used to mean a state of having remembrance, while ‘recall’ is used to mean an act of
recalling. Though the English verb remember have both the meanings of the action of remembering and the
state of having remembrance, there is no Japanese verb which has the two meanings.
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{oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta.
{memorize-Perf/recall}-Past
‘Hanako (vividly) {remembered/recalled} that Taro {behaved as feeling/*felt} glad.’

2.3.3 Relative clauses
In this section, I illustrate that restrictive relative clauses do not show the Experiencer
restriction, while non-restrictive relative clauses do, following previous studies.49 Different from
others, Tenny (2006) claims that relative clauses show the Experiencer restriction, but I argue that
her claim is dubious.
Koyama (1966), Minami (1967), and Nishio (1972) observe that the Experiencer
restriction disappears in ‘modifiers of nominals’, as exemplified in (52), (53), and (54).50,51

(52)

[ik-ita-i]

hito-wa

te-o

age-te

kudasai

[go-wantAdj-Pred.be.Pres] person-Top hand-Acc raise-Con please
(lit. ‘As for people who want to go, please raise your hand.’)
‘Please raise your hand if you want to go.’

(53)

[kare-ga kanasi-i]

(Koyama 1966: 73(16))

riyû

[he-Nom sad-Pred.be.Pres] reason
‘The reason why he is sad’

(Minami 1967: 41)

49

In Chapter 4, non-restrictive relative clauses will be examined in detail, and the claim that non-restrictive
relative clauses do not show the Experiencer restriction will be revised.
50
Koyama’s original claim (p.73) is as follows (I translated the original Japanese text).
(i) Fact 12. . . . adjectives of feelings can be used to represent others’ feelings if they are used as
modifiers of nominals (eg16[=(52)]). Otherwise, they can be used only to represent the speaker’s feelings.
51
I added English glosses to these examples.
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(54)

[inu-no

kowa-i]

ko-mo

oo-i.

[dog-Gen afraid-Pred.be.Pres] child-also many-Pred.be.Pres
‘There are also many children who are afraid of dogs.’ (Nishio 1972: 30)

Kuroda (1973) and Akmajian and Kitagawa (1981) also note that relativization lifts the
Experiencer restriction, as in (55) and (56).

(55)

atui hito
‘hot man’

(56)

(Kuroda 1973: 379(7))

atama-ga ita-i

kodomo wa

head-nom hurt-present child

kono ko

desu.

topic this child is

‘The child who has a headache is this child.’
(Akmajian & Kitagawa 1981:110(150b))

In these examples the present tense morpheme -i appears with the Experiencer adjectives, but the
past tense morpheme -ta also can appear as in (57), so the present tense is not relevant to the
absence of the Experiencer restriction in these examples.

(57)

a. [kare-ga kanasi-k-at-ta]

riyû

[he-Nom sad-Pred-be-Past] reason
‘The reason why he was sad’
b. atu-k-at-ta

hito

hot-Pred-be-Past man
‘a man who was hot’
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c. atama-ga ita-k-at-ta

kodomo wa

head-nom hurt-Pred-be-Past child

kono ko

desu.

topic this child is

‘The child who had a headache is this child.’

Note that relative clauses in these examples are restrictive ones, which restrict a set of
individuals represented by the host noun such as hito ‘man, person’ and ko(domo) ‘child’.
Masuoka (1997) observes that there is a difference between restrictive and non-restrictive relative
clauses with respect to the Experiencer restriction: restrictive relative clauses lift the Experiencer
restriction, whereas non-restrictive relative clauses don’t. For example, let us compare a minimal
pair, (58a,b). The relative clause in (58a) restricts the set of people (hito), so it is a restrictive
relative clause. Here, the Experiencer restriction is not active. On the other hand, the relative
clause in (58b) combines with an NP which denotes a single individual,52 so it is a non-restrictive
one. In this case, the Experiencer restriction is active: only the speaker can be the Experiencer.

(58)

a. [sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

hito-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] man-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

(yo)

go-Past (SFP)

‘The man who was glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office yesterday.’
b. (Context: There is only a single person who has the name, Tarô, in the discourse.)
[sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

{#Tarô/watasi}-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] {#Taro/I}-Top

52

Precisely speaking, it is possible to analyze that what combines with the relative clause is not a single
individual but a set of stages of the individual, as Del Gobbo (2003) claims for Chinese ‘non-restrictive’
relative clauses. Non-restrictive relative clauses are treated in more detail in Chapter 4.
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kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

(yo)

go-Past (SFP)

‘{#Taro/I}, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office
yesterday.’

Different from these authors, Tenny (2006) claims that the Experiencer restriction is
active in relative clauses. Her claim is based on an observation on (59a,b).53

(59)

a. Samui hito

wa dare desu ka?

cold person Top who Cop Question
‘Who is/are the cold person(s)?’
b. Samugatteiru hito

(Tenny 2006:272(62a))

wa dare desu ka?

cold-GARU person Top who Cop Question
‘Who is/are the cold person(s)?’

(Tenny 2006:272(62b))

Tenny states as follows: “In (62a) [=(59a)] the teacher is asking the whole class who among them
is cold. In (62b) [=(59b)] the teacher is asking one student who is or are the cold person or people
in the class? In (a) the implicit second person evaluator of affirmative truth (the individual(s) who
identify themselves as cold) must be direct experiencers or self-ascribers.” I agree with the first
statement, namely that (59a) is appropriate when the teacher is asking the whole class who among
them is cold, but do not with the third statement. The third statement is too strong: in fact, the
question by the teacher can be answered not only as in (60a) but also as in (60b) in a special
condition. (Note that if the third statement is correct, answers like (60b) should be always
unavailable.)
53

Tenny attributes the observation to Ayumi Matsuo.
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(60)

a. Taro: watasi desu.
I

Cop

‘I am.’
b. Taro: Hanako desu.
Hanako Cop
‘Hanako is.’

Answer (60b) is not assertable by Taro if his judgment that Hanako is cold is based on his direct
observation of her behavior, but it is assertable if his judgment is based on Hanako’s saying that
she is cold. It should be noted that under the same condition, Taro cannot make an assertion as in
(61), as expected by the Experiencer restriction.

(61)

Taro: #Hanako-ga

samui desu.

Hanako-Nom cold Cop
(Intended:) ‘Hanako is cold.’

The difference in assertability under the same condition confirms that in (restrictive) relative
clauses the Experiencer restriction is lifted, while in root clauses it is active.
To recapitulate, the Experiencer restriction is not active in restrictive relative clauses
(Koyama 1966, Minami 1967, Nishio 1972, Kuroda 1973, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981 and
others), while it is active in non-restrictive relative clauses (Masuoka 1997). Different from these
scholars, Tenny (2006) claims that relative clauses do not lift the Experiencer restriction, but a
closer inspection shows that Tenny’s data suggests existence of a restriction of a different kind
and does not indicate that the Experiencer restriction is active in relative clauses.

44

2.3.4 Summary
We have seen the following facts about the restriction on the Experiencer argument of
Experiencer adjectives in Japanese.

(62)

a. In a root clause in reportive style, the Experiencer of an Experiencer adjective must be
the speaker.
b. In a to-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer must be the local speaker. In a
no-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
c. In a clause under an epistemic modal, an evidential, or a non-communicational attitude
predicate (except vivid memory report), the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
d. In a clause under a vivid memory report verb, an Experiencer must be the subject of the
memory verb, namely the de se individual in the clause.
e. In a restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
f. In a non-restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer is restricted to the speaker.
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CHAPTER 3
SITUATION-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION

In this chapter, I propose (63) to account for the Experiencer restriction.

(63)

a. An Experiencer has a semantics similar to that of locatives.
b. In Japanese, assertion requires the location of the topic situation, if mental, to be the
mental location of the speaker, namely the speaker’s mind.

It is based on a claim that Experiencers are mental locations, which originated from studies of
lexical conceptual structures and syntax (Jackendoff 1990, Bouchard 1995, Arad 1998, Landau
2010, Varchetta 2010, 2012). In the following, I first claim that sentences which violate the
Experiencer restriction do not have a truth-value (section 3.1). Then I propose that Experiencers
are mental locations, and develop a situation semantic analysis of mental locations (sections 3.2,
3.3, and 3.4). After proposing (63b) in section 3.5, I show that the semantics yields the
Experiencer restriction in various environments correctly (sections 3.6 and 3.7). In section 3.8, I
treat the Experiencer restriction in an embedded clause under a verb of vivid memory report,
which is special in that the Experiencer restriction does not involve speech acts. Section 3.9
shows that the proposed semantics naturally explains the absence of the Experiencer restriction in
restrictive relative clauses. In section 3.10, I treat the Experiencer restriction in interrogatives, and
in section 3.11 I discuss the denotation of the verbal suffix -gar, which lifts the Experiencer
restriction.
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3.1 The Experiencer restriction and the truth-value gap
Let us consider sentence (64) as an example of an Experiencer sentence, i.e., a sentence
with an Experiencer adjective.

(64)

Hanako-wa uresi-i

yo.

Hanako-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres SFP
‘Hanako is glad.’

If the Experiencer, Hanako, is not the speaker, this sentence is not felicitously assertable, as
reviewed in the previous chapter. But by what mechanism does such a sentence become
unacceptable? In the following, I claim that if the Experiencer is not the speaker, unmarked54
Experiencer sentences in the reportive style have no truth-value, and give a compositional
semantics to treat Experiencer sentences.
My proposal is that the unacceptability of the Experiencer sentence is of a kind similar to
that of sentences with first person pronouns which are used to refer to non-speakers. First person
pronouns cannot be used to refer to non-speakers, as shown by the following assertions by John.

(65)

(Scenario: John is speaking.)
a. *I (pointing to Taro) painted the picture.
b. I (pointing to John himself) painted the picture.

Assertion (65a) is absurd. According to the traditional presuppositional analysis of features on
referential pronouns (Cooper 1983, Dowty and Jacobson 1989, Heim and Kratzer 1998, Büring

54

The term ‘unmarked’ is defined in section 2.3.1.
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2005, Heim 2008, Kratzer 2009 and others), in which features denote a partial identity function as
in (66), the absurdness of John’s assertion (65) is a result of the truth-value gap.

(66)

a. [[ [female] ]]g,c = λx: x is female . x
b. [[ [1st] ]]g,c = λx: x includes the speaker in c. x

(Kratzer 2009: 219(68))

Because Taro is not the speaker, the meaning of “I” in (65) is undefined. Consequently, the
meaning of the whole sentence is undefined. This is the source of the absurdness of (65a).
In the following, I present an analysis which treats absurdness of unmarked Experiencer
sentences with non-speaker Experiencers (namely the Experiencer restriction) in a similar way.
That is, the analysis treats the absurdness of such sentences as a result of a truth-value gap.55
Then, naïvely it is supposed that the Experiencer (or the Experiencer role introducer) has
a presupposition similar to the first person pronoun as in (67). Here, I give an interpretation of the
Experiencer role introducer in the neo-Davidsonian framework, assuming that the Experiencer
role introducer is a two-place predicate. In the following sections, the meaning of the Experiencer
role is included in the meaning of Experiencer predicates for ease of presentation. Let us call it
the ‘first-person presuppositional analysis’.

(67)

[[ Exp ]]g,c = λe.λx: x is the speaker in c. Exp(x,e)

55

Admittedly, it is not true that every absurd sentence is truth-value-less. Let us consider (i), for example.
Gajewski (2002, 2009), Fox and Hackl (2006), Singh (2008), Magri (2009), Abrusán (2011) and others
propose that such tautological or contradictory sentences are ungrammatical in virtue of their logical
structure.
(i) a. *There is every curious student.
(Gajewski 2009:1(1c))
b. *Some student but Sue passed the exam.
(Gajewski 2009:2(4a))
Most Experiencer sentences, however, cannot be taken to be tautological or contradictory. For example, (ii)
is true if Hanako is the speaker and she was glad at the time under discussion, and is false if Hanako is the
speaker and she was not glad at the time under discussion. So, it is not tautological or contradictory.
(ii) Hanako-wa uresi-k-at-ta
yo.
Hanako-Top glad-Pred-be-Past SFP
‘Hanako was glad.’

48

Then unmarked Experiencer sentences have no truth value and so are absurd if the Experiencer is
not the speaker.
There are, however, two problems which we need to overcome in order to construct such
an analysis of the Experiencer restriction.
The first problem is that the first-person presuppositional analysis given in (67) cannot
cover all Experiencers. (67) takes it for granted that there is a speaker in the context when an
Experiencer is introduced. However, in third-person narrative, for example, there is no speaker in
the narrated context (Benveniste 1959, Kuroda 1973, Banfield 1982 among others). It is true that
the narrator is the speaker of the narrative in the actual context, but he is not the speaker in the
narrated context. He is not present in the third-person narrative. To deal with such a ‘speaker-less’
context, it is necessary to modify the first-person presupposition in (65) in some way.
The second problem is that the first-person presuppositional analysis does not explain the
absence of the Experiencer restriction in some embedded clauses. Note that in the case of firstperson pronouns, the first-person restriction is active in any clause. In other words, the referent of
a first-person pronoun “I” in any clause is restricted to the speaker in the actual context. For
example, (68) shows that the referent of first-person pronouns in a clause under a verb of speech
and a verb of thought is restricted to the speaker in the actual context.

(68)

(Scenario: John is speaking.)
a. *Mary {said/thought} that I (pointing to Taro) painted the picture.
b. Mary {said/thought} that I (pointing to John himself) painted the picture.

On the other hand, the Experiencer restriction is active in a clause under a verb of speech, while it
is not active in a clause under a verb of thought, as exemplified in (69).
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(69)

Mary-wa [John-ga

uresi-k-at-ta-to]

{*it /omot}-tei-ru.

Mary-Top [John-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] {*say/think}-Perf-Pres
‘Mary {*says/thinks} that John was glad.’

In this chapter, I propose an analysis in which a presupposition on the Experiencer and a
presupposition on the assertive Force lead to the desired truth-value gap as a net effect, using the
possibilistic situation semantics. In this analysis, the presupposition on the Experiencer is not
dependent on a speaker, so the first problem mentioned above is overcome. The dependency on
the speaker is introduced by the presupposition on the assertive Force, which appears only in a
clause which has a speaker. I will show that disappearance of the Experiencer restriction in many
clauses is a result of the absence of the assertive Force.
In the following three sections (3.2, 3.3, and 3.4), I propose that Experiencers are mental
locations, and consider their situation semantic treatment as well as their presupposition. Then, in
section 3.5, I propose a presupposition of the assertive Force.

3.2 Experiencers as mental locations
It is often the case that psychological predicates have periphrastic counterparts which
contain locative prepositions.

(70)

a. Nina is in love (with Paul).
b. There is in me a great admiration for painters.
(Arad 1998, 228(83))

This observation is not limited to English, as shown in (71) - (74).
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(71)

Irish
a. Tá fuath do Y ag X.
is hatred to

at

‘X hates Y.’

(McCloskey & Sells 1988:181(76a))

b. Tá eagla roimh Y ar X.
is fear before

on

‘X is afraid of Y.’

(72)

(McCloskey & Sells 1988:181(77a))

French
a. Paul a

mis Marie en colére.

‘Paul has put Mary in rage.’

(Varchetta 2010:131 n.20)

b. Cela a éveillé en Pierre une rage terrible.
‘That awoke in Pierre a terrible rage.’

(73)

(Bouchard 1995:275(35a))

Italian
a. Il professore di matematica mette sempre paura ai suoi alunni, a prescindere.
the professor of Maths

put

always fear

to his pupils irrespectively
(Varchetta 2010:131(34b))

b. La preoccupazione (per l’esame di domani)

è in

Marco.

the preoccupation (for the exam of tomorrow) is inside Marco
(Varchetta 2010:138(54b))

(74)

Hebrew
a. yeš

be-Gil eyva gdola klapey soxney bituax.

there-is in-Gil rancor great toward agents-of insurance
‘Gil has a great rancor toward insurance agents.’
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(Landau 2010: 11(16a))

b. yeš

be-tox Rina tšuka amitit le-omanut.

there-is inside Rina passion real to-art
‘Inside Rina there is a real passion for art.’

Japanese also conforms to the observation, as in (75).

(75)

a. sono sûgaku-no kyôzyu-wa

gakusei-ni

{osore/zôo/zisin}-o

that math-Gen professor-Top student-into {fear/hatred/confidence}-Acc
hukikom-u.
breathe-Pres
‘The professor of Math puts {fear/hatred/confidence} into his students.’
b. Taro-wa Hanako-o

{kyôhu/huan}-ni

otosiire-ta.

Taro-Top Hanako-Acc {fear/uneasiness}-into put-Past
‘Taro {terrified/worried} Hanako.’

The observation backs a claim that psychological predicates express locative relations
between the Experiencer and mental states (Jackendoff 1990, Bouchard 1995, Arad 1998, Landau
2010, and Varchetta 2010, 2012). Jackendoff (1990) suggests that Experiencers are represented as
locations in conceptual structure (“location of the fear, pleasure, and so forth”). For example, he
supposes that the meaning of x frighten y is represented as in (76a), which is translated as in (76b).

(76)

a. [CS+ ([X]α, [INCH [BE ({FEAR ([α])], [AT [Y]])]])]
b. X causes fear of X to come to be in Y
(Jackendoff 1990: 300 n.4)
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Arad (1998) claims that “the experiencer is either conceived as the stuff contained in the mental
state […] or the container in which the mental states resides”, and Varchetta (2010, 2012) also
makes a similar proposal. Landau (2010) proposes that Experiencers are mental locations, by
arguing that all object Experiencers are oblique (or dative) and that Experiencers undergo
“locative inversion”. In the case of Experiencer subjects, Irish (McCloskey and Sells 1988),
Scottish Gaelic (Landau 2010, referring to G. Ramchand), Marathi (Pandharipande 1990), and
Malayalam (Mohanan and Mohanan 1990) typically mark Experiencer subjects with dative case
or a locative adposition.56 Similarly, Japanese Experiencer arguments of Experiencer predicates
show nominative-dative alternation (Kuno 1973 and many others), as in (77).57 Note that the
‘dative marker’ -ni is a locative postposition, as shown in (78).

(77)

a. watasi-ga samu-k-at-ta.
I-Nom

cold-Pred-be-Past

‘I was cold.’
b. watasi-ni-wa samu-k-at-ta.
I-Dat-Top

cold-Pred-be-Past

‘It was cold for me.’

(78)

a. gakkô-ni-wa

ôkina tosyokan-ga at-ta.

school-Loc-Top large library-Nom be-Past
56

English Experiencer subjects are always marked with nominative case, but they introduce a path, as a
source or a goal, different from non-Experiencer subjects (Speas 1990). It suggests that English also treats
Experiencer subjects as locations.
(i) a. I got angry but it went away.
b. ??I laughed but it went away.
(Landau 2010:13(22a,b))
(ii) a. I tried to remember his name, but it wouldn’t come to me.
b. ??I tried to write his name, but it wouldn’t come to me.
(Speas 1990:(7))
57
The nominative Exp construction is used when there is no theme argument, while the Exp-ni-wa
construction is used when there is an implied or explicit theme argument. See Azuma (1997b) for details.
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‘In the school, there was a large library.’
b. watasi-wa gakkô-ni it-ta.
I-Top

school-to go-Past

‘I went to school.’

Based on these observations and claims, I suppose that Experiencers, including Japanese
ones, are mental locations.

3.3 Situation semantics of ordinary locations
In this section, I give a situation semantic analysis of ordinary (i.e., non-mental) locations,
as a preliminary to a semantic analysis of mental locations.

3.3.1 Semantics of locations
Semantic similarities between time and space are repeatedly noted in the literature
(Castañeda (1967, 1987, 1989), Kaplan (1989), Perry (1979), von Stechow (1982), Newen (1997)
and others). On the other hand, there is an apparent asymmetry between time and space in syntax:
tense is syntactically realized as inflection but space is not. Actually, however, there are
languages which have space inflection. For example, Nez Perce has space inflection markers,
cislocative (proximal) -m and translocative (distal) -ki, which appear between aspect and tense
inflection markers, and Deal (2008) argues that space inflection and tense inflection work
independently to locate the topic time (Klein 1994) and the topic location in the language. More
concretely, in her analysis, tense is treated as a modifier of situations which restricts the topic
situation with respect to the temporal axis, and space is treated as a modifier of situations which
restricts the topic situation with respect to the spatial axis. Thus, tense and space are treated on a
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par in her analysis. Following her approach in the spirit, let us consider semantics of some nonExperiencer sentences in this section.

3.3.2 Root clauses
Following Kratzer (2004, 2007) and Schwarz (2009, 2012), I suppose that a topic
situation is introduced by a syntactic head. In the framework of possibilistic situation semantics
(Kratzer 2014), Schwarz (2009) proposes the following lexical entry for such a head (he attributes
it to Kratzer 2008).58

(79)

[[ Topic ]]g,c = λp.λs′.λs. [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]

(Schwarz 2009: 93(104))

Here, ≈ represents the counterpart relation (Lewis 1986).59 This head takes a proposition and a
topic situation, and yields a set of all the counterparts of the topic situation where the proposition
holds.
Following Deal (2008), I treat tense as a temporal modifier of situations. Using the
temporal precedence relation < and the inclusion relation , past tense and present tense can be
represented as follows.

(80)

a. [[ past ]]g = λs. s < s*
b. [[ present ]]g = λs. s*  s

58

In Kratzer 2004, the topic situation is introduced by a head called ‘Assert’. In Kratzer 2007 and Schwarz
2009, 2012, it is introduced by a head called ‘Topic’.
59
A speaker who is talking about a situation (namely a topic situation) cannot know whether the topic
situation is actual or not because humans are not omniscient. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that what
the speaker is saying about is not a property of a topic situation (which may be non-actual) but a property
of the set of counterparts of a topic situation (which includes the topic situation in the actual world).
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Here, s* means the utterance situation.
For example, let us consider the following sentence.

(81)

Brahms died in 1897.

We can represent the lexical entry for a verb die as in (82).

(82)

[[ die ]]g = λx.λs. x dies in s

The LF of (81) is calculated as in (83).60 Here, t means a temporal inclusion relation.

TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and Brahms died in s and s t 1897 and s < s*

sTop Topic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and Brahms died in s and s t 1897 and s < s*


 Topic TP: λs. Brahms died in s and s t 1897 and s < s*
λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]

T
VP
|
λs. Brahms died in s and s t 1897
past

λs.s < s*
PP
VP
λs.s t 1897
λs. Brahms died in s


in 1897
NP
V

|
Brahms
died: λx.λs. x died in s
(83)

It represents the truth condition that the sentence is true if Brahms died in 1897 and it happened
earlier than the utterance time, as desired.

60

In this section, contribution of viewpoint aspects is set aside. This point will be treated in section 3.6.1.
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Locative modification is calculated similarly as temporal modification. Let us consider
the following example.

(84)

Brahms died in Vienna.

Its LF is calculated as follows. Here, sp means a spatial inclusion relation.

TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna and s < s*

sTop Topic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna and s < s*


 Topic TP: λs. Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna and s < s*
λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]

T
VP
|
λs. Brahms died in s and s sp Vienna
past

λs. s < s*
PP
VP
λs. s sp Vienna
λs. Brahms died in s


in Vienna
NP
V

|
Brahms
died: λx.λs. x died in s
(85)

It represents that Brahms died in Vienna and it happened earlier than the utterance time, as
desired.
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3.3.3 Non-root clauses: clauses under attitude verbs, clauses under epistemic modals, and
relative clauses
3.3.3.1 Attitude ascriptions
De re attitude ascriptions are about a topic situation61 (Kratzer 1998, 2004, 2007, 2014).
For example, to believe a proposition p (in de re reading) is to believe that p about a topic
situation s. The topic situation is also called a res argument. In other words, the lexical entry of
believe can be written as in (86), where s′ is a res argument.

(86)

[[ believe ]] = λpλs′λxλs [x believes p of s′ in s]

(Kratzer 2004)

Let us consider (87) and calculate its meaning for illustration.

(87)

John thinks that Brahms is alive.

Its LF is calculated as follows. Here, pBia is a shorthand for the proposition, λs.[Brahms is alive in
s & s*  s].
61

The following story about the butler and the judge (Kratzer 1998:185) illustrates that attitude ascriptions
are about some topic situation:
Suppose the judge fell into a ditch, drunk, head first. A passer-by pulled him out, took him to the
hospital, and disappeared. The judge was unconscious, and had no recollection of the incident. The
hospital staff gave only a vague description of the man who saved the judge’s life. Miles away, not
knowing about the mishap, the judge's butler reads a false report on the financial situation of his
master. Close to bankruptcy, he had allegedly approached a wealthy man (whose name was not
disclosed) to help him out, threatening that he would commit suicide if the financial collapse
couldn’t be avoided. The report closed by mentioning that some public figure saved the judge
from financial ruin, and thereby saved his life. The butler suspected that it was Milford. Returning
to his village, the butler meets a group of men discussing the judge’s accident. Not paying much
attention, the butler thinks the men are talking about the judge’s financial traumas. He eventually
mentions his suspicion that Milford saved the judge’s life. The next day, when everybody was
speculating about who had taken the judge to the hospital, and thereby saved the judge’s life, it
was reported that the butler suspected that it was MILFORD who saved the judge’s life.
The fact that the last sentence has an interpretation in which it is false indicates that the attitude ascription
is about some particular situation, which specifies the situation in which the judge’s life is saved.
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TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and John believes pBia of sres in s and s*  s

sTop Topic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and John believes pBia of sres in s′ and s*  s′


 Topic TP: λs. John believes pBia of sres in s and s*  s
λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]

T
VP: λs. John believes pBia of sres in s
|

pres
NP
V′ : λx.λs. x believes pBia of sres in s]
λs. s*  s |

John sres
V′: λs′λxλs. x believes pBia of s′ in s

V
CP: pBia
|

believe Brahms is alive
λpλs′λxλs [x believes p of s′ in s]
(88)

3.3.3.2 Epistemic modals
Epistemic modals are quantifiers over situations. For example, the lexical entries for
might and must are given as follows.

(89)

a. [[ might ]]c = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ]

(Kratzer 2014: (18a))

b. [[ must ]]c = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ]

Here, Acc means an accessibility relation: Accc(s)(s′) means that s′ is an alternative of s in view
of the information available in a context c. The information available in c yields different flavors
of modals.
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3.3.3.3 Relative clauses
It is plausible that relative clauses also introduce a topic situation (Schwarz 2012). To
show that, let us consider (90), for example.

(90)

John met the man who saved the judge’s life.

An available reading of (90) is that there is an individual who saved the judge’s life at a particular
situation and John met the person at a different situation (which is the topic situation of the root
clause). So, I suppose that relative clauses have a TopicP, which introduces a topic situation.
For example, an LF for the relative clause in (90) is calculated as follows.

(91) 

λx.λs. s ≈ sTop and x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s*

λx
TopicP: λs. s ≈ sTop and x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s*

sTopTopic′: λs′.λs. s ≈ s′ and x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s*


  
Topic TP: λs. x saved the judge’s life in s and s < s*
λp λs′ λs [s ≈ s′ & p(s)] 
T
VP: λs. x saved the judge’s life in s
|

past
NP
V′ : λy.λs. y saved the judge’s life in s
λs. s < s*
|

x
saved the judge’s life





It means that x’s saving the judge happened in a counterpart of sTop. sTop can be different from the
matrix topic situation, which is provided by a TopicP in the matrix clause, so the reading
mentioned above is obtained: the situation where the man saved the judge’s life and the situation
where John met the man are different.
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3.4 Situation semantics of mental locations: proposal
In this section, I propose a situation semantics of mental locations.
As I stated in section 3.2, I suppose that Experiencers are mental locations, based on the
works of Jackendoff (1990), Landau (2010) and others. Concretely, I propose the following.

(92)

Similarly to external events and states which happen in situations which have an
extension in the spatial axis, experiences such as fear and pleasure happen in situations
which have an extension in the mental axis. Mental locations are minds of sentient
individuals.

The set of mental locations can be regarded as the so-called “phenomenal space” in the
philosophy of consciousness62. Especially, the idea that there is a different axis for consciousness
from the axes for space-time is advanced by Smythies (2003).
The notion of ‘mental location’ is formalized as follows. I define the set of mental
locations Dm as the difference of the set of locations, Dl, and the set of physical locations Dph:

(93)

Definition of the set of mental locations Dm
Dm := Dl − Dph

The elements of Dm are called mental locations. I assume that Dm forms a join-semilattice63 Dm,
 which is isomorphic to the join-semilattice of sentient individuals in discourse, Dsen,.
Letting μ be the lattice isomorphism from Dsen,  to Dm,  and a be an element in Dsen, I call
the element μ(a) a’s mind. For example, suppose that John and Mary are sentient individuals in
62
63

For example, see Huemer (2011) for a review of the sense data theory.
For lattices, see, e.g., Partee, ter Meulen, and Wall (1993).
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discourse. Then, Dsen consists of three elements, John, Mary, and JohnMary, and the lattice
isomorphism μ maps these elements to John’s mind, Mary’s mind, and John’s mindMary’s
mind in Dm, respectively:

μ

(94)
JohnMary
 
John
Mary





Dsen,

John’s mindMary’s mind


John’s mind
Mary’s mind
Dm,

In this case, the set of locations, Dl, consists of John’s mind, Mary’s mind, John’s mindMary’s
mind, and the physical locations.
Note that (95) holds because μ is the lattice isomorphism between Dsen,  and Dm, ).

(95)

i. For a, b  Dsen, a  b  μ(a)  μ(b),
ii. For μ(a), μ(b)  Dm, μ(a)  μ(b)  a  b.

As the function t which maps an eventuality (event or state) s to its temporal interval, t(s),
it is possible to suppose a function l which maps a situation to its location. Letting Ds be the set of
situations, l is given as in (96).

(96)

l: Ds → Dl

I assume that the location function l is total. Furthermore, I assume that it preserves the inclusion
relation between situations:
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(97)

s1  s2  l(s1)  l(s2)

I suppose that Experiencer expressions specify the location of the described situation,
based on the assumption that the Experiencer argument is a locative. But there is one twist. The
specification of mental situations by Experiencers is a presupposition, not part of the at-issue
content. Otherwise, it does not yield a truth-value gap which explains the absurdness of sentences
which does not satisfy the condition on the Experiencer. In this respect, Experiencers are similar
to tenses in some theories, in which tenses are supposed to be presuppositional. Kratzer (1998a)
advances analogies between tenses and pronouns, which were first observed by Partee (1973),
and proposes the following lexical entries for English present and past tenses (she considers a
zero tense also, which is omitted here).

(98)

a. [[ present ]]g,c is only defined if c provides an interval t that includes t0 (the utterance
time). If defined, then [[ present ]]g,c = t.
b. [[ past ]]g,c is only defined if c provides an interval t that precedes t0. If defined, then
[[ past ]]g,c = t.

(from Kratzer (1998a: 101))

For example, let us consider a sentence, Tarô-wa uresi-i (‘Taro is glad’). What I propose is that
the Experiencer argument is tied to a definedness condition on the expressed proposition, as in
(99).

(99)

[[ uresi- ]] = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s

In this formulation, ‘Taro is glad’ means ‘gladness is at s’ if the location of s is Taro’s mind, and
has no truth-value otherwise.
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Note that a sentient individual a cannot have direct evidence of a situation s, namely that
a cannot claim to have perceived s (Willett 1988), if the location of s is not in Dph  {μ(a)}. It is
because one cannot perceive feelings and thoughts of others. (The same point is discussed in Sun
1993 and Garrett 2001 in terms of ‘observability’.) Thus, the following relations hold.

(100)

For a  Dsen and a situation s,
a can directly witness s  s is observable to a  l(s)  Dph  {μ(a)}

3.5 Assertion and mental locations
I suppose that assertion imposes a condition on topic situations in Japanese. In prose, my
concrete proposal is (101).

(101)

In Japanese, assertion requires the location of the topic situation, if it is mental, to be
the speaker’s mind.

English assertion does not impose such a condition on topic situations, so the Experiencer
restriction does not emerge in English.
Formally, my proposal is represented as follows. As stated in section 3.3.2, a topic
situation is introduced by a Topic as in (79), which is reproduced as (102) below:

(102)

[[ Topic ]]g,c = λp.λs′.λs. [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]

(Schwarz 2009: 93(104))

The lexical entry for Assert, which is a SA head of assertive sentences, is given as in (103).

(103)

[[ Assert ]]g,c = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. p(s)
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Schematically, combination of a TopicP and a SAP yields the following meaning, using (102) and
(103).

(104)

SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)]

Assert
TopicP: λs. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)]

sTop
Topic′: λs′.λs. [s ≈ s′ & p(s)]

Topic
TP: λs.p(s)

The definedness condition restricts the situations which are counterparts of the topic situation to
situations whose location is physical or is the speaker’s mind.
From the next section, let us see how the restriction imposed by Assert and the
presupposition of Experiencer adjectives yield the observed Experiencer restriction.

3.6 The Experiencer restrictions in root clauses
3.6.1 The Experiencer restrictions in root clauses in the reportive style
First, let us consider a simple root clause, (105). It is not felicitously assertable because it
has a non-speaker Experiencer.

(105)

(When the speaker is not Taro)
*Tarô-wa uresi-i

yo.

Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres SFP
(Intended:) ‘Taro is glad.’
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To analyze this example, let us look at a detailed analysis of the Japanese tense-aspect system by
Kiyota (2008).
According to a comparative study of Japanese and Salish aspects (viewpoint aspects and
Aktionsarten) by Kiyota (2008), Japanese does not have standard viewpoint aspects such as
perfective and imperfective, different from Salish, English, and other languages. It does not mean
that Japanese just lacks pronounced standard viewpoint aspect markers. Instead, he claims that
compositional semantics of the temporal interpretation of Japanese sentences does not involve the
standard viewpoint aspects, and speculates that Japanese does not have the functional projection
for them.
Kiyota’s analysis is based on Pancheva’s (2003) proposal of the ramified aspect system.
It is often the case that Perfect is treated on a par with standard viewpoint aspects (Giorgi and
Pianesi 1998, von Stechow 2002, among others), but Pancheva argues that Perfect’s various
interpretations (universal, experiential, and resultative) are consequences of compositional
semantics of Perfect and viewpoint aspects, supposing that Perfect is not a viewpoint aspect but
selects for a viewpoint aspect phrase. In her analysis, the aspect phrase consists of two AspPs, the
lower one for viewpoint aspects, and the higher one for Perfect, as in (106).
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(106)

TP

T
AspP1


[PAST] /
Asp1
AspP2
[PRESENT] /
 


[FUTURE]
[PERFECT]
Asp2
vP
|
|
[(UN)BOUNDED] / Aktionsart
[NEUTRAL] /
[RESULTATIVE]
(based on Pancheva 2003: 284(9a)64)

The [BOUNDED] and [UNBOUNDED] features correspond to the perfective and imperfective
viewpoint aspects, respectively. [NEUTRAL] corresponds to the neutral viewpoint aspect, which
is adopted from Smith (1997), and [RESULTATIVE] corresponds to the resultative viewpoint
aspect, which is a new viewpoint aspect introduced by Pancheva to account for the resultative
interpretation of Perfect.
A Japanese aspect marker -tei- has a progressive, a resultative, and an experiential perfect
interpretation. Kiyota (2008) argues that -tei- is a Perfect marker and the various interpretations
of -tei- are consequences of the combination of various Aktionsarten and the semantics and
pragmatics of the Perfect marker -tei-. Importantly, the calculation of the interpretations does not
involve viewpoint aspects. In this respect, the Japanese aspect is different from that of Salish,
English and other languages (Kiyota notes that Icelandic may have a similar aspect system as
Japanese). In his analysis, Japanese TP has the following structure (here, I use the head-initial
order for ease of comparison).
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The tree in Pancheva (2003:284(9a)) does not include the RESUTATIVE viewpoint aspect, which is
introduced later in the same paper .
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(107)

TP

T
AspP1


[PAST] /
Asp1
vP
[PRESENT]
|
|
[PERFECT]
Aktionsart



Semantically, the Japanese Perfect relates events to a topic time. (The function of relating events
to a topic time is assigned to viewpoint aspects in English, Salish and other languages.) Kiyota
proposes the following meaning for predicates and Perfect -tei-.

(108) a. Homogeneous states: λe.P(e)
b. Inchoative states: λe. e1 e2[e=S(e1  e2)  (BECOME(P))(e1)  P(e2)]
c. Activities: λe. e1 e2[e=S(e1  e2)  (BECOME(P))(e1)  DO(P))(e2)]
d. Achievements: λe. (BECOME(P))(e)
e. (Non-culminating)65 accomplishments: λe. e1 e2[e=S(e1  e2)  (BECOME(P))(e1) 
DO(P))(e2) & [w′ [w′ is an inertia world w.r.t. w at the beginning of e → [e′ [e′ is a
culmination of e in w′ & e causes e′ in w′ ]]]]
(Kiyota 2008: 217(6))

(109)

[[ -tei- ]] = λP.λe.λt.e′. [ e′  e & τ(e′) < t & P(e)]

(Kiyota 2008: 225(16))

Here, e=S(e1  e2) means that e is a complex event which is the sum of two sub-events, e1 and e2.
Note that the Japanese Perfect relates an event to the topic time.
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The culmination of accomplishments is not entailed but implicated in Japanese. See Kiyota (2008) for
details.
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Now, let us calculate the meaning of a simple Experience sentence, based on this analysis
of the Japanese tense-aspect system. Unfortunately, Kiyota presents calculations of only
sentences with the Perfect marker -tei-. What happens when the Perfect marker is absent? In the
case of English and Salish, we can suppose that Asp1 does not have semantic/pragmatic
contribution when a Perfect marker is absent. However, in the case of Japanese, we need an
element which relates events (situations) to a topic time, when a Perfect marker is absent. It is
because standard viewpoint aspects relates an event to a reference time and Perfect relates a
reference time to a topic time in English and Salish while Japanese has no viewpoint aspect and
Perfect relates an event to a topic time. From the parsimony, I suppose that sentences without the
Japanese Perfect marker -tei- contain a covert Asp1 element Asp which relates an event
(situation) to a topic time as follows.

[[ Asp ]] = λP.λe.λt.[τ(e) = t & P(e)]

(110)

This aspectual element yields correct interpretations. For example, let us consider the
following sentence, which contains an achievement verb tuk-u ‘arrive/reach’. It represents a
completed event, as the badness of the continuation in (111) shows.

(111)

Tarô-wa tui-ta.

(#Sikasi, mada tui-tei-na-i.)

Taro-Top arrive-Past (#But

yet

arrive-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres)

‘Taro arrived. (#But he has not yet arrived.)’

The past tense morpheme represents a precedence relation between the topic time and the
utterance time. I assume the following lexical entry. Here, < represents the temporal precedence
relation.
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(112)

[[ -ta ]] = λe.λt. t < t*
where t* means the utterance time.

Then the logical form of TP, Tarô-wa tui-ta ‘Taro arrived’, is calculated as follows.

(113)

TP: λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)]

T
AspP1:

λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)]
-ta

[[ -ta ]] = λe.λt. t < t* Asp1:
vP: λe.BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)
|




Asp
Taro-ga tuiλP.λe.λt.[τ(e) = t & P(e)]

Finally, by applying declarative operator (114) to (113), we obtain the interpretation of the
sentence, (115).

(114)

The declarative operator: λP e[P(e)]

(115)

λt.e.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BECOME-ARRIVE(e) & Th(Taro,e)]

(Krifka 1989: 90)

It means that there is an event of Taro’s arriving and it occurred before the utterance time.
As another example, let us consider the following sentence, which contains a stative
predicate. It does not have implication about completion of the event.

(116)

Tarô-wa Amherst-ni i-ta.

({Ima-mo i-ru

/ Ima-wa

Taro-Top Amherst-in exist-Past ({now-also exist-Pres/ now-Top
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i-na-i}.)
exist-Neg-Pred.be.Pres})
‘Taro was in Amherst. ({He is still there / He is not there now}.)’

The logical form of TP, Tarô-wa Amherst-ni i-ta ‘Taro was in Amherst’, is calculated in the same
way as above.

(117)

TP: λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)]

T
AspP1:

λe.λt.[τ(e)=t & BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)]
-ta

[[ -ta ]] = λe.λt. t < t* Asp1:
vP: λe.BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)
|



Asp
Tarô-wa Amherst-ni i-ta
λP.λe.λt.[τ(e) = t & P(e)]

Adding the declarative operator, we obtain the interpretation of the sentence.

(118)

λt.e.[τ(e)=t & t < t* & BE.IN.AMHERST(e) & Th(Taro,e)]

It means that there is an event (state) of Taro’s being in Amherst and it occurred before the
utterance time. Note that the endpoints of the state of being in Amherst are not included in the
state represented by the stative, Amherst-ni i- ‘be in Amherst’, and also that the meaning of the
null aspect Asp does not require the endpoints of the state of being in Amherst to be included in
the topic time.66 Therefore, it does not have any implication on completion of the state, in
accordance with the data.
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The reader may recall Smith’s (1997) analysis of English (perfective) statives and French perfective
statives. Smith claims that in English, statives are accompanied with the perfective viewpoint aspect and
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Now, based on the viewpoint-aspect-less system, let us consider a sentence with an
Experiencer adjective and derive the Experiencer restriction. As Strawson (1950) claims, one
cannot assert a sentence with no truth value felicitously. The goal here is to show that the logical
form of a sentence with a non-speaker Experiencer does not have a truth value.
Before considering a specific example, let us translate the above semantics using
situation semantic terms. Note that the sole function of Asp was to convert events to their times
and dissolve the type mismatch. Because in situation semantics the notion of the topic time is
extended to the topic situation, aspects relate an event/situation to a situation. So the meaning of
Asp becomes trivial (at least) for statives (now the meaning of the declarative operator,
existential quantification over events, is included in that of Asp):

(119) a. [[ Asp ]] = λp.λs.p(s)

if the predicate is stative67

The meaning of tense morphemes can be given as in (120).

(120) a. Past tense: [[ -ta ]] = λs. τ(s) < t*
b. Present tense: [[ -ru,  ]] = λs. t*  τ(s)

Using these lexical entries, let us consider (105), which is reproduced below.

(105)

(When the speaker is not Taro)

that the perfective viewpoint aspect of English statives does not require the endpoints of the state to be
included in the topic time. Contrastively, she claims, the perfective viewpoint aspect of French statives
require the endpoints of the state to be included in the topic time. My analysis, therefore, is somewhat
similar to Smith’s analysis of English statives.
67
Events can be seen as situations which exemplify the expressed proposition (Kratzer 2014). When the
predicate is a stative, any situation on which the proposition holds exemplifies the proposition, so we can
simply replace events with situations.
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*Tarô-wa uresi-i

yo.

Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres SFP
(Intended:) ‘Taro is glad.’

Its logical form is calculated as follows.

(121)

SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*  τ(s)
& gladness is at s]

Assert TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s]

sTop Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s]

Topic
TP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s′ 68

Pres
AspP1: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s
λs. t*  τ(s) 
Asp1
VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s
|

Asp
V
PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s


-i69 NP
Pred′: λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s
‘is’
|

Tarô
uresi-k70
‘glad’

Let us confirm that the logical form does not have a truth value for any situation as long as the
speaker is not Taro. From the definedness conditions of Assert and Experiencer predicates, the
logical form can have a truth value only for a situation s whose location is physical or the
Here, the logical form for AspP1 and that for Pres are both of type s,t, and are combined by Predicate
Modification rule. Though the logical form for Pres is defined for any s, the logical form for AspP1 is
defined only for s such that l(s) = μ(Taro). So the logical form for the combination of AspP 1 and Pres is
also defined only for s such that l(s) = μ(Taro).
69
The be-verb -i ‘is’ is a raising verb (Kawai 2006b, 2008), as its English counterpart. I suppose that it
raises to T.
70
The combination of the Predication head -k and the be-verb in the present tense is realized as -i, so -k
does not appear in the surface form. For details on this point, see Nishiyama (1999), who analyzes the
inflectional endings of Japanese adjectives using Distributed Morphology.
68
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speaker’s mind (l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}), and is also Taro’s mind (l(s) = μ(Taro)). These two
conditions can be satisfied only if the speaker is Taro. It is the desired result: the infelicity of
assertion of the sentence when the speaker is not Taro is a reflection of the truth-value gap of the
sentence.71,72

71

If the relation between s and sTop is not a counterpart relation as given in (102) but an inclusion relation
as in (i), the logical form has a truth value for some situations even if the speaker is not Taro, against the
expectation, but it can be fixed by supposing that the inclusion relation is part of the presupposition, not
part of the at-issue content.
(i) [[ Topic ]]c = λp.λs′.λs. s′  s & p(s′)
First, let us see that this meaning of Topic does not yield a truth gap which corresponds to the
Experiencer restriction. For example, the logical form of the example sentence, (105), is as follows.
(ii) [[ SAP ]]c = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [sTop  s & t*  τ(sTop) & gladness is at sTop],
if l(sTop) = μ(Taro). # otherwise.
For any mental situation whose location is the speaker’s mind, if the location of the topic situation is Taro’s
mind, the logical form has a truth value. Importantly, the two definedness conditions, l(s) Dph 
{μ(speaker(c))} and l(sTop) = μ(Taro), are imposed on different situations. So, even if the speaker and Taro
are not the same individual, the logical form can have a truth value. Thus, it does not explain the
Experiencer restriction.
Next, let us see that if the inclusion relation is part of the presupposition as in (iii), the logical form of
sentences have a truth gap which corresponds to the Experiencer restriction.
(iii) [[ Topic ]]c = λp.λs′.λs: s′  s. p(s′)
With (iii), the logical form of the example sentence, (105), becomes as follows.
(iv) [[ SAP ]]c = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & sTop  s. [ t*  τ(sTop) & gladness is at sTop],
if l(sTop) = μ(Taro). # otherwise.
This logical form has a truth value only for a situation which satisfies (iii) and (iv).
(v) l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & sTop  s
(vi) l(sTop) = μ(Taro)
These two conditions can be satisfied only by a situation s whose location is the speaker’s mind and which
includes sTop whose location is Taro’s mind. Such a situation can exist only when the speaker is Taro,
because the location function l preserves the inclusion relation between situations. This means that (105)
has a truth value only when the speaker is Taro, and it explains the Experiencer restriction.
72
If the contribution of the Experincer, l(s) = μ(x), is not a presupposition but a part of the at-issue content
as in (i), the right truth-value gap is not produced.
(i) [[ uresi- ]] = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x) & gladness is at s
To see that, let us consider the logical form for the example sentence, (105), which is as follows.
(ii) [[ SAP ]]c = λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [l(s) = μ(Taro) & s ≈ sTop & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s]
The definedness condition of this logical form is satisfied if s is a situation whose location is physical or is
the speaker’s mind. Thus, if the location of s is μ(speaker(c)) and the speaker is not Taro, then the logical
form has a truth-value (the truth-value is false because the situation falsifies the relation l(s) = μ(Taro)). It
does not fit with the judgment of the sentence.
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3.6.2 The Experiencer restriction in negated root clauses in reportive style
Next, let us consider a negated root clause, (122). The negated sentence is not felicitously
assertable if Taro is not the speaker, similarly to the affirmative counterpart.

(122)

(When the speaker is not Taro)
*Tarô-wa uresi-ku na-i

yo.

Taro-Top glad-Pred Neg-Pred.be.Pres SFP
(Intended:) ‘Taro is not glad.’

The calculation goes as follows.

(123)



SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*  τ(s) &
¬ (gladness is at s)]

Assert TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*  τ(s) & ¬ (gladness is at s)]

sTop Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & ¬ (gladness is at s)]

Topic
TP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). t*  τ(s) & ¬(gladness is at s′)

Pres
NegP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). ¬ (gladness is at s)
λs. t*  τ(s) 
Neg
AspP1: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s
|

na- Asp1
VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s
‘not’
|

λp.λs.¬p(s) Asp
V
PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s



-i
NP
Pred′:
‘is’
|
λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s
Tarô

 






uresi-k
‘glad’
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This calculation yields the correct interpretation of (122). The logical form has a truth value only
if Taro is the speaker, and has the value 1 if Taro is not glad at the utterance time.

3.6.3 Absence of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in the nonreportive style
Next, let us consider a root clause in the nonreportive style. As stated above, a root clause
in the nonreportive style does not restrict an Experiencer inside of it. Let us take (124) for
illustration.

(124)

(In third-person narrative)
Tarô-wa uresi-k-at-ta.
Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past
‘Taro was glad.’

Its logical form is calculated as follows. (From here, I omit tense and aspect because they do not
have any impact on the derivation of the Experiencer restriction, as shown in the calculations in
the previous sections.) Recall that crucially, when a sentence is in nonreportive style, it lacks a
SAP. Consequently, nothing will require that the topic situation, if not physical, be the speaker’s
mind.
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TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s

sTop Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ s′ & gladness is at s

Topic
VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s

V
PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s


-i
NP
Pred′: λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s
|

Tarô
uresi-k
‘glad’

(125)

Now, the definedness condition of the logical form is just that the location of the situation s is
Taro’s mind. It can be satisfied whoever utters sentence (124), so the Experiencer (Taro) is surely
not restricted.
The point is that root clauses in the nonreportive style do not have a SAP, so the
definedness condition which a SA has is not imposed on their logical form.

3.7 The Experiencer restriction in embedded clauses
3.7.1 Embedded clauses under verbs of saying
As explained in section 2.3.2.1, an Experiencer in a to-complement clause under a verb of
saying is restricted to the local speaker, as in (126), while an Experiencer in a no-complement
clause under a verb of saying is not.

(126)

Hanakoi-wa

[{kanozyoi/*Tarô}-wa uresi-i-to]

Hanakoi-Top [{shei/Taro}-Top

it-ta.

glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] say-Past

‘Hanakoi said that {shei was/*Taro was} glad.’
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The point is that there is an Assert head in a SAP in the embedded to-complement clause
under a verb of saying, and it yields the Experiencer restriction. In the case of a no-complement
clause embedded under a verb of saying, it does not contain a SAP (note that a no-complement
clause is smaller than SAP (see (29)), so the Experiencer restriction does not emerge, as in the
case of a root clause in nonreportive style.
As an example, let us consider the following sentence.

(127)

*Hanako-wa [Tarô-wa uresi-i-to]

yu-u.

Hanako-Top [Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] say-Pres
(Intended:) ‘Hanako says that Taro is glad.’

The LF of the to-clause of (127), Tarô-wa uresi-i-to, is calculated as follows. It is assumed that
the Rep head does not have a relevant semantic contribution.

(128)

RepP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop &
gladness is at s]

Rep
SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop &
|
gladness is at s]
to

Assert TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s

sTop Topic′: λs′ λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ s′ & gladness is at s

Topic
VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s

V
PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s


-i
NP
Pred′: λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s
|

Tarô
uresi-k
‘glad’

78

The LF of the matrix VP is given in (130). Here, I omit a condition on the counterparts of the
topic situation of the matrix clause imposed by matrix assertion, because it is relevant to the event
described by the matrix clause (namely the event of saying) but is irrelevant to the Experiencer
restriction in the to-clause. For concreteness, I suppose lexical entry (129) for the verb of saying
yu-u ‘say’ (the temporal coordinate which is represented in it is omitted below). Here, Φ means a
to-complement clause, which is of type s,t.

(129)

[[ say Φ ]]c = λΦ.λs′.λx.λs. for any context c′ compatible with what x says at t(c) in s,
[[ Φ]]c′(s′).73

The LF of (127) is given as in (130).
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In a toID-clause under a verb of saying, first- (and second-)person pronouns always refer to the matrix
speaker and addressee, respectively, as explained in section 2.1.1. Therefore, for this analysis to be viable,
it is necessary to suppose that the Japanese first- and second-person pronouns are evaluated with respect to
the matrix context (while the Japanese Assert is evaluated with respect to the local context), in line with
Schlenker’s (2003) treatment of shiftable and non-shiftable indexicals. A conceptual problem of this
approach is that it does not explain the observation that indexicals shift together in a clause in languages
like Slave and Zazaki (Anand and Nevins 2004, Anand 2006). Currently, however, it does not seem that
there is Japanese-internal evidence against the Schlenkerian approach. Sudo (2012) proposes an analysis in
the line of Anand (2006) which covers Japanese, claiming that ‘direct’ discourse introduced by toDD is
actually a shifted context and that it shows shift together. But his Japanese data is questionable. For
example, he states that wh-phrases in a toDD-clause can take a wide scope (i.e., a scope wider than the toclause) and that Kuno (1988) agrees with the judgment. However, Kuno himself states that wh-phrases in
such an environment cannot take a wide scope (and I agree with Kuno). Also, Kuno claims that extraction
from toDD-clauses is banned. Kuno’s (and my) judgment suggests that toDD really introduces direct
discourse, which is unintegrated to the matrix clause, contrary to Sudo’s claim.
Another possible analysis, which does not assume (129), is that Assert does not involve speaker(c)
as in (i) but involves a semantic parameter for the Experiencer, h, as in (ii), and h is set to the matrix
speaker at a SAP in a matrix clause and to the subject of a verb of saying at a SAP in a toID-clause under the
verb of saying.
(i)
λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)]
(ii) λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(h)}. [s ≈ sTop & p(s)]
(The semantic parameter for the Experiencer is explained in more detail in chapter 5. Although the chapter
explains a feature-checking analysis of the Experiencer restriction in addition to the semantic parameter,
involvement of the parameter in an analysis of the Experiencer restriction is a separate matter from
involvement of feature checking.) This analysis avoids the above-mentioned potential problem related to
context shift.
I leave the problem to decide which analysis is superior for future work.
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(130)

VP

NP
V′


Hanako sres
V′

V
RepP
|
yu- Tarô-wa uresi-i-to
‘say’ ‘that Taro is glad’

It is calculated as follows.

(131)

[[ Hanako sres says that Taro is glad ]]c
= [[ sres says that Taro is glad ]]c([[Hanako]]c)
= ([[ says that Taro is glad ]]c (sres))(Hanako)
= λs. c′ compatible with what Hanako says in s, [[that Taro is glad]]c′(sres)
= λs. c′ compatible with what Hanako says in s, (λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c′))} &
l(s) = μ(Taro).[s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s])(sres)
= λs. c′ compatible with what Hanako says in s, sres ≈ sTop & gladness is at sres,
if l(sres) Dph  {μ(speaker(c′)) & l(sres) = μ(Taro). # otherwise.

The definedness condition is satisfied only if Taro is the speaker in the reported context, c′. This
explains the Experiencer restriction. Taro is not the speaker in the reported context c′ for sentence
(127), so the sentence does not have a truth-value.

3.7.2 Embedded clauses under attitude verbs of thinking, believing and knowing
Attitude verbs such as believe and know do not impose the Experiencer restriction in
complement clauses. It is because these verbs do not involve speech acts. In other words, what is
thought, believed or known is not asserted. Thus, complement clauses of these non-
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communicational verbs do not contain an SAP, different from to-clauses under verbs of saying.
Therefore, the Experiencer restriction does not emerge in an embedded clause under noncommunicational attitude verbs.

3.7.3 Embedded clauses under epistemic modals and evidentials
3.7.3.1 Embedded clauses under epistemic modals
Let us consider a sentence with an epistemic modal, as in (132). It shows no Experiencer
restriction.

(132)

Tarô-wa uresi-i

nitigaina-i.

Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres must-Pred.be.Pres
‘Taro must be glad.’

The lack of the Experiencer restriction is expected because epistemic modals are quantifiers over
situations, as reproduced below.

(89)

a. [[ might ]]c = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ]

(Kratzer 2014: (18a))

b. [[ must ]]c = λpλs s′ [Accc(s)(s′) & p(s′) ]

Note that the evaluation situation s′ for the embedded proposition, Taro was glad, is not a topic
situation introduced by Topic[assert]. Instead, s′ is a situation accessible to the topic situation.
There is no special reason to suppose that the accessibility relation keeps the constraint that the
mental location of the situation is the plurality of the minds of people with whom the speaker
identifies. Therefore, it is plausible that Topic[assert] at the top of the sentence does not force the
Experiencer restriction on an Experiencer in an embedded clause under an epistemic modal.
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3.7.3.2 Embedded clauses under evidentials
Let us consider a sentence with an evidential, as in (133). It also shows no Experiencer
restriction.

(133)

Tarô-wa uresi-i

yôda.

Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres Evid
‘It seems that Taro is glad.’

Two types of evidentials are found in literature: epistemic modals and modifiers of
speech act. In the case of Japanese, McCready and Ogata (2006) analyze all evidential markers as
epistemic modals. If their analysis is on the right track, the same argument as above can be
applied. The evaluation situation for the embedded proposition is not a topic situation introduced
by Topic[assert], so the Experiencer restriction does not emerge. If (some) Japanese evidential
markers are modifiers of speech act, the fact of absence of the Experiencer restrictions in
embedded clauses under evidentials suggests that assertion modified by these modifiers do not
impose the speaker-empathy restriction on a topic situation.

3.8 The Experiencer restriction in vivid memory report
Vivid memory reports restrict an Experiencer. However, it cannot be the case that the
reported content (what is remembered) contains an assertive speech act. In this section, I give an
explanation of this fact, using situation semantic treatment by Barwise (1981), Stephenson (2010)
and others.
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3.8.1 Direct perception report and situations
Barwise (1981) compares direct and indirect perception reports such as (134a,b).

(134) a Austin saw a man get shaved in Oxford.
b. Austin saw that a man got shaved in Oxford.

(Barwise 1981: 371 (1),(2))

The complement of direct perception report is transparent, while that of indirect perception report
is opaque: for example, suppose that the man who got shaved in Oxford who Austin saw was
Barwise. Then (135a) is a valid inference, but (135b) isn’t.

(135) a. Austin saw Barwise get shaved in Oxford.
b. Austin saw that Barwise got shaved in Oxford.

To account for the characteristics of direct perception reports, Barwise proposes that in direct
perception reports, what is reported to be perceived is a situation. For example, direct perception
report, Beryl saw Meryl feed the animals, can be analyzed as in (136).

(136)

There is an actual past situation s that Beryl saw, and s supports the truth of Meryl feed
the animals.

(Kratzer 2014: (5))

3.8.2 Vivid memory report
Stephenson (2010) finds that attitude reports such as remember and imagine have a vivid
reading which is similar to that of a direct perception report. For example, let us consider the
following sentence pair.
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(137) a. Mary remembered John feeding the cat.
b. Mary remembered that John fed the cat.

(Stephenson 2010: 147(1),(2))

(137a) can be true only if Mary witnessed the situation where John fed the cat, while (137b) can
be true even if Mary was only told about John’s feeding the cat. Stephenson (2010) calls the use
exemplified by (137a) the vivid use, which requires direct witnessing of the situation, and the
other use the non-vivid use, which does not require direct witnessing.
As (137a) shows, gerundive small clause complements have only a vivid use. The vivid
use is also forced by modifiers such as vividly or in perfect detail, as shown in (138). Without
vividly, (138) has a non-vivid interpretation also.

(138)

Mary vividly remembered that John was busy feeding the cat.
(Stephenson 2010: 149 (12))

Similarly to the analysis of direct perception reports by Barwise and others, Stephenson
proposes a situation semantic analysis of the vivid use of memory/imagination reports. She,
however, makes an addition: she claims that an analysis of de se vivid reports requires centered
situations, not just situations, extending Lewis’s (1979) and Chierchia’s (1989) analyses of de se
attitude reports using centered worlds. I follow Stephenson’s analysis of vivid memory reports
here, but my analysis does not depend on how one treats de se vivid reports. What is relevant to
my analysis is the requirement of direct witnessing of a situation, as we will see.
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3.8.3 Analysis of vivid memory report
In the formulation by Stephenson (2010), the verb remember in its vivid reading takes
three arguments, a propositional content, a centered situation, and an agent. Concretely,
remember in the vivid use has the following lexical entry (Stephenson uses an intensional system).

(139)

[[ remember ]]w,t = [λp. [λs,y: p(s,y) = 1. [λx. x has the cognitive relation of
remembering vividly towards s,y in w at t] ] ]
(Stephenson 2010: 153 (29))

She explains this as follows: “This says that a sentence of the form x remembers p, making
reference to a particular centered situation s,y, is true at world w and time t iff x holds the
appropriate vivid cognitive relation towards s,y, provided that p is true in s,y.” The cognitive
relation of remembering vividly towards s,y is characterized as in (140).

(140)

For x to vividly remember s,y (in w at t), it must be the case that:
i. x formed a memory of s by directly witnessing it
ii. x’s experience of s is from the perspective of y
iii. the time of s is prior to t
iv. s ≤ w (for true memories)
(Stephenson 2010: 513 (30))

Let us see how a vivid interpretation of memory reports is derived from this lexical entry
for remember. For example, a gerundive small clause complement, John feeding the cat, is
translated as in (141) (a finite clause complement, that John feeds the cat, is also translated into
the same LF).
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(141)

[[ John feeding the cat ]]w,t = [λs,y. John feeds the cat in s]
(Stephenson 2010: 514 (33))

In this case, the LF is independent of the center, y. However, in the case of controlled
complement clauses, their LF is dependent on the center:

(142)

[[ feeding the cat ]]w,t = [λs,y. y feeds the cat in s]
(Stephenson 2010: 514 (34))

For example, a sentence, John remembered feeding the cat, is calculated as follows (here, tense is
ignored).

(143)

[[ John remembered feeding the cat ]]w,t = [[ remember]]w,t ([[ feeding the
cat ]]w,t)(s1,z)([[ John ]]w,t)
= [λp. [λs,y: p(s,y) = 1. [λxe. x has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly
towards s,y in w at t] ] ]([λs,y. y feeds the cat in s])(s1,z)(John)
= 1 iff John has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly towards s1,z in w at t,
provided that z feeds the cat in s1.
(Stephenson 2010: 515 (36))

In this case, for John to remember vividly s1,z, it must be the case that his experience of s1 is
from the perspective of z (from condition (ii) of (140)). It leads to the conclusion that John’s
experience is from the perspective of the feeder of the cat, namely that John fed the cat and his
memory is from inside.
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3.8.4 The Experiencer restriction in vivid memory report
As explained in the previous chapter, vivid memory report restricts Experiencers, as in
(144). In this section, I present an analysis of this fact, based on Stephenson’s observation that
vivid memory reports require direct witnessing.

(144) a. *Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga

uresi-k-at-ta

no]-o

oboe-tei-ru

Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past Fin]-Acc remember-Perf-Pres
(Intended:) ‘Hanako remembers that Taro was glad.’
b. Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Nom

uresi-k-at-ta

no]-o

oboe-tei-ru

glad-Pred-be-Past Fin]-Acc remember-Perf-Pres

‘Hanakoi remembers that shei was glad.’

Let us recall (140.i). A vivid memory report shows that the agent formed a memory of a
particular situation s which supports a reported propositional content by directly witnessing the
situation. Note that a sentient individual a cannot directly witness a situation if its location is not
in Dph  {μ(a)}, as stated in (100):

(100)

For a  Dsen and situation s,
a can directly witness s  s is observable to a  l(s)  Dsp  {μ(a)}

Therefore, (140.i) requires (145) as a necessary condition.

(145)

For x to vividly remember s,y (in w at t), it must be the case that
l(s)  Dph  {μ(x)}
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Now, using the lexical entry for uresi-i ‘be glad’ (99),

(99)

[[ uresi-i ]] = λx.λs. l(s) = μ(x) & gladness is in s]

let us calculate (144a) (in the following, I use English translations for easy of presentation).

(146)

[[ Hanako remembers that Taro was glad ]]w,t = [[ remember]]w,t ([[ that Taro was
glad ]]w,t)(s1,z)([[ Hanako ]]w,t)
= [λp. [λs,y: p(s,y) = 1. [λxe. x has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly
towards s,y in w at t] ] ]([λs,y. [s′.s  s′ & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is in
s′])(s1,z)(Hanako)
= 1 iff Hanako has the cognitive relation of remembering vividly towards s1,z in w at
t, provided that [s′.s1  s′ & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is in s′].

Because of the conditions s′.s1  s′ & l(s′) = μ(Taro) in (146), we see that condition (147) needs
to be met for the sentence Hanako-wa Tarô-ga uresi-k-at-ta no-o oboe-tei-ru (‘Hanako
remembers that Taro was glad’) to have a truth value.

(147)

l(s1) = μ(Taro)

Suppose that (147) is satisfied. Then the sentence cannot be true. Hanako has the cognitive
relation of remembering vividly towards s1,z, so (148) must hold (see (145)). However, (147)
and (148) are incompatible (because Taro is not Hanako and μ is the lattice isomorphism between
Dsen, and Dm,).
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(148)

l(s1)  Dph  {μ(Hanako)}

Therefore, the sentence is not felicitously assertable for cooperative discourse participants.

3.9 Absence of the Experiencer restriction in restrictive relative clauses
In restrictive relative clauses, an Experiencer is not restricted (Koyama 1966, Masuoka
1997), as exemplified in (149). The Experiencer of the feeling of being glad in (149) is not the
speaker, but (149) is acceptable.

(149)

[sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

hito-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] person-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

(yo)

go-Past (SFP)

‘The person who was glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office
yesterday.’

This is a natural consequence of the semantics of situations. To see that, let us consider the
following sentence, for example.

(150)

[(sono toki) uresi-k-at-ta]

hito-wa

(tugi-no

hi-mo)

ki-ta

(yo).

[(that time) glad-Pred-be-Past] person-Top (next-Gen day-also) come-Past (SFP)
‘The person who was glad (at that time) came (next day also).’
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The syntactic structure of (150) is given as follows. In this dissertation, I assume a movement
analysis of relativization in Japanese, following Ishizuka (2009), for concreteness.74 “wh”
represents a phonetically null relative pronoun. Recall that relative clauses have their own topic
situation which can be different from the topic situation of the matrix clause, as argued in section
3.3.3. SAP is present in reportive style, but not in nonreportive style.

74

See Ishizuka (2008, 2009) for a comparison of the movement analysis and the base-generation analysis
proposed by Kuno (1973) and others. My arguments do not depend on the choice.
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(151)

(SAP)

(Assert) TopicP

sTop Topic′

Topic
TP

Past
VP


-ta DP
V′

D
NP3
ki-75
|
‘come’
the NP2
CP3
 
s5
NP1 s4
CP2


hito
whi
CP1
‘person’

λx.λs. x is a person in s
C TopicP

s′Top Topic′

Topic
TP

Past
VP


-ta V
PredP
 λs′. τ(s′) < t*

ar- NP
Pred′
‘be’ |

whi
uresi-k
‘glad’

The denotation of CP2 is given as follows.

(152)

[[ whi TopicP ]]c
= λx.[[ TopicP ]]c,g[i→x]

75

The citation form of this verb is ku-ru (‘come-Pres’).
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= λx. λs′: l(s′) = μ(x). [s′ ≈ s′Top & τ(s′) < t* & gladness is at s′]

Note that it is not plausible that CP2 and NP1 combine directly, as in (153).

(153)

NP

NP1
CP2


hito
whi
CP1
‘person’

λx.λs. x is a person in s C TopicP

s′Top Topic′

Topic
TP

Past
VP


-ta V
PredP
 λs′. τ(s′) < t*

ar- NP
Pred′
‘be’ |

whi
uresi-k
‘glad’

If (153) were the correct structure, the main predicate of the relative clause and the host NP were
always evaluated with respect to the same situation, especially to the same time. However, there
are examples in which the main predicate of a relative clause and its host NP are evaluated with
respect to different times. For example, a person who heard a story about the childhood of George
Washington (say, the cherry tree story) can assert (154).

(154)

watasi-wa [daitôryô-ni
I-Top

nat-ta]RC

kodomo-no hanasi-o kii-ta.

[President-Pred become-Past] child-Gen story-Acc hear-Past

‘I heard a story about a child who became President.’
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Here, the time of becoming President is later than that of being a child. They are different and do
not overlap. Because this kind of sentence is fine, I suppose that relative clauses and their host
nouns combine with different situation pronouns, as in (151).76 The denotation of the relative
clause CP3 and that of NP2 in (151) are as follows.

(155) a. [[ CP3 ]]c = λx: l(s4) = μ(x). s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4
b. [[ NP2 ]]c = λx. x is a person in s5

They are combined by Predicate Modification.

(156)

[[ NP3 ]]c
= [[ [ NP2 CP3 ] ]]c
= λx: l(s4)=μ(x). x is a person in s5 & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4

Assuming that Japanese has a phonetically null counterpart of the English definite article the,77 it
has the following lexical entry.

(157)

[[ the ]]c = λfe,t: !x. f(x)=1. the y such that f(y) = 1
(based on von Fintel & Heim 2007:81(152c))

76

Another possibility is that relative clauses existentially quantify over situations (cf. the referential
analysis of tense (Partee 1973 and others) and the quantificational analysis of tense (Ogihara 1989,
Kusumoto 1999 and others)). The choice of the analyses does not change the argumentation. In both the
analyses, the definedness condition of Assert, which restricts the topic situation of the root clause, does not
have an effect on the situation with respect to which the content of the relative clause is evaluated.
77
This is a simplification just for the sake of argument.
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NP3 combines with the.

(158)

[[ DP ]]c
= [[ [ the NP3 ] ]]c
= the y such that y is a person in s5 & l(s4)=μ(y) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is
at s4, if !x. [x is a person in s5 & l(s4)=μ(x) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4].
# otherwise.

It means that the denotation of DP is defined if there is exactly one individual who is a person in
s5 and was glad in s4, which is in the past and is a counterpart of the topic situation of the relative
clause, s′Top. When defined, it denotes the unique person in s5 who was glad in s4, which is in the
past and is a counterpart of the topic situation of the relative clause, s′Top. SAP of (151) has the
following denotation.

(159)

[[ SAP ]]c
= λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & τ(s) < t* & ιy[y is a person in s5 &
l(s4)=μ(y) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4] comes in s],
if !x. [x is a person in s5 & l(s4)=μ(x) & s4 ≈ s′Top & τ(s4) < t* & gladness is at s4].
# otherwise.

It means that the unique person denoted by DP came in a situation s which is in the past and is a
counterpart of the topic situation of the root clause, sTop, if the location of the situation s is
physical or the speaker’s mind. Note that the definedness condition of Assert at the root, namely
the condition that the location of the situation s is physical or the speaker’s mind, restricts the
situation variable with respect to which the main predicate of the root clause, but there is no
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principle which connects the situation variable s with the situation pronoun s4 at the top of the
relative clause. Therefore, the Experiencer restriction does not emerge.

3.10 The Experiencer restriction in interrogatives
In interrogative sentences, the Experiencer is restricted to the addressee, as in (160).

(160)

(When Taro is not the addressee:)
{*boku/kimi/*Tarô}-wa uresi-i
{*I

(ka)?

/you/*Tarô}-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres Q

‘{*Am I/Are you/*Is Taro} glad?’

In this section, let us consider how this restriction emerges.
In section 3.4, I proposed that an assertive SA head (Assert) in Japanese requires that the
location of the topic situation be physical or be the speaker’s mind, (103).

(103)

[[ Assert ]]g,c = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. p(s)

Here, I propose that an interrogative Force head in Japanese requires that the location of the topic
situation be physical or be the addressee’s mind.

(161)

[[ Quest ]]g,c = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(addr(c))}. p(s)

To make the calculation concrete, let us use a proposition set approach for interrogatives
(Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977). According to Hamblin’s treatment of interrogatives, the
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meaning of interrogatives is a set of possible answers. Thus, the interrogative Force head Q which
produces a polar question has meaning (162).

(162)

[[ Q ]]g,c = λp.λs.{p(s), ¬p(s)}

To see that (162) leads to the Experiencer restriction in interrogatives, let us consider the
meaning of (163), which is an unacceptable sentence unless Taro is the addressee.

(163)

Tarô-wa uresi-i

 Q?

Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres Q
‘Is Taro glad?’ (* unless Taro is the addressee)

Using it, the meaning of (163) is given as in (164).

(164)

SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(addr(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). {s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s,
s ≈ sTop & ¬(gladness is at s)}

Quest ForceP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). {s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s, s ≈ sTop & ¬(gladness is
at s)}

Q
TopicP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ sTop & gladness is at s

sTop Topic′: λs′ λs: (s) = μ(Taro). s ≈ s′ & gladness is at s

Topic
VP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s

V
PredP: λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). gladness is at s


-i
NP
Pred′: λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s
‘is’
|

Tarô
uresi-k
‘glad’

The logical form is defined only if Taro is the addressee. This is the Experiencer restriction.
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3.11 The denotation of the verbal suffix -gar
Finally, let us consider the denotation of the verbal suffix -gar ‘behave as being …’,
which lifts the Experiencer restriction, in more detail.
How does -gar lift the restriction? Gar-suffixation is systematically applicable, so I
assume that it is an operation in the syntactic component (vid. Marantz 1997), and that
compositional semantic calculation is viable. I propose the following meaning for -gar.

(165)

[[ -gar ]]c = λfe,s,t.λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) &
f(x)(s′) = 1].

For example, if uresi- ‘glad’ and -gar are combined as follows.

(166)

[[ uresi-gar ]]c
= [[ -gar ]]c([[ uresi- ]]c)
= (λfe,s,t.λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & f(x)(s′) =
1]) (λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s)
= λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(x) &
gladness is at s′]

It means that an individual x (which corresponds to the referent of the subject) behaves in a
situation s in a way which suggests that x is glad at the same time. (Concretely, the location of s′
is x’s mind, while the location of s is physical.) Note that it is not a partial but a total function.
Hence, the Experience restriction does not emerge (recall that the Experiencer restriction emerges
from the definedness condition on the meaning of the Experiencer predicate and that on Assert).
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For illustration, let us consider the following sentence.

(167)

Tarô-wa uresi-gat-ta

yo.

Taro-Top glad-GAR-Past SFP
‘Taro behaved as being glad.’

Its logical form is calculated as follows (tense and aspect are omitted).

(168)

SAP: λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. [s ≈ sTop & Taro behaves in s in a way which
suggests that s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′]

Assert TopicP: λs.[s ≈ sTop & Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)
|
=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′]
yo 
sTop Topic′: λs′′ λs.[s ≈ s′′ & Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′
[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′]

Topic
VP: λs: Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that s′[τ(s′)=
τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(Taro) & gladness is at s′]

NP
V: λx.λs. x behaves in s in a way which suggests that

s′[τ(s′)=τ(s) & l(s′) = μ(x) & gladness is at s′]
Tarô
uresi-gar

The logical form for SAP gives the truth condition that the sentence is true for a situation s if s is
a counterpart of the topic situation sTop and Taro behaves in s in a way which suggests that Taro is
glad at the same time, τ(s). It is a right paraphrase of ‘Taro behaved as being glad’. Importantly,
this logical form has a truth value, whoever the subject of the sentence is. In other words, garverbs do not show the Experiencer restriction.78

78

A fact which should be mentioned is that gar-verbs do not prefer the speaker as an Experiencer (Nitta
1991, Sawada 1993, Kamada 2000 and others):
(i) watasi-wa uresi-{k-at-/??gat}-ta
yo.
I-Top
glad-{Pred-be/??GAR}-Past SFP
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CHAPTER 4
NON-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVE CLAUSES AND THE EXPERIENCER
RESTRICTION
4.1 Introduction
In this section, I consider Experiencer restrictions in non-restrictive relative clauses.
In the previous literature, it is observed that restrictive clauses do not impose the
Experiencer restriction, while non-restrictive relative clauses do (Masuoka 1997). However, the
observation is applicable to non-restrictive relative clauses only in extensional contexts. In the
following, I add new data: (i) an Experiencer in a non-restrictive relative clause is restricted to the
local speaker if the relative clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, whereas (ii) it is not
restricted if the relative clause is in the scope of a non-communicational attitude verb.
This is a familiar pattern now—under assertion or a verb of saying, an Experiencer is
restricted to the local speaker, but under a non-communicative attitude verb, it is not restricted.
The only difference is that now the Experiencer is further embedded in a non-restrictive relative
clause. To analyze it, it is necessary to have an analysis of Japanese non-restrictive relative
clauses in general. In the following, I first show that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses
resist being in the scope of operators in higher clauses, but they can be embedded under to‘I {was glad/behaved as being glad}.’
According to the proposed lexical entry for -gar, it is suggested by use of gar-verbs that the referent of the
subject NP is in a certain mental state. It is plausible that -gar signals the speaker’s lack of direct evidence
that the referent of the subject NP is in the mental state (cf. von Fintel and Gillies’ 2010 analysis of must).
Then, it is reasonable that the speaker cannot be the Experiencer argument of gar-verbs, because the
speaker usually has direct evidence of his/her own feelings. An apparent problem of this analysis is that
addition of -mi-se-ru ‘let (someone/them) see’ makes the speaker Experiencer fine:
(ii) watasi-wa uresi-gat-te
mi-se-ta
I-Top
glad-GAR-Conn see-let-Past
‘I let him see me behave as being glad.’
To solve this problem, it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the construction V-te mi-se-ru in detail. I
leave it for future work.
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complements of attitude verbs. To account for this observation, I employ an analysis proposed by
Schlenker (2010, 2013a,b) for English and French appositive relative clauses, and propose that
Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are attached to ForceP, whether matrix or embedded.
Then I argue that the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses is accounted for in
a way similar to the Experiencer restriction in the other environments analyzed in the previous
chapter. That is, the source of the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses is
assertion’s speaker-empathy requirement.

4.2 Restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses in Japanese
Different from English, it is not easy to distinguish non-restrictive relative clauses and
restrictive relative clauses in Japanese. In particular, Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses do
not use comma intonation. To single out non-restrictive relative clauses in Japanese, I use relative
clauses with host nouns which refer to a singleton in the discourse, as in (169).

(169)

[NRRC watasi-ga kinô
[NRRC I-Nom

at-ta

] {Tarô/Hanako-no hahaoya}

yesterday meet-Past ] {Taro/Hanako-Gen mother}

(lit.) ‘{Taro/Hanako’s mother}, who I met yesterday’

It should be noted that, depending on the discourse, the host nouns in example (169) can be
interpreted as non-singletons. That is, in a discourse in which there is more than one person
whose name is Taro or Hanako, the host nouns in (169) do not refer to a singleton, and so the
relative clause can be restrictive. In the following, when a proper noun appears in an example, it
is always assumed that there is only a single individual to whom the name refers in the discourse.
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Restrictive relative clauses do not restrict an Experiencer in them (Masuoka 1997), as
exemplified in (149), reproduced below. The absence of an Experiencer restriction in restrictive
relative clauses was accounted for in the previous chapter.

(170)

[sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

hito-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] man-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

‘The man who was glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office yesterday.’

On the other hand, non-restrictive relative clauses restrict an Experiencer to the speaker (Masuoka
1997). In (171), Taro, a third-person individual, cannot be the Experiencer if (171) is uttered in a
truth-directed context. (If it is uttered in a non-truth-directed context, the restriction disappears.
For example, if this sentence is part of a story which the speaker is narrating, then there is no
problem in using Taro as an Experiencer.)

(171)

[sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

{watasi/*Taro}-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] {I/Taro}-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

‘{I/*Taro}, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office
yesterday.’

To find an analysis of restrictions on an Experiencer in non-restrictive relative clauses is
the goal of this chapter. As a first step, let us look at analyses of non-restrictive relative clauses in
the next section.
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4.3 Analyses of non-restrictive relative clauses
Currently, it is a cross-linguistically disputed topic whether non-restrictive relative
clauses are non-embeddable (‘scopeless’). Prima facie, non-restrictive relative clauses are nonembeddable. For example, let us consider the following pair, taken from Schlenker (2010:75).

(172) a. I doubt that John, who is smart, is competent.
⇒ John is smart.
b. I doubt that John is smart and competent.
⇒ John is smart.

(172b) shows that ‘John is smart’ is in the scope of the attitude predicate. The contrast between
(172b) and (172a) suggests that the content of the non-restrictive relative clause is not in the
scope of the attitude predicate.
Potts (2005) claims that non-restrictive relative clauses79 cannot be semantically
embedded. To account for the observation, he proposes an analysis using a multidimensional
semantics. In his analysis, the content of non-restrictive relative clauses is not in the at-issue
meaning. Instead, it is in a different dimension of meaning, which Potts calls CI (conventional
implicature) meaning. CI meanings are never embedded in his system, so the meaning of nonrestrictive relative clauses is supposed to be a good example of conventional implicature in his
analysis.

79

Potts himself avoids the term, non-restrictive relative clause, and prefers the term, supplementary
relative. See section 4.2.3 of Potts (2005).
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However, since Potts’ analysis, it has been pointed out that there are data which suggest
that non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable (Amaral, Roberts, and Smith 2007, Potts
2007, Harris and Potts 2009a,b, Schlenker 2010, 2013a,b, Sæbø 2011, and others). On the one
hand, some researchers claim that those data can be explained by assuming a pragmatic
perspective shift and they do not show that non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable (Harris
and Potts 2009a,b). On the other hand, some researchers propose that those data indicate that nonrestrictive relative clauses are really embeddable, and claim that multidimensional semantics is
unnecessary to account for the behavior of non-restrictive relative clauses (Sæbø 2011, Schlenker
2010, 2013a,b).
The dispute is not limited in English. For example, Del Gobbo (2003, 2005) claims that
Chinese non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable, while Constant (2011) claims that they
are not embeddable. In the next section, let us consider the case of Japanese.

4.4 Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses
To my knowledge, the problem of embeddability of Japanese non-restrictive relative
clauses has not been discussed in detail in the literature except Miyake (1995).80 In this section, I
present the following observations.

(173) a. Negative polarity items (NPIs) in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by a
matrix negation operator (Miyake 1995)
b. Tense of non-restrictive relative clauses is not in the scope of the matrix tense (Miyake
1995)

80

Sato (2012) also contains some related examples.
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c. Indeterminate phrases in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by the matrix
Q (Miyake 1995)
d. Even inside of a topic DP, a non-restrictive relative clause can represent information
which is not taken for granted
e. Narrow reading under to-complements of attitude verbs is available

These data are consistent with the claim that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are attached
to matrix or embedded ForceP (at least at LF).81

4.4.1 NPIs in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by a matrix negation operator
In Japanese, although NPIs in restrictive relative clauses can be licensed by matrix
negation (Kinsui 1986), NPIs in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by matrix
negation (Miyake 1995). It is consistent with the hypothesis that non-restrictive relative clauses
are not in the scope of matrix negation, different from restrictive relative clauses.
Let us consider expressions, rokuna (‘satisfactory, worth mentioning’) and kore-to it-ta
(‘any remarkable’) as examples of NPIs (Kinsui 1986). As the following examples show, they
need to be licensed by negation.82

81

Here, I am not claiming that all these data are consequences of the attachment of Japanese non-restrictive
relative clauses to ForceP. What I am saying (consistency) is weaker than that. Maybe some of them are
accounted for by other mechanisms than the position of the non-restrictive relative clause.
82
It is often the case that NPIs are licensed in downward-entailing environment in general. Downwardentailing environments include not only negated clauses but also conditionals. In the case of the above
Japanese NPIs, rokuna is not licensed in conditionals, but kore-to it-ta is:
(i) *rokuna
sensyu-ga tor-e-reba,
tîmu-wa rainen
yusyô
satisfactory player-Nom take-Ability-if team-Top next.year win.the.championship
deki-ru kamosirenai.
can-Pres might
(Intended:) ‘If we can take satisfactory players, our team might be able to win the
championship next year.’
(ii) kore-to it-ta
kiroku-ga de-reba, kanozyo-wa suisens-are-ru
darô.
any remarkable record-Nom set-if
she-Top
nominate-Pass-Pres Epis
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(174) a. rokuna

sensyu-ga

tor-e-na-k-at-ta.

satisfactory player-Nom take-Ability-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘We couldn’t take any satisfactory players.’
b. *rokuna

sensyu-ga

(Kinsui 1986:620(56))83

tor-e-ta.

satisfactory player-Nom take-Ability-Past
(Intended:) ‘We could take satisfactory players.’

(175) a. kore-to it-ta

kiroku-ga

(Miyake 1995:56(21a))

de-na-k-at-ta.

any remarkable record-Nom set-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Any remarkable records weren’t created.’
b. *kore-to it-ta

kiroku-ga

de-ta.

any remarkable record-Nom set-Past
(Intended:) ‘Some remarkable records were created.’

Let us embed these NPIs in relative clauses. In the case of an NPI in a restrictive relative clause,
it is licensed not only by negation in the same relative clause but also by negation in a
superordinate clause (Kinsui 1986):

(176) a. saikin-wa

[rokuna

siai-o

si-na-i]

bokusâ-ga i-ru.

recently-Top [satisfactory fight-Acc do-Neg-Pred.be.Pres] boxer-Nom exist-Pres
‘Recently there are boxers who do not fight any satisfactory fight.’
b. *saikin-wa

83

[rokuna

siai-o

su-ru]

bokusâ-ga i-ru.

‘If she sets any remarkable records, she will be nominated.’
For this and following examples, I added emphasis and glosses.
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recently-Top [satisfactory fight-Acc do-Pres] boxer-Nom exist-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
(Intended:) ‘Recently there are boxers who fight any satisfactory fight.’
c. saikin-wa

[rokuna

siai-o

su-ru]

bokusâ-ga i-na-i.

recently-Top [satisfactory fight-Acc do-Pres] boxer-Nom exist-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
‘Recently there are not boxers who fight any satisfactory fight.’
(Miyake 1995:57(22a))
d. nihon-ni-wa

[[rokuna

ronbun-o kak-u]

gakusya-ga

i-ru]

Japan-Loc-Top [[satisfactory paper-Acc write-Pres] scholar-Nom exist-Pres]
daigaku-ga

na-i.

university-Nom Neg-Pred.be.Pres
‘There are not universities which have scholars who write any satisfactory papers in
Japan.’

(177) a. [kore-to it-ta

(Kinsui 1986:620(59))

kiroku-o

das-ana-k-at-ta]

sensyu-o

[any remarkable record-Acc set-Neg-Pred-be-Past] player-Acc
sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
‘I know players who didn’t set any remarkable records.’
b. *[kore-to it-ta

kiroku-o

dasi-ta]

sensyu-o

sir-tei-ru.

[any remarkable record-Acc set-Past] player-Acc know-Perf-Pres
(Intended:) ‘I know players who set some remarkable records.’
c. [kore-to it-ta

kiroku-o

dasi-ta]

sensyu-o

sir-ana-i.

[any remarkable record-Acc set-Past] player-Acc know-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
‘I don’t know players who set any remarkable records.’
(Miyake 1995: 57(22b))
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Contrastively, an NPI in a non-restrictive relative clause is licensed by negation in the same
clause but not by the matrix negation (Miyake 1995), as illustrated in (178) and (179).

(178) a. [rokuna

siai-o

si-na-i]

Tyson-ga

ki-ta.

[satisfactory fight-Acc do-Neg-Pred.be.Pres] Tyson-Nom come-Past
≈ ‘Tyson, who did not fight a satisfactory fight, came.’
b. *[rokuna

siai-o

su-ru]

Tyson-ga

ki-ta.

[satisfactory fight-Acc do-Pres] Tyson-Nom come-Past
(Intended:) ≈ ‘Tyson, who fought a satisfactory fight, came.’
c. *[rokuna

siai-o

su-ru]

Tyson-ga

ko-na-k-at-ta.

[satisfactory fight-Acc do-Neg-Pred.be.Pres] Tyson-Nom come-Neg-Pred-be-Past
(Intended:) ≈ ‘Tyson, who fought a satisfactory fight, didn’t come.’

(179) a. [kore-to it-ta

kiroku-o

das-ana-k-at-ta]

sono sensyu-o

[any remarkable record-Acc set-Neg-Pred-be-Past] that player-Acc
sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
≈ ‘I know the player, who didn’t set any remarkable records.’
b. *[kore-to it-ta

kiroku-o

dasi-ta] sono sensyu-o

[any remarkable record-Acc set-Past] that player-Acc
sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
(Intended:) ≈ ‘I know the player, who set some remarkable records.’
c. *[kore-to it-ta

kiroku-o

dasi-ta] sono sensyu-o

[any remarkable record-Acc set-Past] that
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player-Acc

sir-ana-i.
know-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
(Intended:) ≈ ‘I don’t know the player, who set some remarkable records.’
(Miyake 1995: 57(23b))

These data are consistent with the hypothesis that restrictive relative clauses are in the scope of
matrix negation, while non-restrictive relative clauses are not.84,85

4.4.2 Tense in non-restrictive relative clauses are not in the scope of matrix tense
Another fact is that while tense in a restrictive relative clause (can) depend on the matrix
tense, tense in a non-restrictive relative clause does not depend on the matrix tense (Miyake 1995).
Let us look at (180), where the matrix tense is past and the tense embedded in a restrictive
relative clause is present. It has the simultaneous interpretation in which the time of the boy’s
crying and the time of Mariko’s talking to him coincide.86
84

Another analysis (Miyake 1995) assumes percolation of the NPI feature. According to the analysis, NPIs
in a non-restrictive relative clause cannot make the whole DP which contains the non-restrictive relative
clause an NPI.
85
NPIs in a complement clause under an attitude verb are not licensed by Neg above the attitude verb,
irrespective of the complementizer type.
(i) *Tarô-wa [rokuna
sensyu-ga ki-ta-{no-o/to}]
sinzi-tei-na-i.
Taro-Top [satisfactory player-Nom come-Past-{Fin-Acc/Rep}] believe-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
(Intended) ‘Taro doesn’t believe that satisfactory players came.’
It predicts that if non-restrictive relative clauses are under the scope of an attitude verb, NPIs in them are
not licensed by Neg above the attitude verb. The prediction is borne out. When the NPI in (i) is further
embedded in a non-restrictive relative clause as in (ii), the result is ungrammatical.
(ii) *Tarô-wa [[rokuna
siai-o
su-ru] Tyson-ga ki-ta-{no-o/to}]
Taro-Top [[satisfactory fight-Acc do-Pres] Tyson-Nom come-Past-{Fin-Acc/Rep}]
sinzi-tei-na-i.
believe-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
‘Taro doesn’t believe that Tyson, who fights satisfactory games, came.’
(When the non-restrictive relative clause in (ii) is attached to the matrix ForceP, the NPI in it is surely not
licensed by Neg, because Neg is below Force.) I thank Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) for a relevant question.
86
It is not always the case that restrictive relative clauses allow a simultaneous interpretation. For example,
let us consider (i). If a simultaneous interpretation is always available for present tense embedded in a
restrictive relative clause, the embedded tense in (i) could be present tense. The unacceptability of
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(180)

Mariko-wa naiteiru
M-top

otokonoko-ni hanasikaketa

cry-teiru-pres boy-to

talk-past

‘Mariko talked to a boy who is (now) crying’ (the speech time interpretation)
‘Mariko talked to a boy who was crying (at the time of her talking to him)’
(the simultaneous interpretation)
(Kusumoto 1999: 89(128))

Now, let us consider (181a) and (181b). (181a) contains a restrictive relative clause, while (181b)
contains a non-restrictive relative clause. Interestingly, (181b) lacks a simultaneous interpretation:
To assert (181b), the speaker must have a belief that Mr. Iwasaki is studying chipmunks at the
speech time. In contrast, to assert (181b), the speaker does not need to have a belief that the
person is studying chipmunks at the speech time.

(181) a. [simarisu-o

kenkyûsi-tei-ru] hito-ga

happyôsi-ta.

[chipmunk-Acc study-Perf-Pres] person-Nom present-Past
‘A person who is studying chipmunks made a presentation.’
‘A person who was studying chipmunks made a presentation’
b. [simarisu-o

kenkyûsi-tei-ru] Iwasaki san-ga

happyôsi-ta.

[chipmunk-Acc study-Perf-Pres] Mr. Iwasaki-Nom present-Past
embedded present tense in (i) shows that a simultaneous interpretation is not always available for present
tense in a restrictive relative clause.
(i) [handôtai-o
sirabe-tei-{ta/*ru}]
kenkyûsya-ga
[semiconductor-Acc investigate-Perf-{Past/Pres}] researcher-Nom
toranzisutâ-o hatumeisi-ta.
transistor-Acc invent-Past
‘Researchers who were testing semiconductors invented the transistor.’
What is observed (and relevant) in this subsection is that there is a context in which present tense in a nonrestrictive relative clause lacks a simultaneous interpretation which present tense in a restrictive relative
clause has.

109

‘Mr. Iwasaki, who is studying chipmunks, made a presentation.’
??‘Mr. Iwasaki, who was studying chipmunks, made a presentation.’

To check the intuition, let us consider the following continuations. (182a) can follow (181a),
whereas (182b) cannot follow (181a). Note that (182b) is odd if the speaker believes that Mr.
Iwasaki is studying chipmunks at the speech time. The goodness of continuation (182a) shows
that the speaker does not need to have a belief that the person is studying chipmunks at the speech
time of (181a).

(182) a. … ano hito-wa

ima-demo simarisu-o

kenkyûsi-tei-ru no-ka nâ

that person-Top now-even chipmunk-Acc study-Perf-Pres Fin-Q SFP
‘… Is the person studying chipmunks even now?’
b. … #Iwasaki san-wa ima-demo simarisu-o

kenkyûsi-tei-ru no-ka nâ

Mr. Iwasaki-Top now-even chipmunk-Acc study-Perf-Pres Fin-Q SFP
‘… Is Mr. Iwasaki studying chipmunks even now?’

The lack of the simultaneous interpretation suggests that a non-restrictive relative clause is not in
the scope of the matrix tense.

4.4.3 Indeterminate phrases in non-restrictive relative clauses are not licensed by the matrix
Q
In Japanese, indeterminate phrases such as dare ‘who’ and nani ‘what’ in a restrictive
relative clause can be licensed by a matrix interrogative element ka (or Q):
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(183)

anata-wa [dare-ga

kai-ta]

hon-o

yomi-masi-ta

ka?

(Miyake 1995)

you-Top [who-Nom write-Past] book-Acc read-Polite-Past Q
(lit.: ‘Did you read a book [who wrote]?’)
‘Whose book did you read?’

However, if indeterminate phrases are in a non-restrictive relative clause, they are not licensed by
a matrix interrogative element:

(184)

*anata-wa [dare-ga

kai-ta]

sono hon-o

yomi-masi-ta

ka? (Miyake 1995)

you-Top [who-Nom write-Past] that book-Acc read-Polite-Past Q
(lit.: ‘Did you read the book, [who wrote]?’)

The following pair of restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses shows the same pattern.

(185) a. anata-wa [nani-o

kai-ta]

sakka-o

Q? (Miyake 1995)

sit-tei-ru-no

you-Top [what-Acc write-Past] writer-Acc know-Perf-Pres-Fin Q
(lit.: ‘Do you know authors [that wrote what]?’)
‘What authors do you know? What did they write?’
b. *anata-wa [nani-o

kai-ta]

Murakami Haruki-o

you-Top [what-Acc write-Past] M.

H.

sit-tei-ru-no

-Acc know-Perf-Pres-Fin Q

(lit.: ‘Do you know Haruki Murakami, [that wrote what]?’)

111

Q?

(Miyake 1995)

These data suggest that non-restrictive relative clauses are not in the c-commanding
domain of the matrix Q.87

4.4.4 Presupposition and non-restrictive relative clauses
The content of a topic DP is taken for granted. The restrictive relative clause inside of a
topic DP is no exception: if a topic DP contains a restrictive relative clause, the content of the
relative clause must be taken for granted. In contrast, non-restrictive relative clauses which are
prima facie inside of a topic DP, namely non-restrictive relative clauses with their host nouns
marked with a topic-marker wa, do not follow this pattern: they can represent information which
is not taken for granted. In this section I show it.
First, let us consider a discourse which begins with the following utterance, which is a
variant of an English sentence in Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000)88.

(186)

watasi-ga sensyû
I-Nom

Ithaca-kara New York-e-no

hikôki-no

naka-de

at-ta

last.week Ithaca-from New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen inside-Loc meet-Past

zyosei-no

koto-nituite ohanasisi-ta-i

koto-ga

ari-mas-u

woman-Gen thing-about tell-want-Pred.be.Pres thing-Nom exist-Polite-Pres
‘Let me tell you something about a woman I met while flying from Ithaca to New York
last week.’

(Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000): 351(37))

87

Another analysis (Miyake 1995), which assumes that what is relevant to the licensing of indeterminate
phrases is a [+WH] feature which indeterminate phrases have and that the [+WH] feature can percolate to
dominating nodes, is that an indeterminate phrase in a non-restrictive relative clause cannot make the whole
nominal phrase which contains the non-restrictive relative clause have a [+WH] feature.
88
Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet’s original English sentence appears in (190).
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It makes clear that nothing special about the woman is taken for granted. Now, let us suppose that
(186) is followed by (187). It sounds quite awkward.

(187)

*[Ithaca-kara New York-e-no

hikôki-no

kinai-de

nimotu-o

[Ithaca-from New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen inside-Loc luggage-Acc
nakusi-tesimat-ta] zyosei-wa
lose-do-Past

totemo

hara-o tate-tei-masi-ta

woman-Top very.much get.upset

-Perf-Polite-Past

‘The woman who lost her luggage on the flight from Ithaca to New York was pretty
upset.’
(The English sentence is a modified version of Del Gobbo 2003:93(113a))

The badness of (187) is expected: A topic-marked element needs to be in the common ground,
but the information represented by the topic-marked subject is new information which is difficult
to accommodate. Hence (187) is bad. Sentences in which the DP is not a topic, such as (188), are
fine as a continuation of (186).

(188)

[Ithaca-kara New York-e-no

hikôki-no

kinai-de

nimotu-o

[Ithaca-from New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen inside-Loc luggage-Acc
nakusi-tesimat-ta] zyosei-ga
lose-do-Past

totemo

hara-o tate-tei-masi-ta

woman-Nom very.much get.upset -Perf-Polite-Past

‘A woman who lost her luggage on the flight from Ithaca to New York was pretty
upset.’
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In (187), the new information is provided by a restrictive relative clause. Now let us
consider a non-restrictive relative clause, as in (189), which is an analogue of (187). Importantly,
(189) can follow (190).89

(189)

[Ithaca-kara New York-e-no

hikôki-no

kinai-de

nimotu-o

[Ithaca-from New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen inside-Loc luggage-Acc
nakusi-tesimat-ta] {sono zyosei/kanozyo}-wa totemo
lose-do-Past

{that woman/she}-Top

hara-o tate-tei-masi-ta

very.much get.upset -Perf-Polite-Past

‘{The woman/She}, who lost her luggage on the flight from Ithaca to New York, was
pretty upset.’
(The English sentence is a modified version of Del Gobbo 2003:93(113a))

(190)

watasi-ga sensyû
I-Nom

Ithaca-kara New York-e-no

hikôki-no

naka-de

at-ta

last.week Ithaca-from New York-to-Gen airplane-Gen inside-Loc meet-Past

zyosei, Jill Jensen-no

koto-nituite ohanasisi-ta-i

koto-ga

woman, Jill Jensen-Gen thing-about tell-want-Pred.be.Pres thing-Nom
ari-mas-u
exist-Polite-Pres
‘Let me tell you something about Jill Jensen, a woman I met while flying from Ithaca
to New York last week.’
(The English sentence is from Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: 351(37))

89

In this respect, Japanese and Chinese non-restrictive relative clauses differ. In Chinese, a similar
discourse is awkward (Del Gobbo 2003: 96).
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By (190), it is clear that the information that Jill Jensen lost her luggage on the flight, which is the
content of the non-restrictive relative clause in (189), is not in the common ground. Although the
non-restrictive relative clause, which represents new information, is prima facie in a topic-marked
DP (that is, the non-restrictive relative clause modifies a host noun marked with a topic marker
wa), the whole sentence is felicitously assertable. A plausible account of it is that the nonrestrictive relative clause is not (or is not interpreted) in the topic-marked DP.

4.4.5 Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are embeddable under an attitude verb
Up to here, we have seen data which are in accordance with a hypothesis that Japanese
non-restrictive relative clauses are outside of the scope of (i) matrix negation, (ii) matrix tense,
(iii) matrix Q, and (iv) topic. In this subsection, let us consider the region ‘above CP’. I argue that
non-restrictive relative clauses can be in the scope of an attitude verb.
First, let us consider the following sentence, in which a non-restrictive relative clause
appears in a complement clause of a verb of saying.

(191)

Hanakoi-wa [kinô

kanozyoi-wa [NRRC kanozyoi-no otôto-to

Hanakoi-Top [yesterday shei-Top
ason-dei-ta]

Tarô-o

[

shei-Gen

mi-ta-to]

brother-with

it-tei-ta.

play-Perf-Past] ] Taro-Acc see-Past-Rep] say-Perf-Past
Demo boku-wa [Tarô-ga
but
no]-o

I-Top

kinô

itinitizyû hitori-de ie-ni

Taro-Nom yesterday all.day

alone

i-ta

home-at be-Past

sit-tei-ru.

Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres
(lit.) ‘Hanakoi said that shei saw Taro, who was playing with heri brother, yesterday.
But I know that Taro was alone at home all day yesterday.’

115

≈ ‘Hanakoi said that shei saw Taro yesterday and that he was playing with heri brother.
But I know that Taro was alone at home all day yesterday.’

If the content of the non-restrictive relative clause, ‘who was playing with her brother,’ is not
embedded and takes a scope out of the attitude verb, the speaker must believe that Taro was in the
park. Then, the continuation, ‘But I know that Taro was alone at home […]’ should lead to
infelicity. However, the sentence is utterly fine. It indicates that the content of a non-restrictive
relative clause can be embedded under the verb of saying.
One might wonder that the local speaker-orientation of the content of the non-restrictive
relative clause is maybe due to partial quotation and does not reflect the scopal relation between
the verb of saying and the non-restrictive relative clause. That is, if the complement clause of the
verb of saying or the non-restrictive relative clause is a (partial) quotation of Hanako’s saying,
then one can keep a hypothesis that the content of non-restrictive relative clauses is always
(global) speaker-oriented (cf. Anand 2007, Sæbø 2011). For (191), however, such an analysis is
impossible. Note that (191) uses third-person pronoun kanozyo (‘she’) for reference to Hanako. If
the whole complement clause of the verb of saying or the non-restrictive relative clause is a
quotation of Hanako’s saying, the reference to Hanako should be done using a first-person
pronoun (or a phonetically null pronoun). The use of a third-person pronoun indicates that the
clauses cannot be quotations.
Can the content of a non-restrictive relative clause be embedded under attitude predicates
other than a verb of saying? Let us consider the following example, in which a non-restrictive
relative clause appears in a to-complement clause of a verb of believing.

(192)

Tarôi-wa [ [NRRC karei-no titioya-o
Taroi-Top [ [

mituke-ta] Tanaka-san-ga

hei-Gen father-Acc find-Past] Tanaka-Ms.-Nom
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asita

kuru-to]

sinzi-tei-ru.

tomorrow come-Rep] believe-Perf-Pres
Sikasi watasi-wa [Tanaka-san-ga
but

I-Top

zitu-wa Tarô-no

titioya-o

Tanaka-Ms.-Nom factually Taro-Gen father-Acc

mituke-tei-na-i

no]-o

sit-tei-ru

find-Perf-NEG-Pred.be.Pres Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres
(lit.) ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka, who found hisi father, will come tomorrow. But I
know that factually Ms. Tanaka has not found Taro’s father.’
≈ ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka will come tomorrow and that she found hisi father.
But I know that factually she has not found his father.’

Note that if the content of the non-restrictive relative clause is not embedded, the continuation
should lead to infelicity. The goodness of this example shows that the content of a non-restrictive
clause is embeddable in this case also.
Let us consider another example. Constant (2011) uses the following Chinese example to
argue that Chinese non-restrictive relative clauses are scopeless. In this example, the content of
the non-restrictive clause, ‘(Lisi) had actually been at home all along’, is not in the teacher’s
thought.

(193)

Lăoshī yĭwéi

shì yīzhí

zài jiā-ji

teacher think.wrongly be all.along at

de Lĭsì zùo-le èzùojù.

home-Loc DE Lisi do-Pfv prank

‘The teacher thought that it was Lisi, who had actually been at home all along, who had
done the prank.’

(Constant 2011: (31))
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A Japanese counterpart of (193) is (194).90

(194)

sensei-wa

[ [NRRC ie-ni

teacher-Top [ [
si-ta-to]

zutto

i-ta]

Risi-ga

sono itazura-o

home-at all.along be-Past] Lisi-Nom that prank-Acc

gokaisi-tei-ru.

do-Past-Rep] think.wrongly-Perf-Pres
(lit.) ‘The teacher thought wrongly that it was Lisi, who had been at home all along,
who had done the prank.’
a. ≈ ‘The teacher thought that Lisi had been at home all along and that he had done the
prank.’
b. ≈ ‘The teacher thought that Lisi had done the prank. Lisi was at home all along.’

Different from the Chinese non-restrictive relative clause, this Japanese counterpart allows
embedding, as shown in interpretation (194a). The two interpretations, (194a) and (194b), are due
to de dicto/de re ambiguity.
In the above examples, a to-clause is used for the complement clause of the attitude verb.
If no-clause is used, however, the content of the non-restrictive relative clause resists being
embedded. For example, (195), which uses a no-complement, sounds awkward, compared to
(192) (see footnote 90 also).

90

Note that this example uses a to-complement clause. If a no-complement clause is used, the meaning of
the sentence differs from the English sentence very much:
(i) sensei-wa
[ [NRRC ie-ni
zutto
i-ta]
Risi-ga sono itazura-o
teacher-Top [ [
home-at all.along be-Past] Lisi-Nom that prank-Acc
si-ta-no]-o
gokaisi-tei-ru.
do-Past-Fin]-Acc think.wrongly-Perf-Pres
≈ ‘The teacher thought wrongly about the fact that Lisi had been at home all along and that he had
done the prank.’
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(195)

??Tarôi-wa [ [NRRC karei-no titioya-o

mituke-ta] Tanaka-san-ga

Taroi-Top [ [NRRC hei-Gen father-Acc find-Past] Tanaka-Ms.-Nom
asita

kuru-no]-o

sinzi-tei-ru.

tomorrow come-Fin]-Acc believe-Perf-Pres
Sikasi watasi-wa [Tanaka-san-ga
but

I-Top

mituke-tei-na-i

zitu-wa Tarô-no

titioya-o

Tanaka-Ms.-Nom factually Taro-Gen father-Acc
no]-o

sit-tei-ru

find-Perf-NEG-Pred.be.Pres Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres
(lit.) ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka, who found hisi father, will come tomorrow. But I
know that factually Ms. Tanaka has not found Taro’s father.’
≈ ‘Taroi believes that Ms. Tanaka will come tomorrow and that she found hisi father.
But I know that factually she has not found his father.’

These data indicate that the content of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses is
embeddable under to-complements of attitude verbs.

4.4.6 Pragmatics of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses
In the previous section, we saw that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are
embeddable under a to-complement of an attitude verb. It suggests that Japanese non-restrictive
relative clauses do not have conventional implicature semantics which Potts (2005) proposes for
English non-restrictive relative clauses. (Conventional implicature semantics predicts that the
content of non-restrictive relative clauses is not embeddable.) Against Potts’s (2005) analysis of
English non-restrictive relative clauses as conventional implicatures using a multidimensional
semantics, Schlenker (2010, 2013a,b) proposes a unidimensional analysis for English and French
non-restrictive relative clauses. According to Schlenker, the content of non-restrictive relative
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clauses is ‘translucent’91. Pragmatic properties of non-restrictive relative clauses which
Schlenker’s analysis tries to explain include (i) non-at-issueness, (ii) non-triviality, and (iii) noncontroversiality. Let us see whether Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses have these properties
one by one.
Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses have the property, non-at-issueness. To see it, let
us use the P family test, which is a test for non-at-issueness (backgroundedness), as Chierchia and
McConnell-Ginet (2000) and Kadmon (2001) argue. The following examples show that the
content of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are not-at-issue.

(196) a. Negation
Tarô-wa [NRRC Epikutêtosu-no senmonka-de a-ru]

Sikano-ni

Taro-Top [NRRC Epictetus-Gen expert-Pred be-Pres] Sikano-Dat
aw-ana-k-at-ta.
meet-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Taro didn’t meet Sikano, who was an expert in Epictetus.’
⇒ Sikano was an expert in Epictetus.
b. Conditional
[NRRC Epikutêtosu-no senmonka-de a-ru]

Sikano-ga

nagaikisi-tei-ta

[NRRC Epictetus-Gen expert-Pred be-Pres] Sikano-Nom live.long-Perf-Past
ra, kare-wa sutoatetugaku-no hon-o
if he-Top Stoicism-Gen

91

kai-ta

darou.

book-Acc write-Past Mod

Translucency is defined as follows.
(i)
Translucency (Schlenker 2013a: (24))
If an NRR is uttered in a global context set C, it should be possible to add to C unsurprising
assumptions to obtain a context C+ in which the NRR is ‘locally trivial’, i.e. entailed by its local
context given C+.
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‘If Sikano, who was an expert in Epictetus, lived long, he would have written a book on
Stoicism.’
⇒ Sikano was an expert in Epictetus.

Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses, however, do not seem to have the non-triviality.
To see that, let us consider the following example from Schlenker (2013a), after Potts (2005).

(197)

Armstrong survived cancer. #Lance, who survived cancer, won the Tour de France.

Different from the English example, its Japanese counterpart is acceptable:

(198)

Âmusutorongu-wa gan-o
Armstrong-Top

ikinobi-ta. [NRRC gan-o

ikinobi-ta]

cancer-Acc survive-Past [NRRC cancer-Acc survive-Past]

Ransu-wa Tûru do Furansu-de kat-ta.
Lance-Top Tour de France-at

win-Past

(lit.) ‘Armstrong survived cancer. Lance, who survived cancer, won the Tour de
France.’

This suggests that the content of Japanese non-restrictive relative clause can be trivial. However,
the conclusion might be too hasty. If the predicate in the non-restrictive relative clause expresses
a time-independent state, the sentence becomes bad. For example, the following example sounds
strange. Note that its first sentence excludes the possibility that strength of legs of the person
under discussion did not change very much during the time under discussion. The badness of this
example indicates that Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses also have the property of nontriviality.
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(199)

Âmusutorongu-wa kyakuryoku-ga
Armstrong-Top

tuyo-k-at-ta.

strength.of.leg-Nom strong-Pred-be-Past

#[NRRC kyakuryoku-ga

tuyo-k-at-ta]

Ransu-wa

[NRRC strength.of.leg-Nom strong-Pred-be-Past] Lance-Top
Tûru do Furansu-de kat-ta.
Tour de France-at

win-Past

(lit.) ‘Armstrong had strong legs. Lance, who had strong legs, won the Tour de France.’

I think that an account for the acceptability of (198) is to posit that Ransu modified by the relative
clause is type-shifted from an individual to the set of all the stages of the individual (in line with
Paul 1994 and Del Gobbo 2003), and the relative clause is restricting the set of stages. In this
analysis, the second sentence in (198) is interpreted as ‘a stage of Lance that has survived cancer
won the Tour de France’. It is in accordance with the intuition that (198) can be used only if
Lance won the Tour de France after he survived cancer.
Finally, Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses have the property, non-controversiality
also. Let us consider (200), which is a Japanese counterpart of Schlenker’s (2013b: 24(59))
example. It shows that Japanese behaves similarly to English: if the information of the nonrestrictive relative clause is surprising, the sentence becomes odd.

(200)

(Context: The news isn’t out yet that Obama has committed a crime.)
One expects the Commander-in-chief to have an exemplary behavior. However
a. [saikôsirêkan-de

a-ru]

Obama-ga

tatta ima tuma-o

korosi-ta.

[Commander-in-chief-Pred be-Pres] Obama-Nom just now wife-Acc murder-Past
‘Obama, who is the Commander-in-chief, has just murdered his wife.’
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b. (#)[tatta ima tuma-o

korosi-ta]

Obama-ga

saikôsirêkan-da.

[just now wife-Acc murder-Past] Obama-Nom Commander-in-chief-Pred.be.Pres
‘Obama, who has just murdered his wife, is the Commander-in-chief.’

The above data suggest that pragmatically Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are
considerably similar to English ones. They show (i) non-at-issueness, (ii) non-triviality, and (iii)
non-controversiality.

4.5 Analysis of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses
Let us now make a formal analysis of Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses.
We have seen that semantically Japanese non-restrictive relative clauses are out of the
scope of (i) matrix negation, (ii) matrix tense, (iii) matrix Q, and (iv) matrix topic, and (v) can be
in the scope of (a to-complement of) an attitude predicate. Following these observations, I
propose that a Japanese non-restrictive relative clause is attached to ForceP.92
For the Japanese non-restrictive relative clause, I present the following semantics of nonrestrictive relative clauses, in line with Schlenker (2013b): the meaning of a non-restrictive
relative clause is treated as parataxis, which is (as a first approximation) conjunction. (In (201),
for simplicity I use the label ‘NRR’ and ‘CP’ for the non-restrictive relative clause and ForceP,
respectively. The subscript CPi on NRR expresses the CP to which the NRR attaches.)

(201) a. Let node CPi dominate the LF position of DP.
[[ [CPi … DP NRRCPi … ] ]]g = # unless for some DP d and some index k, DP = dk.
If  #, [[ [CPi … DPk NRRCPi … ] ]]g = [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]g  [[ NRRCPi ]]g(g(k))
92

Note that to complementizer selects for a ForceP.
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(where # represents presupposition failure)
b.  is the operation of parataxis. As a first approximation,
[[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]g  [[ NRRCPi ]]g(g(k)) = 1 iff [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]g = 1 and
[[ NRRCPi ]]g(g(k)) = 1.
(based on Schlenker 2013b: 20(45))

For example, let us consider (202).

(202)

[Amherst-ni sum-u]

Sikano san-ga

byôki-da.

[Amherst-Loc live-Pres] Mr. Sikano-Nom sick-Pred.be.Pres
‘Mr. Sikano, who lives in Amherst, is sick.’

Its meaning is calculated as follows (for ease of presentation, I use its English counterpart).

(203) a. Mr. Sikanok, [λxi xi lives in Amherst], is sick.
b. [[ (a) ]]g  # since Mr. Sikano carries an index, k. And
[[ (a) ]]g = [[ Mr. Sikanok is sick ]]g  [[ λxi xi lives in Amherst ]]g(g(k))

For indices on a proper noun, I posit the meaning of proper nouns given in (204), as in Schlenker
(2013).

(204)

If p is a proper name carrying an index i,
[[ pi ]]g = # unless g(i) = [[ p ]]g. If  #, [[ pi ]]g = [[ p ]]g = g(i)
(based on Schlenker 2013b:21(47))
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From this, [[ Mr. Sikanok ]]g = [[ Mr. Sikano ]]g = g(k). Letting [[ Mr. Sikano ]]g be Mr. Sikano,
the calculation (203b) continues as follows.

[[ Mr. Sikanok is sick ]]g  [[ λxi xi lives in Amherst ]]g(g(k))

(205)

= is-sick(Mr. Sikano)  (λx. lives-in-Amherst(x))(Mr. Sikano)
= is-sick(Mr. Sikano)  lives-in-Amherst(Mr. Sikano)

4.6 The Experiencer restriction in embedded non-restrictive relative clauses
Now let us turn to the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses. As seen
in (171), an Experiencer in a non-restrictive relative clause is restricted to the speaker if the host
noun which the relative clause modifies is in a matrix clause. In this section, I show that an
Experiencer in non-restrictive relative clauses is restricted to the local speaker if the relative
clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, but not restricted if the relative clause is in the scope of
a non-communicational attitude verb.
First, let us consider the following examples, where an Experiencer adjective is in a nonrestrictive relative clause which is in the scope of a verb of saying.93 These examples differ in the
choice of the host noun of the non-restrictive relative clause. The host nouns in (206a), (206b),
and (206c) refer to Hanako, Taro, and the speaker, respectively. These examples indicate that the
Experiencer restriction is active in this environment and that the Experiencer must be the local
speaker.

93

In principle, non-restrictive relative clauses can attach to either embedded ForceP (i.e., in the scope of
attitude verbs) or matrix ForceP (i.e., outside of the scope of attitude verbs). The second sentence in the
examples guarantees that the non-restrictive relative clause under discussion is embedded in the scope of
attitude verbs.
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(206) a. Tarôi-wa [[NRRC karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o kii-te
Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing
{??uresi-k-at/uresi-gat}-ta]

Hanako-ga

sore-o si-ta-to]

{??glad-Pred-be/glad-GAR}-Past] Hanako-Nom it-Acc do-Past-Rep]
it-tei-ru.
say-Perf-Pres
Sikasi, Hanako-wa Tarô-no
But

hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-tei-na-i.

Hanako-Top Taro-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres

(lit.) ‘Taroi says that Hanako, who {??was glad/behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi
mother’s news, did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’
≈ ‘Taroi says that Hanako {??was glad/behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi
mother’s news and did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’

b. Tarôi-wa [[NRRC karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o kii-te
Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing
{uresi-k-at/??uresi-gat}-ta]

karei-ga sore-o si-ta-to]

{glad-Pred-be/??glad-GAR}-Past] hei-Nom it-Acc do-Past-Rep]
it-tei-ru.
say-Perf-Pres
Sikasi, hontô-wa Tarôi-wa
But

karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

fact-Top Taroi-Top hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc

kii-tei-na-i.
hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres
(lit.) ‘Taroi says that hei, who {was glad/??behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi
mother’s news, did it. But actually Taroi didn’t hear hisi mother’s news.’

126

≈ ‘Taroi says that hei {was glad/??behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi mother’s
news and did it. But actually Taro didn’t hear his mother’s news.’
c. Tarôi-wa [[NRRC karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o kii-te
Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing
{?uresi-k-at/(?)uresi-gat}-ta]

watasi-ga sore-o si-ta-to]

{glad-Pred-be/??glad-GAR}-Past] I-Nom

it-Acc do-Past-Rep]

it-tei-ru.
say-Perf-Pres
Sikasi, watasi-wa Tarô-no
But

I-Top

hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-tei-na-i.

Taro-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres

(lit.) ‘Taroi says that I, who {?was glad/(?)behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi
mother’s news, did it. But actually I didn’t hear Taro’s mother’s news.’
≈ ‘Taroi says that I {?was glad/(?)behaved as feeling glad} at hearing hisi mother’s
news and did it. But I didn’t hear his mother’s news.’

Second, let us consider the following examples, where an Experiencer adjective is in a
non-restrictive relative clause which is in the scope of a non-communicational attitude verb. The
host nouns in the non-restrictive relative clauses in (207a) and (207b) refer to Hanako and the
speaker, respectively. The goodness of these examples indicates that the Experiencer restriction is
not active in non-restrictive relative clauses if the relative clauses are in a complement clause of
non-communicational attitude verb.

(207) a. Tarôi-wa [[NRRC karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]
Hanako-ga

sore-o si-ta-to]

{omot/sinzi}-tei-ru.

Hanako-Nom it-Acc do-Past-Rep] {think/believe}-Perf-Pres
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Sikasi, Hanako-wa Tarô-no
But

hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-tei-na-i.

Hanako-Top Taro-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres

(lit.) ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako, who was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news,
did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’
≈ ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news and did
it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’

b. Tarôi-wa [[NRRC karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past]
watasi-ga

sore-o si-ta-to]

{omot/sinzi}-tei-ru.

Hanako-Nom it-Acc do-Past-Rep] {think/believe}-Perf-Pres
Sikasi, Hanako-wa Tarô-no
But

hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-tei-na-i.

Hanako-Top Taro-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres

(lit.) ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that I, who was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news, did it.
But I have not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’
≈ ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that I was glad at hearing hisi mother’s news and did it. But I
have not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’

To summarize, an Experiencer in non-restrictive relative clauses is (i) restricted to a
speaker if the non-restrictive relative clause is not in the scope of an attitude predicate, (ii)
restricted to a local speaker if the non-restrictive relative clause is in the scope of a verb of saying,
and (iii) not restricted if the non-restrictive relative clause is in the scope of a noncommunicational verb.
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4.7 Analysis of the Experiencer restrictions in non-restrictive relative clauses
In section 4.4, we looked at data which support the claim that non-restrictive relative
clauses are interpreted to be attached to ForceP. Now, note that the distribution of the Experiencer
restriction on Experiencer adjectives in non-restrictive relative clauses found in the previous
section indicates a correlation between the Experience restriction and presence of assertion. In
this section, I illustrate that with the semantics of non-restrictive relative clause given in section
4.5, the Experiencer restriction is derived in a natural way, by assuming that the speech act
operator is distributive with respect to the parataxis operator .
To see how it works, let us consider the following sentence. On the surface, the nonrestrictive relative clause in (208) is embedded in a DP which is in a matrix clause. In this case,
the Experiencer is restricted to the speaker.

(208)

#[NRRC uresi-k-at-ta]

Tarô-ga

sore-o si-ta.

[NRRC glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Nom it-Acc do-Past
(Intended:) ‘Taro, who was glad, did it.’

I maintain that the Experiencer restriction is caused by the restriction on the situation pronoun in
the non-restrictive relative clause by an illocutionary operator. Precisely, the meaning of (208) is
calculated as follows. First, the matrix predicate is translated as in (209).

(209)

Tarok, [λxi xi was glad], did it.
b. [[ (a) ]]g  # since Taro carries an index, k. And
[[ (a) ]]g = [[ Tarok did it ]]g  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(g(k))
= [[ Tarok did it ]]g  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro)
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What matters here is the second conjunct. I posit that the non-restrictive relative clause contains a
Topic and a topic situation, sTop′, as a restrictive relative clause does. So, more precisely, the
second conjunct is represented as in (210). Here, tense is ignored and part of calculation (121) is
used.

(210)

[[ λxi s′ [ Topic [ xi was glad ]] ]]g(Taro)
= λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s](Taro)
= λs: l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s]

Assertive illocutionary operator is added to (209):94

(211)

Assert( [[ Tarok did it ]]g  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro) )

I assume that Assert is, as a first approximation, distributive with respect to the conjunction:
94

Maybe illocutionary operators are not distinguished by their illocutionary forces, and there is only a
single operator, say, SA (Speech Act). Note that at ForceP, declarative sentences and interrogative
sentences have different meanings. So, it is not necessary to assume different illocutionary operators which
produce different objects from a single object. Suppose that SA works as Assert when it takes a declarative
sentence radical, as Quest when it takes an interrogative sentence radical, and so on. What is good about
having such a single speech act operator is that it enables us to account for the fact that non-restrictive
relative clauses in questions have assertive illocutionary force, as in (i).
(i) [uresi-{*k-at/gat}-ta]
kimi-ga ko-na-i
no ka?
[glad-{*Pred-be/GAR}-Past] you-Nom come-Neg-Pred.be.Pres Fin Q
‘Will you, who {*was/behaved as feeling} glad, not come?’
Let us suppose that the speech act operator is distributive with respect to the conjunction:
(ii) SA(α  β ) = SA(α)  SA(β)
In the case of (i), the sentential type of the matrix clause is an interrogative, but that of the non-restrictive
relative clause (with its argument filled by the referent of the host noun, following Schlenker’s rule) is a
declarative. Therefore, schematically we obtain the following:
(iii) SA (will you not come?  you behaved as feeling glad)
= SA(will you not come?)  SA(you behaved as feeling glad)
= Quest(will you not come?)  Assert(you behaved as feeling glad)
If, instead of SA, we assume that Quest, an interrogative illocutionary operator, is at the top of (i), then it
would combine with an interrogative matrix clause and with the non-restrictive relative clause, which
represents a declarative sentence radical. Then the latter combination, namely Quest and a declarative
sentence radical, should be undefined.
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(212)

Assert( α  β ) = Assert(α)  Assert(β)

Then, (211) becomes (213):

(213)

Assert( [[ Tarok did it ]]g  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro) )
= Assert([[ Tarok did it ]]g)  Assert([[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro) )
= Assert([[ Tarok did it ]]g)  Assert(λs:l(s)=μ(Taro).[s≈s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at
s])

The second conjunct is already calculated in (121). According to it, the final result of the
calculation of the second conjunct is given as follows.

(214)

Assert(λs:l(s)=μ(Taro).[s≈s′ & t*  τ(s) & gladness is at s])
= λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))} & l(s) = μ(Taro). [s ≈ sTop & t*  τ(s) & gladness is
at s]

As argued in section 3.6.1, it means that Taro is the speaker when the LF has a truth-value. This
is the desired Experiencer restriction.
Now, let us consider the Experiencer restriction in a non-restrictive relative clause
embedded under a verb of assertion.

(215)

#[ [NRRC uresi-k-at-ta]

Tarô-ga

sore-o si-ta-to] Hanako-ga

it-ta.

[ [NRRC glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Nom it-Acc do-Past] Hanako-Nom say-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako said that Taro, who was glad, did it.’
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In this case, the calculation goes similarly to the above case. The difference is that instead of
Assert, a verb of assertion takes (209). Let us look as the relevant part:

(216)

[[ say [ that Taro, who was glad, did it ] ]]g
= [[ say ]]g ([[ Taro, who was glad, did it ]]g)
= [[ say ]]g ([[ Tarok did it ]]g  [[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro) )

Similarly to Assert, let us posit that attitude verbs are distributive with respect to . Then we
obtain (217).

(217)

[[ (216) ]]g = [[ say ]]g([[ Tarok did it ]]g  [[ say ]]g([[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro) )

The second conjunct is the same as the LF which was considered in section 3.7.1. According to
the calculation given there, Taro must be the local speaker in order for the LF to have a truthvalue. This is the desired Experiencer restriction.
Finally, let us consider the Experiencer restriction in a non-restrictive relative clause
embedded under a verb of non-assertion, as in (218).

(218)

[ [NRRC uresi-k-at-ta]

Tarô-ga

sore-o si-ta-to] Hanako-wa

sinzi-tei-ta.

[ [NRRC glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Nom it-Acc do-Past] Hanako-Top believe-Perf-Past
‘Hanako believe that Taro, who was glad, did it.’

The calculation goes similarly to the above cases. In this case, the operator which embeds the
conjunct [[ λxi xi was glad ]]g(Taro) is sinzi-ru ‘believe’, and its lexical entry is given in (86). The
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point is that a verb of non-communication does not impose a restriction on the res situation, so the
Experiencer restriction does not emerge.

133

CHAPTER 5
FEATURE-CHECKING ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I give an analysis of the Experiencer restriction which involves checking
of a morphosyntactic feature. It can be seen as a refinement of Tenny’s (2006) double featurechecking analysis. She proposes that the Experiencer restriction involves checking of two
morphosyntactic features, [+sentient] ([+sen]) and [+discourse participant]. In the double-feature
checking analysis, Experiencer DPs are assigned the two features by Experiencer adjectives and
raise for feature-checking. (Experiencer raising is proposed by Stowell (1986), Campbell and
Martin (1989), Sato and Kishida (2009), Landau (2010), among others, based on Experiencers’
special properties such as backward anaphora.) The feature [+sen] is checked at a phrase in the
right-periphery called the Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase,95 and the feature [+discourse
participant] is checked at a SAP above it. [Spec, SAP], to which Experiencer DPs raise, is the
place for the speaker, so the Experiencer restriction emerges.96 Because only sentient individuals
can experience their feelings, epistemologically it is natural that Experiencer adjectives assign a
sentience feature to Experiencer DPs. But it is not obvious that Experiencer adjectives assign
[+discourse participant] feature to Experiencer DPs, and it turns out to be problematic, as shown
in the next chapter. In this chapter I present a single-feature checking analysis of the Experiencer
restriction, in which only a [+sen] feature is checked. I argue that the checking occurs at the
phrase called the epistemic modal phrase (ModP), where epistemic modals occur.97 In the spirit of
Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2006, 2007a,b), I assume that there is a semantic coordinate h
95

The Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase is introduced by Speas and Tenny (2003).
The two-feature checking analysis is reviewed and examined in the next chapter.
97
I do not follow her in adopting the Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase because no test for presence of a
Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase is given.
96
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for the perspective holder from whose point of view events are described and that epistemic
modals are dependent on it. Corresponding to the norm of assertion proposed by Stephenson
(2007b:66), the assertive SAP sets the value of the coordinate h to the speaker. I propose that the
Experiencer restriction emerges because the Japanese phonetically null epistemic modal epis,
which works as a semantic binder of agreeing Experiencer DPs,98 has a presupposition that the
domain of the λ-operator is restricted to the perspective holder.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I show that clauses in which
Experiencers are restricted allow insertion of an epistemic modal in section 5.2.99 Based on it, I
argue in section 5.3 and 5.4 that such sentences contain an epistemic modal head (Mod), which is
placed lower than a speech act head (SA), and an assertive SA sets the semantic parameter h to
the speaker. In section 5.5, I present a feature checking analysis of the Experiencer restriction in
which the modal head has a [+sen] feature which agrees with the corresponding feature on
Experiencer DPs. At the end of this chapter (section 5.6), I compare this analysis and the
situation-based analysis presented in the previous chapters and suggest that the latter is favored
by the principle of parsimony.

5.2 The epistemic modal and the Experiencer restriction
In this section, I argue that clauses which restrict Experiencers always have an epistemic
modal projection, by showing that such clauses always allow insertion of an epistemic modal,
darô. Note that it is not mysterious that the epistemic modal projection is related to the
Experiencer role. Both are related to sentience. Furthermore, Stephenson’s (2006, 2007a,b) work

98

It is because epistemic modals and Experiencer DPs have [+sen] feature and agreement occurs. A probe
works as a semantic binder of the agreeing goal (Kratzer 2009).
99
There is an exception: complements of verbs of vivid memory report do not allow insertion of an
epistemic modal. It is set aside here and will be mentioned in section 5.6.
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shows that the unpronounced Experiencer of predicates of personal taste is related to the
individual whose knowledge is relevant to the interpretation of epistemic modals.

5.2.1 Epistemic modal expressions in Japanese
The following three words are the most frequently used epistemic modal expressions in
Japanese.100,101

(219) a. darô (‘probably’, ‘seem’102)
b. kamosirena-i (‘it is epistemically possible that’)
c. nitigaina-i (‘it is epistemically necessary that’)

Darô is a functional element, while kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i are lexical predicates (Inoue
2007). This difference is reflected in the fact that darô does not show inflection, while
kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i does.103 Let us look at (220a,b), for example. They show that
addition of darô to a simple sentence does not increase the number of occurrences of tense in the
sentence.

(220) a. Tarô-wa soko-ni it-ta.
Taro-Top there-to go-Past
100

Etymologically, these expressions are derived as follows.
(i) darô = de (Pred) - ar (‘be’) - ô (conjectural)
(ii) kamosirena-i = ka (Q) - mo (‘also’) - sir (‘know’) - e (ability) - na (Neg) - i (Pred.be.Pres)
(iii) nitigaina-i = ni (Pred) - tigaw (‘different’) - na (Neg) - i (Pred.be.Pres)
101
Their polite forms, desyô, kamosiremasen, and nitigaiarimasen are also frequently used.
102
For a detailed analysis of the meaning of darô, see, e.g., Hara and Davis (2013).
103
In general, Japanese modals can be divided into ‘genuine’ and ‘quasi’-modals (see, e.g., Inoue 2007;
Kizu 2009). Addition of a genuine modal does not change the number of tense in a sentence, while addition
of a quasi modal does. In this terminology, darô is a genuine modal, while kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i are
quasi-modals.
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‘Taro went there.’
b. Tarô-wa soko-ni it-ta

darô.

Taro-Top there-to go-Past seem
‘It seems that Taro went there.’

Contrastively, addition of kamosirena-i and nigitaina-i introduces tense which indicates the time
of epistemic judgment, as shown in (221a-d).

(221) a. Tarô-wa soko-ni it-ta

{kamosirena/nitigaina}

Taro-Top there-to go-Past {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary}
-i.
-Pred.be.Pres
‘It is {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro went there.’
b. Tarô-wa soko-ni it-ta

{kamosirena/nitigaina}

Taro-Top there-to go-Past {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary}
-k-at-ta.
-Pred-be-Past
‘It was {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro went there.’
c. Tarô-wa soko-ni i-ru

{kamosirena/nitigaina}

Taro-Top there-to go-Pres {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary}
-i.
-Pred.be.Pres
‘It is {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro is there.’
d. Tarô-wa soko-ni i-ru

{kamosirena/nitigaina}

Taro-Top there-to go-Pres {be epistemically possible/be epistemically necessary}
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-k-at-ta.
-Pred-be-Past
‘It was {epistemically possible/epistemically necessary} that Taro was there.’

In the following, I use the term an ‘epistemic modal’ only for darô, which belongs to a functional
category, excluding kamosirena-i and nitigaina-i, which belong to a lexical category. Following
Koizumi (1991, 1993), Kishimoto (2011), and Sato (2011), I call the functional category of darô
‘Mod(al)’.

5.2.2 Root clauses
First, let us consider a declarative root clause, as in (222). As we saw in the previous
chapters, it shows the Experiencer restriction in reportive style.

(222)

{watasi/#Tarô}-wa uresi-k-at-ta

yo

{I/Taro}-Top

SFP

glad-Pred-be-Past

‘{I/#Taro} was glad.’

As shown in (223), it allows insertion of darô.

(223)

{watasi/Tarô}-wa uresi-k-at-ta darô.
{I/Taro}-Top glad-Pred-be-Past Mod
a. ‘It seems that {#I/Taro} was glad.’
b. ‘{I/Taro} would have been glad.’
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The English translations show that if (223) is interpreted in a counterfactual context, both the
speaker and Taro can be the Experiencer, but if it is interpreted in a factual context, only Taro is
allowed as the Experiencer. That the speaker cannot be the Experiencer in that case is related to
the general fact that it is strange to use darô for an event which the speaker
experienced/witnessed (and retains its memory). What is relevant here is that insertion of darô
produces an acceptable sentence.
An interrogative root clause shows the same pattern. Let us consider (224), for example.
It shows the Experiencer restriction.

(224)

{kimi/#Tarô}-wa uresi-k-at-ta

(ka)

{you/#Taro}-Top glad-Pred-be-Past

Q

‘{Are you/#Is Taro} glad?’

The interrogative root clause allows insertion of darô, as in (225).

(225)

{kimi/Tarô}-wa uresi-k-at-ta

darô (ka)

{you/Taro}-Top glad-Pred-be-Past Mod Q
a. ‘Does it seem that {#you were/Taro was} glad?’
b. ‘Would {you/Taro} have been glad?’

As in the case of the declarative root clause, the point here is that the resulting sentence, (225), is
acceptable. It is not relevant here that insertion of darô lifts the Experiencer restriction.
In nonreportive style, root clauses do not show the Experiencer restriction:

(226)

(Context: In third-person narrative)
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Tarô-wa

uresi-k-at-ta.

Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past
‘Taro was glad.’

As shown in (227), insertion of darô is possible in nonreportive style also.

(227)

(Context: In third-person narrative)
Tarô-wa

uresi-k-at-ta

darô.

Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past Mod
‘Taro was probably glad.’

5.2.3 To-complement clauses under verbs of saying
We have seen that the Experiencer restriction is active in to-complement clauses under a
verb of saying like yu-u ‘say’ (section 2.3.2.1). This section shows that they allow insertion of
darô.
For example, let us take sentence (228). Its embedded clause contains a third person
pronoun which refers to the local speaker, Hanako, so it represents indirect discourse.

(228)

#Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kiite)

kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing) shei-Gen
-to]

uresi-k-at-ta

cousin-Top glad-Pred-be-Past

{it-ta/saken-da/…}.

-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…}
(Intended:) ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had been glad (to hear that).’
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This sentence is not felicitous because the Experiencer in the embedded clause does not refer to
the local speaker. This embedded clause allows insertion of darô, as shown in (229). As a result
of insertion of an epistemic modal, the Experiencer restriction is lifted and the sentence can be
felicitously asserted.

(229)

Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kiite)

kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing) shei-Gen
darô-to]

uresi-k-at-ta

cousin-Top glad-Pred-be-Past

{it-ta/saken-da/…}.

Mod-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…}
(Intended:) ‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had been glad (to hear that).’

Another way to distinguish indirect discourse from direct discourse is to embed a WHelement in the complement clause. By the scope of the WH-element, we can tell whether the
complement clause is direct or indirect discourse. For example, let us consider (230). Here, a
WH-element nani (‘what’) is embedded under a verb of saying, but it can take a matrix scope
(note that a question marker ka is at the sentence-final position). In this interpretation of the WHelement, the embedded clause must represent indirect discourse.

(230)

#Hanako-wa [Tarô-wa

nani-ga

uresi-k-at-ta

Hanako-Top [Taro-Top what-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past
-to]

{it-ta/saken-da/…}

(ka)

-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…} Q
(lit. Hanako {said/shouted/…} that Taro was glad about what’)
(Intended:) ‘What did Hanako {say/shout/…} that Taro was glad about?

Insertion of darô into the complement clause makes the sentence felicitously assertable as before:
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(231)

Hanakoi-wa [Tarô-wa

nani-ga

uresi-k-at-ta

Hanakoi-Top [Taro-Top what-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past
darô-to]

{it-ta/saken-da/…}

(ka)

Mod-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…} Q
(lit. Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that Taro was glad about what’)
‘What did Hanako {say/shout/…} that Taro was glad about?’

It confirms that a to-complement clause under a verb of saying allows insertion of darô.

5.2.4 To-complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing
To-complement clauses under a verb of thinking or believing allow insertion of Mod
darô, as in (232), similarly to to-complement clauses under verbs of saying.

(232)

Hanakoi-wa

[kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta

darô-to]

cousin-Top glad-Pred-be-Past Mod-Rep]

{omot/?sinzi}-tei-ta.
{think/believe}-Perf-Past
‘Hanakoi {thought/?believed} that heri cousin had been probably glad.’

Note that to-complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing without darô do not show the
Experiencer restriction (as in (49a)), while to-complement clauses under verbs of saying without
darô show the Experiencer restriction (as in (228)).
To-complement clauses under a verb of knowing lift the Experiencer restriction as in
(49b), and resist insertion of Mod darô, as shown by the awkwardness of (233).
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(233)

??Hanakoi-wa

[kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta

darô-to]

cousin-Top glad-Pred-be-Past Mod-Rep]

sit-tei-ta.
know-Perf-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanakoi knew that heri cousin had been probably glad.’

5.2.5 No-complement clauses under verbs of saying
Next, let us consider no-complement clauses. They lift the Experiencer restriction, as
shown in (42), (48), and (50), and they do not allow insertion of darô, as shown in (234) and
(235).

(234)

Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kii-te)

kanozyoi-no itoko-ga

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen
uresi-gat-ta-(*darô)-no]-o

cousin-Nom

iw-ana-k-at-ta.

glad-GAR-Past-(*Mod)-Fin]-Acc say-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Hanakoi did not say that (*it was probable that) heri cousin behaved as being glad (to
hear that).’

(235)

Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-no itoko-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta

(*darô)-no]-o

cousin-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past (*Mod)-Fin]-Acc

sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi knows that (*it is probable that) heri cousin was glad.’
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This observation is not a surprise, for no-clauses are Finite phrases (FinP), which are smaller than
ModP (section 2.1.2).

5.2.6 Restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses
Restrictive relative clauses do not restrict the Experiencer, while non-restrictive relative
clauses restrict the Experiencer in some environments (see the previous chapter for the details):

(236)

[RRC sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

hito-wa

[RRC that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] people-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

‘The people who were glad to hear the news went to the assemblyman’s office
yesterday.’

(237)

#[NRRC sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

Tarô-wa

[NRRC that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

(Intended:) ‘Taro, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office
yesterday.’

Interestingly, as Masuoka (1997), Kishimoto (2011), and Sato (2012) point out, restrictive
relative clauses do not allow insertion of darô, as in (238), whereas non-restrictive relative
clauses do, as in (239). It does not depend on the environment where the relative clause appears.
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(238)

*[RRC sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta

darô] hito-wa

[RRC that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past Mod] people-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

(Intended:) ‘The people who seem to have been glad to hear the news went to the
assemblyman’s office yesterday.’

(239) a. [NRRC sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta

darô] Tarô-wa

[NRRC that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past Mod] Taro-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

‘Taro, who seems to have been glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office
yesterday.’

b. Tarôi-wa [[NRRC karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta

darô]

Taroi-Top [[NRRC hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past Mod]
Hanako-ga

sore-o si-ta-to]

{omot/sinzi}-tei-ru.

Hanako-Nom it-Acc do-Past-Rep] {think/believe}-Perf-Pres
Sikasi, Hanako-wa Tarô-no
But

hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-tei-na-i.

Hanako-Top Taro-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-Perf-Neg-Pred.be.Pres

(lit.) ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako, who was probably glad at hearing hisi
mother’s news, did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’
≈ ‘Taroi {thinks/believes} that Hanako was probably glad at hearing hisi mother’s news
and that she did it. But Hanako has not heard Taro’s mother’s news.’
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5.2.7 Adversative conjunctive clauses
Finally, let us consider adversative conjunctive clauses which are headed by ga and
ke(re)do (both mean ‘though’).104 They behave similarly to non-restrictive relative clauses, so we
can analyze them straightforwardly with adapting the analysis of the non-restrictive relative
clause presented in the previous chapter, as shown in section 5.5.3 below. When a matrix clause
is in reportive style, an Experiencer in an adversative conjunctive clause is restricted to the
speaker, as shown in (240) and (241).105,106,107

104

Not all adversative conjunctive clauses behave similarly. Different from adversative conjunctive clauses
headed by ga and ke(re)do, adversative conjunctive clauses headed by noni ‘though’ lift the Experiencer
restriction (Minami 1967, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981, Tenny 2006) and do not allow insertion of darô
(Minami 1967, 1974, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981).
105
To my knowledge, Minami (1967) is the first that observed that the Experiencer restriction is active in
ga and keredo adversative conjunctive clauses. He does not make reportive/nonreportive distinction in the
paper, but all his examples are in reportive style.
106
Akmajian and Kitagawa (1981:109-110) also claim that keredo (and ga) clauses impose the Experiencer
restriction. However, their claim is derived based on inappropriate data. Concretely, they give the following
example for keredo, and based on its badness, they argue that keredo clauses show the Experiencer
restriction (they judge the sentence “?*” as shown in (i), though my judgment is “*”).
(i) ?*Sono kodomo wa
netu-de
kurusi-i
keredo
nak-anakat-ta.
that child
topic fever-with suffer-present KEREDO cry-not-past
(Intended: ‘The child, although he is suffering with fever, did not cry.’)
(Akmajian & Kitagawa 1981:110(151a))
(The intended meaning is not given in the original text, so I added it.) A factor which makes the sentence
bad is the choice of the tense in the keredo clause. In fact, the badness of (i) does not disappear even if we
replace the Experiencer NP sono kodomo ‘the child’ with a first person pronoun as in (ii) or the
Experiencer predicate kurusi-i with a gar-counterpart, kurusi-gar-u as in (iii), which is not expected if the
badness of (i) is due to the Experiencer restriction:
(ii) *watasi wa
netu-de
kurusi-i
keredo
nak-anakat-ta.
I
topic fever-with suffer-present KEREDO cry-not-past
(Intended: ‘I, although I am suffering with fever, did not cry.’)
(iii) *Sono kodomo wa
netu-de
kurusi-gat-tei-ru
keredo
nak-anakat-ta.
that child
topic fever-with suffer-GAR-Perf-present KEREDO cry-not-past
(Intended: ‘The child, although he is behaving as suffering with fever, did not cry.’)
The badness of (ii) and (iii) undermines the claim that (i) shows that the Experiencer restriction is active in
keredo clauses.
To show that the Experiencer restriction is active in keredo clauses, we need to change the
embedded present tense in (i) to past tense, as in (iv).
(iv) *REP/√NR Sono kodomo wa
netu-de
kurusi-k-at-ta
keredo
nak-anakat-ta.
that child
topic fever-with suffer-Pred-be-past KEREDO cry-not-past
‘The child, although he was suffering with fever, did not cry.’
Sentence (iv) is unacceptable in conversation, namely in reportive style, while it is acceptable in thirdperson narrative, namely in non-reportive style. For (iv), if we replace the Experiencer NP with a first
person pronoun or the Experiencer adjective with its gar-counterpart, we obtain an acceptable sentence:
(v) watasi wa
netu-de
kurusi-k-at-ta
keredo
nak-anakat-ta.
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(240) a. [ACC {#Tarô/watasi}-wa (sore-o
[ACC {#Taro/I}-Top
kanasi-gat-ta

kii-te)

uresi-kat-ta-ga,]

Hanako-wa

(that-Acc hear-ing) glad-Pred-be-Past-though] Hanako-Top
zo.

worried-GAR-Past SFP
‘Though {#Taro/I} was glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’
b. [ACC Tarô-wa (sore-o

kii-te)

uresi-gat-ta-ga,]

Hanako-wa

[ACC Taro-Top (that-Acc hear-ing) glad-GAR-Past-though] Hanako-Top
kanasi-gat-ta

zo.

sad-GAR-Past SFP
‘Though Taro behaved as being glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’

(241) a. ??[ACC kono ko-wa

hito-ri-de

sabisi-i

keredo]

??[ACC this child-Top one-CL-by lonely-Pred.be.Pres though]
dare-mo ason-de yar-imas-en

wa.

WH- play-Con YAR-Polite-Neg SFP
(Intended:) ‘Though this child is alone and feels lonely, no one plays with her.’
(based on Minami 1967:41)
b. [ACC kono ko-wa

hito-ri-de

sabisi-gat-tei-ru

keredo]

[ACC this child-Top one-CL-by lonely-GAR-Perf-Pres though]
I
topic fever-with suffer-Pred-be-past KEREDO cry-not-past
‘I, although I was suffering with fever, did not cry.’
(vi) Sono kodomo wa
netu-de
kurusi-gat-tei-ta
keredo
nak-anakat-ta.
that child
topic fever-with suffer-GAR-Perf-past KEREDO cry-not-past
‘The child, although he was behaving as suffering with fever, did not cry.’
(iv), (v), and (vi) indicate that the Experiencer restriction is active in keredo clauses in reportive style. This
shows that keredo clauses behave in the same manner as ga (‘though’) clauses (with respect to the
Experiencer restriction).
107
Sentence-final discourse particles zo and wa in these examples are similar to yo. These sentence-final
discourse particles can appear only in reportive style.
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dare-mo ason-de yar-imas-en

wa.

WH- play-Con YAR-Polite-Neg SFP
‘Though this child is alone and behaving as feeling lonely, no one plays with her.’

In these examples, (a)-sentences contain Experiencer adjectives, while (b)-sentences contain garverbs, which do not show the Experiencer restriction. (240a) and (241a) suggest that the
Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives is restricted to the speaker in adversative
conjunctive clauses. The goodness of (240b) and (241b) suggests that the badness of (240a) and
(241a) is in fact due to the Experiencer restriction and not to some other reasons.
When a matrix clause is in nonreportive style, the Experiencer restriction in adversative
conjunctive clauses is lifted:

(242)

(Context: In third-person narrative)
[ACC Tarô-wa (sore-o

kii-te)

uresi-kat-ta-{ga/keredo}]

Hanako-wa

[ACC Taro-Top (that-Acc hear-ing) glad-Pred-be-Past-{though/though}] Hanako-Top
kanasi-gat-ta.
sad-GAR-Past
‘Though Taro was glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’

Adversative conjunctive clauses behave similarly to non-restrictive relative clauses in
embedded clauses also. For example, (243) shows that an adversative conjunctive clause activates
the Experiencer restriction in a to-complement clause under a verb of saying while it does not in a
to-complement clause under a verb of thinking or in a no-complement clause.

(243) a. Tarôi-wa [Hanakoj-ga

[ACC ej karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-te

Taroi-Top [Hanako-Nom [ACC ej hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing
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uresi-k-at-ta

kedo] sore-o si-ta-to]

{*it/omot}-tei-ru.

glad-Pred-be- Past though] it-Acc do-Past-Rep] {*say/think}-Perf-Pres
‘Taroi {*says/thinks} that Hanakoj did it though shej was glad at hearing hisi mother’s
news.’

b. Tarôi-wa [Hanakoj-ga

[ACC ej karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-te

Taroi-Top [Hanako-Nom [ACC ej hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing
uresi-k-at-ta

kedo] sore-o si-ta-no]-o

glad-Pred-be- Past though] it-Acc do-Past-Fin]-Acc
{iw-ana/sinzi-na}-k-at-ta.
{say-Neg/believe-Neg}-Pred-be-Past.
‘Taroi did not {say/believe} that Hanakoj did it though shej was glad at hearing hisi
mother’s news.’

Irrespective of the environment, darô can be inserted into adversative conjunctive clauses
(Minami 1974, Akmajian and Kitagawa 1981: 108-109). For example, (244) shows that darô can
be inserted in an adversative conjunctive clause which is in a root clause in reportive or
nonreportive style, and (245) shows that darô can be inserted in an adversative conjunctive clause
in a to-complement clause under a verb of thinking.

(244)

(In reportive and nonreportive styles)
[ACC Tarô-wa (sore-o

kii-te)

uresi-kat-ta

darô-{ga/keredo}]

[ACC Taro-Top (that-Acc hear-ing) glad-Pred-be-Past Mod-{though/though}]
Hanako-wa kanasi-gat-ta.
Hanako-Top sad-GAR-Past
‘Though Taro was probably glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad.’
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(245)

Tarôi-wa [[ACC Hanakoj-wa karei-no hahaoya-no nyûsu-o

kii-te

Taroi-Top [[ACC Hanako-Top hei-Gen mother-Gen news-Acc hear-ing
uresi-k-at-ta

darô-kedo]

Yoshio-wa kanasi-gat-ta-to]

omot-tei-ru.

glad-Pred-be- Past Mod-though] Yoshio-Top sad-GAR-Past-Rep] think-Perf-Pres
‘Taroi thinks that Yoshio behaved as feeling sad though it is probable that Hanako was
glad at hearing hisi mother’s news.’

5.2.8 Interim summary
A summary of the above data is given in table 1 below. Importantly, the Experiencer
restriction is active only in clauses where insertion of darô is possible. In other words, all the
environments that show the Experiencer restriction are those which allow insertion of darô. It
should be noted that the converse does not hold: some environments which allow insertion of
darô, e.g., to-complement clauses under a verb of thinking/believing, do not show the
Experiencer restriction.

Table 1. Availability of darô and the Experiencer restriction across clausal types

root clauses in reportive style
root clauses in nonreportive style
adversative conjunctive clauses in
nonreportive style
to-complement clauses under a
verb of saying
to-complement clauses under a
verb of thinking/believing
to-complement clauses under a
verb of knowing
no-complement clauses under a
verb of saying/knowing

Insertion of darô is
possible
yes
yes
yes

The Experiencer
restriction is active
yes
no
no

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

no
(Table continues)
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(Table continued)

restrictive relative clauses
non-restrictive relative clauses
whose superordinate clause is a
root clause in reportive style
non-restrictive relative clauses
whose superordinate clause is a
root clause in nonreportive style
non-restrictive relative clauses
whose superordinate clause is
under an attitude verb
adversative conjunctive clauses
whose superordinate clause is a
root clause in reportive style
adversative conjunctive clauses
whose superordinate clause is a
root clause in nonreportive style
adversative conjunctive clauses
whose superordinate clause is
under an attitude verb

Insertion of darô is
possible
no
yes

The Experiencer
restriction is active
no
yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes if they are in a toclause under a verb of
saying
yes

yes

yes

no

yes if they are in a toclause under a verb of
saying

5.3 The Experiencer restriction and SAP
Syntactically, the allowance of insertion of darô indicates that there is a projection of
Mod (Koizumi 1991, 1993). Can we find other factors which lead to the Experiencer restriction,
in addition to the presence of a ModP? The most plausible candidate is presence of a SAP. Note
that the Experiencer is always restricted to the speaker or addressee of the context, if present,
which are notions related to speech act. As explained in CHAPTER 2, root clauses in reportive
style have a SAP while those in nonreportive style don’t. In reportive style, root clauses allow
sentence-final discourse particles in them:

(246)

(Context: In conversation)
{watasi/#Tarô}-wa uresi-k-at-ta
{I/#Taro}-Top

({wa/sa/na/yo/ne}).

glad-Pred-be-Past ({SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})
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‘{I/#Taro} was glad.’

Sentence-final discourse particles are related to a SAP (Tenny 2006, Saito and Haraguchi 2012),
so it is not a surprise that they can appear in root clauses in reportive style. On the other hand,
nonreportive style does not allow insertion of sentence-final discourse particles, as shown in
(247). It is understandable if root clauses in nonreportive style lack a SAP (Tenny 2006).

(247)

(Context: In third-person narrative)
Tarô-wa

uresi-k-at-ta

(*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne}).

Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})
‘Taro was glad.’

In this section, I argue that clauses which contain a phonetically null epistemic Mod restrict the
Experiencer to the speaker of the speech act which is realized as the closest SA.
It is not necessary that a SA and an Experiencer are in the same clause for the
Experiencer restriction. For example, an adversative conjunctive clause does not allow insertion
of a sentence-final particle, though its matrix clause does:

(248)

[Tarô-wa (sore-o

kii-te)

uresi-gat-ta

(*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne})-ga,]

[Taro-Top (that-Acc hear-ing) glad-GAR-Past (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})-though]
Hanako-wa kanasi-gat-ta

({yo/ne}).

Hanako-Top sad-GAR-Past ({SFP/SFP})
‘Though Taro behaved as being glad (to hear that), Hanako behaved as being sad’

Similarly, a non-restrictive relative clause does not allow insertion of a sentence-final particle,
though its matrix clause does:
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(249)

[(sore-o

kii-te)

uresi-gat-ta

(*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne})]

Tarô-wa

[(that-Acc hear-ing) glad-GAR-Past (*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})] Taro-Top
tobidasi-te

it-ta

({wa/sa/na/yo/ne})

run.away-ing go-Past ({SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})
‘Taro, who behaved as being glad (to hear that), ran away.’

In these clauses, an Experiencer is restricted to the matrix speaker, as seen in the previous
sections. Note that in the case of adversative conjunctive clauses, if the whole sentences are put in
nonreportive style, the Experiencer restriction disappears (see (242)). It is expected if a SA at the
root is relevant with the Experiencer restriction in adversative conjunctive clauses. Then, it is also
expected that non-restrictive relative clauses do not show the Experiencer restriction in
nonreportive style. This expectation is fulfilled: let us consider the following sentence which
contains a non-restrictive relative clause again.

(250)

#[sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

Taro-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Top
kinô

sono gi’in-no

zimusyo-ni it-ta

yesterday that assemblyman-Gen office-to

yo

go-Past SFP

‘Taro, who was glad to hear the news, went to the assemblyman’s office yesterday.’

This sentence, which shows the Experiencer restriction, is in reportive style, as indicated by
availability of a sentence-final particle yo. If non-restrictive clauses are used in nonreportive style,
the Experiencer restriction is lifted:

(251)

(Context: In narrative)
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[sono nyûsu-o

kii-te

uresi-k-at-ta]

Taro-wa

[that news-Acc hear-ing glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Top
Hanako-ni

hanasikake-ta (*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne}).

Hanako-Dat talk.to-Past

(*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})

‘Taro, who was glad to hear the news, talked to Hanako.’

This suggests that a SA at the root is relevant to the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive
relative clauses.
To-complement clauses under a verb of saying also do not allow a sentence-final particle
(Saito and Haraguchi 2012), as in (252).108

(252)

Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kiite)

kanozyoi-no itoko-wa

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hearing) shei-Gen
(*{wa/sa/na/yo/ne})-to]

uresi-gat-ta

cousin-Top glad-GAR-Past

{it-ta/saken-da/…}.

(*{SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP/SFP})-Rep] {say-Past/shout-Past/…}
‘Hanakoi {said/shouted/…} that heri cousin had behaved as being glad (to hear that).’

In the case of to-complement clauses under a verb of saying, however, the Experiencer is
restricted to the local speaker. Let us suppose that to-complement clauses contain a SAP (between
a ForceP and a ReportP). The badness of sentence-final particles inside of to-complement clauses
is probably due to meaning conflict: sentence-final particles are linked to the matrix context (as

108

When to-complement clauses represent direct discourse, sentence-final particles are available, as in (i).
(i) Hanako-wa “Yosiko-wa uresi-gat-ta
({wa/yo/ne})”-to
{it-ta/saken-da/…}
Hanako-Top “Yosiko-Top glad-GAR-Past ({SFP/SFP/SFP})”-Quot {say-Past/shout-Past/…}
‘Hanako {said/shouted/…}, “Yosiko behaved as being glad.”’
But in this case, to does not embed the projections for sentence-final particles. Rather, it takes a phonetic
sequence, Yosiko-ga uresi-gat-ta ({wa/yo/ne}).
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first and second person pronouns), and so their modification of embedded speech act causes
mismatch. (The reason why this case is treated differently from adversative conjunctive clauses
and non-restrictive relative clauses is that to-clauses under a verb of saying allow insertion of an
interrogative marker ka (as in (23)), while the other clauses not.)
The only one problematic case is to-complement clauses under a verb of
thinking/believing. They do not restrict the Experiencer, though they are c-commanded by a SA
at the root and a SA in the embedded clause. Because a SA and the Experiencer need not be in the
same clause for the Experiencer restriction (see (248) and (249)), it appears that dropping of the
supposition that to-complement clauses contain a SAP does not help. We will see a solution in the
next section.
The above arguments can be summarized as follows: all and only clauses which allow
insertion of darô restrict the Experiencer to the speaker related to the closest SA, except tocomplement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing. Supposing that there is a
phonetically null Mod Mod if Mod is not overtly occupied, this summary can be restated as
follows.

(253)

All and only clauses which contain Mod restrict Experiencers in them to the speaker
related to the closest SA, except to-complement clauses under verbs of noncommunicational attitudes, where the Experiencer restriction is inactive.

5.4 Assertive speech acts and a semantic parameter
In this section, let us consider speech acts further and see that assertion requires the
speaker to empathize with a covert Experiencer, if there is one, in English. Based on it, I propose
that assertion in Japanese requires the speaker to empathize with an Experiencer, whether it is
covert or overt.
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For example, let us consider the following conversation, which involves a predicate of
personal taste, ‘taste good’.

(254) A: This soup tastes good.
B: No, it doesn’t taste good.

Here, A and B disagree without making false assertion. Importantly, B’s assertion cannot be
interpreted as an assertion about A’s taste. It represents B’s taste or the taste of people who are
like B. This fact suggests that the speaker needs to empathize with a covert Experiencer, if any, in
assertion.109 This point is stated by researchers of predicates of personal taste in different ways,
but the core is similar:

“The other important piece of my pragmatic proposal is the norm of assertion. I suggest
that it is what Lasersohn would call autocentric. Specifically, I propose that in order for a
speaker A to assert a sentence S, it must be the case that for all of A’s doxastic
alternatives w′,t′,x, S is true at the index w′,t′,x. […] this means that A must believe
that S is true as judged by A.” (Stephenson 2007b: 66)

“Sentences with predicates of personal taste in truth-directed contexts [e.g., assertions]
(and without an overt subject being specified) always express first-person-based
109

A different approach to this observation is to impose a restriction on the condition of
confirmation/denial by the hearer. See von Fintel and Gillies (2011) for such an analysis of an epistemic
modal, might. I do not take this approach here, because it does not help to account for the restriction on the
overt Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives, which do not involve a hearer’s judgment. For
example, let us consider assertions (i) and (ii) made by Taro:
(i) watasi-wa uresi-i.
‘I am glad.’
(ii) #Hanako-wa uresi-i. (Intended:) ‘Hanako is glad.’
Assertion (ii) is always unacceptable, irrespective of the hearer’s judgment. In other words, the badness of
(ii) is independent of confirmation/denial by the hearer of the information conveyed by the sentence.
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genericity, generalizing from a first-personal subjective experience to anyone meeting the
contextually given restriction.” (Moltmann 2010: 214)

“(43) states how we propose to treat PPTs [= predicates of personal taste].
(43) Proposal
PPTs such as tasty are used to make statements about whether something is tasty
to people in general, based on first person experience.
The idea is this: when I say This cake is tasty, I commit myself to finding the cake tasty.
That’s why I cannot coherently follow up with, . . . but I don’t like it. But this is not all I
do. I also generalize beyond my own experience to the likely experience of anyone with
whom I empathize who might eat the cake and claim that they would find it tasty too.
This is why PPTs are interpreted generically, at least when there is no overt PP.”
(Pearson 2013a: 121)110

Now, to account for the Experiencer restriction, I propose that assertion’s requirement of
the speaker’s empathy to an Experiencer is stronger in Japanese than in English: in Japanese,
assertion requires the speaker to empathize with an Experiencer, whether it is covert or overt.
Formally, this is analyzed as a result of agreement between Experiencer NPs and Mod in
Japanese, which does not occur in English. (In both languages, assertion sets the value of h to the
speaker.) A formal analysis is presented in the next section.

110

Actually, the assertion This cake is tasty can be followed by but I don’t like it with respect to some other
property than tastiness (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.). In that case, however, the continuation, but I don’t like it, does
not indicate the speaker’s non-commitment to finding the cake tasty. Therefore, the purport of Pearson’s
argument is not affected by such a case.
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5.5 Single-feature checking analysis
In this section, I present an analysis which supposes that Mod agrees with an Experiencer,
and mediates the value of Experiencer determined by SA (namely, the speaker) to the
Experiencer. The idea of agreement between the epistemic modal and the Experiencer follows
Tenny’s (2006) proposal of agreement between the Sentience/Evidential head and the
Experiencer DP. In Tenny’s analysis, Experiencer adjectives assign their Experiencer arguments
features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant], and the features are checked by a
Sentience/Evidentiality head and an SA head, respectively. In the analysis which I present below,
only one feature, [sen] (which is the same as [+sentient] feature), is assigned to an Experiencer
DP and it is checked with [sen] on a Mod head. I call this analysis a single-feature checking
analysis.111
Partly following Tenny’s double-feature checking analysis, I propose as follows.

(255) a. Experiencer adjectives assign their Experiencer DP a feature [sen], which indicates that
the referent of the DP can have epistemic states.112
b. Mod has a feature [sen].
c. If there is an Experiencer DP in the local domain of Mod, the Experiencer DP raises to
[Spec,ModP] and their feature [sen] agree.113
111

In Tenny’s analysis, the Experiencer, which raises to [Spec,Sen/EvidP] for checking [+sentient] feature,
further raises to [Spec,SAP] to check [+discourse participant], if there is no intervening Sen/EvidP. One of
the reasons why I do not take the double-feature checking analysis is that it predicts island sensitivity which
is not observed: if an Experiencer is in a syntactic island and the closest SAP is outside of the island, then
the two-feature analysis predicts that the Experiencer is not restricted. However, there are syntactic islands
which do not contain SAP which show the Experiencer restrictions, namely adversative conjunctive
adjuncts and nonrestrictive relative clauses. Another reason is related to the use of [+discourse participant],
which is treated in the next chapter.
112
It follows Tenny (2006:264): “The feature [+sentient] indicates that the entity referred to can have
epistemic states.”
113
If there is no Experiencer in the local domain of Mod, agreement of [sen] does not occur. In such a case,
feature [sen] on Mod remains unchecked. I suppose that failure of agreement of [sen] feature on Mod is
unproblematic, based on Preminger’s (2009, 2011) claim that failure to Agree does not lead to crash.
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In the spirit of Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2006, 2007a,b) and others, I suppose that the truthvalue of a sentence depends not only on the assignment function g, possible world w, and context
c, but also on a parameter for an Experiencer of the sentence, h. I suppose that an SA head sets h
to the denotation of a phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] as in (256). The null pronoun is
proposed in Speas (2004).

(256)

[[ [SAP pro [SA ϕ ] ] ]]g,w,c,h = λx. [[ ϕ ]]g,w,c,h→x ([[ pro ]]g,w,c,h)

Speas claims that the pronoun refers to the speaker. In the spirit of Speas (2004), I suppose that a
speaker can assert a sentence S only if the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] at the root of
S is bound to the speaker, as in (257) (which will be revised below).

(257)

One can assert an SAP only if [Spec,SAP] is occupied by a phonetically null pronoun
that is bound to the speaker. (To be revised)

I suppose that the trace of a moved DP is a variable, as is usually supposed (e.g., as in Heim and
Kratzer 1998). Mod, which agrees with an Experiencer DP, binds the trace of the moved
Experiencer DP, based on the claim that syntactic feature checking accompanies semantic
binding. In Heim and Kratzer (1998), movement of a DP introduces a λ-binder which binds the
trace of the DP, but here I do not posit a λ-binder distinct from the one which corresponds to Mod.
It might be considered to be rather ad hoc, but the same kind of analysis of movement of a DP to
the left-periphery is required in other analyses also (e.g., McKenzie 2011 and Constant 2014), and
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so it seems that such a semantic treatment is legitimate.114 With these suppositions, I propose that
a phonetically null Mod Mod is a semantic binder of the trace of its agreeing Experiencer DP
with a presupposition that its domain is {h}, as in (258). Here, [n] represents an index feature, and
α and β are arbitrary elements.

(258)

[[ Mod[n][sen] [α [n][sen] β] ]]g,w,c,h = λx: x=h. [[ α [n][sen] β ]]g[n→x],w,c,h
agreement

In the following, let us see how this analysis works. Condition (257) will be revised in the course
of analysis.

5.5.1 Analysis of a root clause
First, let us consider an assertive root clause in conversation (259).

(259)

(Context: In conversation)
Hanako-wa

uresi-k-at-ta

yo

Hanako-Top glad-Pred-be-Past SFP
‘Hanako was glad.’

This sentence is felicitously assertable only if Hanako is the speaker. If Hanako is not the speaker,
it is unacceptable. Let us see how it is derived in the single-feature checking analysis.

114

I thank Seth Cable (p.c.) for this point.
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The TP of (259) has the following structure (in the following, I omit irrelevant
projections). The Experiencer predicate uresi-k ‘glad-Pred’ assigns a feature [sen] to the
Experiencer DP Hanako (which has an index feature [n]).

(260)





TP

VP
T
 
 


PredP
V
-ta
 



Past
 
DP
Pred′
-ar
‘be’
Hanako[n][sen] AP
Pred
|
|
A
-k
|
uresi‘glad’

The TP is c-commanded by a Mod. It is supposed that a Mod has a feature [sen] and an index
feature [n], and they agree with the corresponding features on the Experiencer DP, which raises to
[Spec,ModP].
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(261)

ModP
Mod′

TP
Mod


VP
T
Mod[n][sen]
 
 


PredP
V
-ta


Past
 
DP
Pred′
-ar
‘be’
Hanako[n][sen]
AP
Pred
|
|
A
-k
|
uresi‘glad’
DP

Hanako[n][sen]




agreement

The ModP is c-commanded by an SA.

(262)

SAP
proi

SA′

ModP
SA


DP
Mod′


Hanako[n][sen]
TP
Mod




Hanako[n][sen]-wa uresi-k-at-taMod[n][sen]
agreement

[Spec,SAP] is occupied by a phonetically null pronoun proi which is bound to the speaker,
following (257).
Now, let us calculate the logical form of (262). In the following, I use English
translations in place of Japanese words and ignore the past tense.
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(263)

[ proi SA[ Hanako[n][sen]Mod[n][sen] [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ] ]

Here, the elements in this logical form have the following meaning:

(264) a. [[ Hanako[n][sen] ]]g,w,c,h = g(n) if g(n) = Hanako. Undefined otherwise.
b. [[ was glad ]]g,w,c,h = λx.x was glad in w
c. [[ Mod[n][sen] ψ ]]g,w,c,h = λx:x=h.[[ψ]]g[n→x],w,c,h
d. [[ [ForceP pro [SA ϕ] ] ]]g,w,c,h = λx. [[ ϕ ]]g,w,c,h→x ([[ pro ]])
e. [[ proi ]]g,w,c,h = g(i) if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise

(from (257))

The calculation of (263) goes as follows.

(265)

[[ (263) ]]g,w,c,h
= (λx. [[ Hanako[n][sen] Mod[n][sen] [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ]]g,w,c,h→x)
([[ proi ]])
= (λx. [[ Hanako[n][sen] Mod[n][sen] [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ]]g,w,c,h→x)(g(i))
if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise.
= [[ Hanako[n][sen] Mod[n][sen] [ Hanako[n][sen] was glad ] ]]g,w,c,g(i)
if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise.
= λx: x=g(i). (x was glad in w)([[ Hanako[n][sen] ]]g,w,c,g(i))
if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise.
= λx: x=g(i). (x was glad in w)(g(n))
if g(i) = sp(c) and g(n) = Hanako. Undefined otherwise.
= g(n) was glad in w
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if g(i) = sp(c), g(n) = Hanako, and g(n)=g(i). Undefined otherwise.

Thus, the SAP means that Hanako was glad in w, if Hanako is the speaker. Otherwise the logical
form is undefined. This is the desired result. If Hanako is not the speaker, the sentence has no
truth-value, so it is not felicitously assertable.

5.5.2 Clauses without ModP
Clauses such as no-complement clauses and restrictive relative clauses do not contain
ModP, as indicated by the fact that they cannot contain Mod darô. When they contain an
Experiencer, agreement between the Experiencer and Mod does not happen, so the Experiencer is
not restricted. In other words, an Experiencer DP with features [n] and [sen] in such a clause is
interpreted as g(n) and [sen] indicates that g(n) can have epistemic states (from (255a)), but
nothing forces the value g(n) to be the speaker in the sentence.

5.5.3 Non-restrictive relative clauses and adversative conjunctive clauses
Let us consider non-restrictive relative clauses. As we saw above, they can contain Mod
darô, so they have ModP. To see how the Experiencer restriction of the non-restrictive relative
clause emerges, let us consider (266).

(266)

(Context: The speaker is not Taro.)
#[sore-ga

uresi-k-at-ta]

Tarô-wa tobidasi-ta.

[that-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past] Taro-Top run.away-Past
(Intended:) ‘Taro, who was glad about that, ran away.’
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I posit the following structure for the non-restrictive relative clause in (266). The Experiencer
adjective sore-ga uresi-k- ‘be glad about that’ assigns feature [sen] to a covert relative pronoun
wh. The relative pronoun raises to [Spec,ModP] to check the features [sen] and [n], and then
raises to yield a predicate of type e,t, with insertion of a λ-abstractor below it.

(267)



ModP

DP
ModP

 wh[n][sen]λj

ModP

Mod′

TP
Mod


VP
T
Mod[n][sen]
 

 
PredP
V
-ta



 Past

 
DP
Pred′
ar‘be’
wh[n][sen]
AP
Pred

|
DP
A -k

 
sore-ga
uresi‘that-Nom’ ‘glad’
Agreement
DPj

wh[n][sen]











The LF of (267) is calculated as follows (I use English translations). I suppose that the
relative pronoun lacks meaning, but its traces are interpreted as variables, following Heim and
Kratzer (1998).

(268)

[[ wh[n][sen] λj wh[n][sen]j [ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen] was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h
= λx.[[ j [ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen] was glad about that ] ]]g[j→x],w,c,h
= λx.[ ([[ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen] was glad about that ]]g[j→x],w,c,h)([[ j ]]g[j→x],w,c,h)]
= λx.[ ([[ Mod[n][sen] [ wh[n][sen] was glad about that ]]g[j→x],w,c,h)(x)]
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= λx.[ λy: y=h. (y was glad about that in w)(x) ]
= λx. [x was glad about that in w] if x=h, undefined otherwise.

From the fifth line to the sixth line in (268), I used the following lexical entry for the predicate,
was glad about that.

(269)

[[ was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h = λx. x was glad about that in w

I posit that the non-restrictive relative clause is attached to a ForceP (see the analysis in
the previous chapter), as in (270) (ignoring word order).

(270)

SAP
proi

SA′
ForceP

SA

ForceP
ForceP
 
TP
Mod
wh[n][sen] sore-ga uresi-k-at-ta Mod[n][sen]

 

‘who was glad about that’
Tarok-wa tobidasi-taMod[n][sen]
Agreement
‘Tarok ran away’
The calculation of the non-restrictive relative clause is executed, following rule (201), which is
reproduced below.

(201) a. Let node CPi dominate the LF position of DP.
[[ [CPi … DP NRRCPi … ] ]]g = # unless for some DP d and some index k, DP = dk.
If  #, [[ [CPi … DPk NRRCPi … ] ]]g = [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]g  [[ NRRCPi ]]g(g(k))
(where # represents presupposition failure)
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b.  is the operation of parataxis. As a first approximation,
[[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]g  [[ NRRCPi ]]g(g(k)) = 1 iff [[ [CPi … DPk …] ]]g = 1 and
[[ NRRCPi ]]g(g(k)) = 1.
(based on Schlenker 2013: 20(45))

Using it, the topmost ForceP is calculated as follows.

(271)

[[ [ForceP Tarok [ForceP who was glad about that ] ran away ] ]]g,w,c,h
= [[ Tarok ran away ]]g,w,c,h  [[ who was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h(g(k))

The first conjunct yields (273), with lexical entry (272) for ran away.

(272)

[[ ran away ]]g,w,c,h = λx. x ran away in w

(273)

[[ Tarok ran away ]]g,w,c,h
= (λx. x ran away in w)([[Tarok ]]g,w,c,h)

(using (272))

= (λx. x ran away in w)(g(k)) if g(k) = Taro. Undefined otherwise.

(using (264a))

= g(k) ran away in w if g(k) = Taro. Undefined otherwise.

The second conjunct yields (274).

(274)

[[ who was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h(g(k))
= (λx. x was glad about that in w)(g(k)) if x=h, undefined otherwise. (using (268))
= g(k) was glad about that in w

if g(k)=h, undefined otherwise.
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Combining (273) and (274), we obtain the translation of the whole ModP, (271)

(275)

[[ [ForceP Tarok [ForceP who was glad about that ] ran away ] ]]g,w,c,h
= [[ Tarok ran away ]]g,w,c,h  [[ who was glad about that ]]g,w,c,h(g(k))
= g(k) ran away in w, if g(k) = Taro. Undefined otherwise
 g(k) was glad about that in w, if g(k)=h, undefined otherwise.

From (201), the truth condition of the whole ForceP is that it is true if and only if g(k) ran away in
w, g(k) was glad about that in w, g(k) = Taro, and g(k) = h. In short, it means that Taro was glad
about that and he ran away in w and Taro = h.
Finally, the value of h at ModP (in ForceP) is set by SAP. It is the speaker, as is
calculated in (276).

(276)

[[ proi [ SA[ForceP ForceP [ForceP NRR] ] ] ]]g,w,c,h
= (λx. [[ [ForceP ForceP [ForceP NRR] ] ]]g,w,c,h→x)([[ proi ]])

(using (256a))

= [[ [ForceP ForceP [ForceP NRR] ] ]]g,w,c,g(i) if g(i) = sp(c). Undefined otherwise. (using
(264e))

Consequently, combination of (275) and (276) yields the final result: the whole sentence, (266), is
true if and only if Taro was glad about that and he ran away and Taro is the speaker. The
condition that Taro is the speaker is not satisfied in the given context, so the sentence is not
acceptable.
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The Experiencer restriction in adversative conjunctive clauses is explained similarly to
the Experiencer restriction in non-restrictive relative clauses. For illustration, let us consider the
following sentence.

(277)

#Tarô-wa uresi-k-at-ta-kedo,

boku-wa uresi-ku

Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-though I-Top

na-k-at-ta

yo

glad-Pred Neg-Pred-be-Past SFP

(Intended:) ‘Though Taro was glad, I was not glad.’

(277) has the following structure (here, projections which are irrelevant to the present discussion
are omitted, and word order is not observed).

(278)

SAP
SA′

proi
ForceP
ConnP

ForceP

ModP
Conn boku-wa uresi-ku na-k-at-ta




‘I was not glad’
NP
Mod′
kedo


‘though’
Tarô Mod[n][sen] PredP
Taro

NP
Pred′

Tarô[n][sen] Pred
AP
|

Agreement
-k
uresi‘glad’
[[ [ModP Tarô-wa uresi-k-at-ta ] ]]g,w,c,h is calculated as in (279).
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SA
|
yo

(279)

ModP: Taro was glad in w if Taro = h. Undefined otherwise.

NP
Mod′: λx: x=h. x was glad in w

Tarô Mod[n][sen] PredP: x was glad in w
Taro λx: x=h 
NP
Pred′: λx. x was glad in w

Tarô[n][sen] Pred
AP: λx. x was glad in w
x
|

Agreement
-k
uresi‘glad’

I suppose that adversative conjunctors such as kedo ‘though’ have the following meaning (t1 and
t2 are of type t).

(280)

[[ kedo ]]g,w,c,h = λt1.λt2. t1  t2

The operation , which represents a conjunction as a first approximation, actually represents a
discourse relation (Schlenker 2013a: 41). In the case of a non-restrictive relative clause, it is
supposed that all discourse relations that are available for parataxis in discourse are possible, if
there is no element which specifies a discourse relation in the non-restrictive relative clause.
Schlenker (2013a) does not discuss adversative conjunction and uses  only for non-restrictive
relative clauses. But in the literature, the relation between two sentences which are conjoined by
an adversative conjunctor such as but is often captured as a discourse relation of Contrast115
(Asher and Lascarides 2003, among many others), which is a discourse relation between

115

Adversative conjunction may involve other discourse relations also. For example, in the case of (i), not
only Contrast but also Background holds between the two sentences (Asher and Lascarides 2003:465).
(i) John loves sport. But he hates football. (Asher and Lascarides 2003:168(41b))
The discourse relation of Background is defined as follows.
(ii) Background(α, β): “This relation holds whenever one constituent provides information about the
surrounding state of affairs in which the eventuality mentioned in the other constituent occurred.”
(Asher and Lascarides 2003: 460)
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structurally similar but semantically dissimilar sentences (Asher and Lascarides 2003).116 It is not
fundamentally different from (some of117) the other discourse relations available for parataxis, so
it seems to be reasonable to suppose that the relation between an adversative conjunctive clause
and a matrix clause also can be represented by , similarly to that between a non-restrictive
relative clause and a matrix clause. Using (279) and (280), [[ ForceP ]]g,w,c,h is calculated as in
(281).

(281)

SAP
SA′

proi

ForceP
Taro was glad in w  sp(c) was glad in w
if Taro = h and sp(c) = h. # otherwise.
ConnP
λt2. Taro was glad in w  t2
if Taro = h. # otherwise.
ModP:
Taro was glad in w if Taro = h
if Taro = h. # otherwise



Tarô-wa uresi-k-at-ta
‘Taro was glad’

SA

ForceP
sp(c) was glad in w
if sp(c) = h. # otherwise.
Conn boku-wa uresi-ku na-k-at-ta
‘I was not glad’
kedo
‘though’
λt1.λt2. t1  t2

The calculated [[ ForceP ]]g,w,c,h shows that it is undefined unless Taro = h and sp(c) = h. The
condition that Taro = h and sp(c) = h cannot be satisfied unless Taro is the speaker. This explains
the infelicity of (277).
116

Formally, Asher and Lascarides (2003) define Contrast as follows, using Segmented Discourse
Representation Theory (SDRT).
(i) “Contrast(a, b) can hold only if Ka and Kb are structurally similar and semantically dissimilar.” (Asher
and Lascarides 2003: 152)
Here, Ka and Kb mean the Segmented Discourse Representation Structures (SDRSs) of sentences a and b,
respectively. For other definitions of the discourse relation of Contrast in other frameworks, see Mann and
Thompson (1988), Umbach (2004), and Spenader and Maier (2009), among others.
117
For example, the discourse relation of parallelism is a relation between structurally similar and also
semantically similar sentences.
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5.5.4 To-complement clauses under verbs of saying
Let us consider a to-clause under verb of saying yu-u ‘say’.

(282)

#Hanako-wa [Taro-wa uresi-k-at-ta-to]

it-ta.

Hanako-Top [Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] say-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako said that Taro had been glad.’

The to-clause has two interpretations, namely indirect discourse interpretation and direct
discourse (=direct quotation) interpretation. The analysis of the Experiencer restriction in the case
of the direct quotation interpretation reduces to the analysis of the Experiencer restriction of a
root clause, #Taro-wa uresi-k-at-ta (‘Taro was glad’), which was analyzed in section 5.5.1. So I
focus on the Experiencer restriction in the case of the indirect discourse interpretation in this
section.
Let us consider the to-clause, (283), in (282). Its syntactic structure is given in (284),
where most of the projections which are irrelevant to the following argument are omitted.

(283)

Taro-wa uresi-k-at-ta-to
Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep
‘that Taro was glad’
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(284)

RepP
SAP
SA′

proi

Rep
|
-to

ModP
SA
 


NP
Mod′
 

Tarô Mod[n][sen] PredP
Taro

NP
Pred′

Tarô[n][sen] Pred
AP
|

Agreement
-k
uresi‘glad’

The calculation goes in the same way as the case of the root clause, which is given in section
5.5.1. First, [[ ModP ]]g,w,c,h is calculated as follows.

(285)

RepP
SAP
proi

SA′

Rep
|
-to

ModP:
SA
Taro was glad in w if Taro = h. # otherwise.

NP
Mod′: λx: x=h. x was glad in w

Tarô Mod[n][sen]
PredP: x was glad in w
Taro
λx: x=h

NP
Pred′: λx. x was glad in w

Tarô[n][sen] Pred
AP: λx. x was glad in w
x
|

Agreement
-k
uresi‘glad’
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Second, [[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h is calculated as in (286), using the result of the calculation of
[[ ModP ]]g,w,c,h.

(286)

[[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h
= [[ [SAP proi [ SA ModP ] ] ]]g,w,c,h
= λx.([[ ModP ]]g,w,c,h→x) ([[ proi ]]g,w,c,h)
= λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]g,w,c,h)

What is the referent of proi in the case of a to-clause under a verb of saying? Let us recall (257),
which is reproduced below.

(257)

One can assert an SAP only if [Spec,SAP] is occupied by a phonetically null pronoun
that is bound to the speaker. (To be revised)

In other words, the referent of proi in the case of a to-clause under a verb of saying is the speaker
who asserted the content of the to-clause, namely the local speaker. Therefore, the calculation of
[[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h continues as follows.

(287)

[[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h
= λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]g,w,c,h)

(from (286))

= λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)(Hanako)
= Taro was glad in w if Taro = Hanako. # otherwise.

Taro is not Hanako, so it shows that the LF of the SAP is not defined. It is in accordance with the
non-assertability of (282).
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5.5.5 To-complement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing
Next, let us consider the exceptional case mentioned in section 5.2.7, namely tocomplement clauses under verbs of thinking/believing/knowing. They do not restrict an
Experiencer, although they contain ModP and SAP. For example, (288) is felicitously assertable.

(288)

Hanako-wa [Taro-ga

uresi-k-at-ta-to]

{omot/sinzi/sit}-tei-ta.

Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep] {think/believe/know}-Perf-Past
‘Hanako {thought/believed} that Taro was glad.’

Note that the condition on the selection of proi in [Spec, SAP], (257), does not cover these tocomplement clauses, since the content of thinking/believing/knowing is not asserted (in other
words, thinking, believing, and knowing are not assertive speech acts). Here, extending (257), let
us suppose (289) for the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP]:118

(289) a. If an individual A asserts a SAP, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in
[Spec,SAP] must be A.
b. Otherwise, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] can be any
individual.

With (289), the Experiencer restriction does not emerge in to-clauses under verbs of
thinking/believing/knowing.

118

This analysis is due to Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.).
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For illustration, let us consider (288). The to-clause, (283), has the syntactic structure
given in (284), reproduced below.

(283)

Taro-wa uresi-k-at-ta-to
Taro-Top glad-Pred-be-Past-Rep
‘that Taro was glad’

(284)

RepP
SAP
SA′

proi

Rep
|
-to

ModP
SA
 


NP
Mod′
 

Tarô Mod[n][sen] PredP
Taro

NP
Pred′

Tarô[n][sen] Pred
AP
|

Agreement
-k
uresi‘glad’
[[ SAP ]]g,c,w,h is calculated as in (286):

(286)

[[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h
= [[ [SAP proi [ SA ModP ] ] ]]g,w,c,h
= λx.([[ ModP ]]g,w,c,h→x) ([[ proi ]]g,w,c,h)
= λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]g,w,c,h)
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From (289b), [[ proi ]]g,w,c,h can be any individual, so it can be Taro. When [[ proi ]]g,w,c,h is Taro,
[[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h has a truth value.

(290)

[[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h
= λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)([[ proi ]]g,w,c,h)

(from (286))

= λx. (Taro was glad in w if Taro = x. # otherwise)(Taro)
= Taro was glad in w

From this calculation, it is also clear that [[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h is not defined when the referent of proi is
not Taro. It is, however, not relevant to the assertability of (288). The availability of proi whose
referent is Taro guarantees that [[ SAP ]]g,w,c,h has a truth value for some proi, and it guarantees
the assertability of (288).

5.5.6 Interrogatives
Finally, let us consider an interrogative, as in (291a,b). In the previous section, we
considered declarative sentences. Note that in the case of interrogatives, the Experiencer must be
the addressee:

(291) a. {kimi-wa/} uresi-i

(ka)?

{you-Top/} glad-Pred.be.Pres (Q)
‘Are you glad?’
b. #Tarô-wa uresi-i

(ka)?

Taro-Top glad-Pred.be.Pres (Q)
(Intended:) ‘Is Taro glad?’
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They can be treated by extending (289) to cover interrogatives as in (292).

(292) a. If an individual A asserts a SAP, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in
[Spec,SAP] must be A.
b. If individual A asks individual B a SAP, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun
in [Spec,SAP] must be B.
c. Otherwise, the referent of the phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP] can be any
individual.

5.6 Comparison between the feature-checking analysis and the situation-based analysis
Up to this point, the feature-checking analysis presented above is good at explaining the
Experiencer restriction in various environments. However, there is a case which cannot be
explained by the feature-checking analysis. It is the complement clause of vivid memory report.
The situation-based analysis presented in CHAPTER 3 can account for the Experiencer restriction
in this environment also (see section 3.8), so the principle of parsimony favors the situation-based
analysis.
The key data is that an Experiencer is restricted in a no-complement clause of verbs of
vivid memory report, while it is not restricted in a no-complement clause of verbs of knowing.
Let us compare (294) and (293).

(293)

Under a verb of vivid memory report
Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga

uresi-{gat/#k-at}-ta

no]-o

(ariarito)

Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-{GAR/#Pred-be}-Past Fin]-Acc (vividly)
{oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta.
{memorize-Perf/recall}-Past
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‘Hanako (vividly) {remembered/recalled} that Taro {behaved as being/#was} glad.’

(294)

Under a verb of knowing
Hanako-wa

[ Tarô-ga

uresi-{gat/k-at}-ta

no]-o

Hanako-Top [ Taro-Nom glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past Fin]-Acc
sit-tei-ta.
know-Perf-Past
‘Hanako knew that Taro {behaved as being/was} glad.’

No-complement clauses do not allow insertion of Mod, as shown in (295) and (296). Therefore,
they do not contain ModP.

(295)

Under a verb of vivid memory report
*Hanako-wa [Tarô-ga

uresi-{gat/k-at}-ta

darô-no]-o

(ariarito)

Hanako-Top [Taro-Nom glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past Mod-Fin]-Acc (vividly)
{oboe-tei/omoidasi}-ta.
{memorize-Perf/recall}-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako (vividly) {remembered/recalled} that Taro {probably behaved as
being/was probably} glad.’

(296)

Under a verb of knowing
*Hanako-wa

[ Tarô-ga

uresi-{gat/k-at}-ta

darô-no]-o

Hanako-Top [ Taro-Nom glad-{GAR/Pred-be}-Past Mod-Fin]-Acc
sit-tei-ta.
know-Perf-Past
(Intended:) ‘Hanako knew that Taro {probably behaved as being/was probably} glad.’
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Hence agreement between the Experiencer DP in these no-complement clauses and Mod does not
occur. It means that the Experiencer DP has an index feature and [sen] feature. Without
agreement, the index feature on the Experiencer DP is not restricted to the referent of the
phonetically null pronoun in [Spec,SAP]. The [sen] feature just indicates that the referent of the
bearer of the feature can have epistemic states (see (255a)), and so it does not yield the
Experiencer restriction under discussion.
This accounts for the absence of the Experiencer restriction in no-complement clauses
under a verb of knowing, (294), but it does not account for the presence of the Experiencer
restriction in no-complement clauses under a verb of vivid memory report. As explained in
section 3.8 of CHAPTER 3, the situation-based analysis can account for the Experiencer
restriction in no-complement clauses under a verb of vivid memory report, so it is favored by the
principle of parsimony.
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CHAPTER 6
PREVIOUS FORMAL ANALYSES OF THE EXPERIENCER RESTRICTION
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I look at some previous formal analyses and point out problems which
they face: (i) Kamio’s (1995, 1997a,b) account based on his theory of territory of information, (ii)
Tenny’s (2006) feature-checking account using morphosyntactic features [+sentient] and
[+discourse participant], and (iii) Fujii’s (2006, 2007) proposal of the reflexive subject
requirement for Experiencer adjectives.

6.2 Kamio’s territory-of-information analysis
In this section, I look at Kamio’s (1995, 1997a,b) analysis of the Experiencer restriction
based on his (1990, 1995, 1997a,b, 2002) theory of territory of information.
When a speaker makes an assertion, he needs evidence for the truth of the asserted
content.119 An aim of the theory of territory of information is to clarify the notion of evidence
necessary for assertion. The theory employs a notion of the speaker’s and hearer’s ‘territory of
information’, which is based on a notion of psychological ‘closeness’ of conveyed information to
the speaker/hearer, and explains the conditions for specific utterance forms (e.g., sentences
without any modals/evidentials, sentences with a modal/evidential, sentences with a tag question,
and so on). For example, he claims that information which is within the speaker’s territory of
information but not within the hearer’s territory of information is conveyed by sentences without
a modal or evidential.
119

It is stated, for example, in Searle’s (1969) speech act theory as a preparatory condition for assertion:
“the speaker has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of proposition p”.
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I explain the theory of territory of information briefly in section 6.2.1. Based on it, it is
argued in section 6.2.2 that his analysis works for the Experiencer restriction in root clauses, but,
as Tenny (2006:280) and Kamio himself (1995: 251f n.13) note, it is not clear how it can be
extended to account for the behavior of the Experiencer in complex sentences.

6.2.1 The closeness of information and territory of information
This section introduces the theory of territory of information by Kamio (1990, 1995,
1997a,b, 2002).
The theory of territory of information tries to understand functions of different sentential
forms in terms of psychological ‘closeness’ of conveyed information to the speaker and the hearer.
The basic postulate of the theory is the following.

(297)

There are two linear psychological scales, one for the speaker and the other for the
hearer, which measure the distance between the speaker/hearer and a given piece of
information:
information
Speaker |——|——————————|
1
0
information
Hearer |————————|————|
1
0
A given piece of information is located on these scales and can take any value between
(and including) 1 and 0.

(Kamio 1995: 236f)

He states that the meaning of values 1 and 0 is given as follows.120

120

Note, however, that it is not clear what he means by the explanation for the value 1: what does knowing
information “completely” (or possessing full knowledge) mean? He does not explicate it.
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(298) a. That a given piece of information takes the value 1 on the psychological scale for the
speaker (or for the hearer) represents a situation in which the speaker assumes that he
(or the hearer) knows the information completely and thus possesses its full knowledge.
b. That a given piece of information takes the value 0 on the psychological scale for the
speaker (or for the hearer) represents a situation in which the speaker assumes that he
(or the hearer) possesses no knowledge of the information.
(Kamio 1997b:147, slightly modified)

Based on this notion of the psychological distance of information to the speaker/hearer, the term
of the speaker’s/hearer’s territory of information is defined. In short, if the speaker assumes that a
piece of information is close enough to him (or to the hearer), the information is said to be within
the speaker’s (or the hearer’s) territory of information. Formally, Kamio defines the term of the
territory of information as follows.

(299)

There are two conceptual categories called the speaker’s and the hearer’s territory of
information. A given piece of information that is closer to the speaker than n belongs to
the speaker’s territory of information, and that which is closer to the hearer than n
belongs to the hearer’s territory of information, where n is a specified value between 1
and 0 and designates the outer boundary of both territories.

(Kamio 1997a: 17(24))

What kind of information is close to the speaker/hearer? In the case of Japanese, Kamio
claims that information which satisfies one or more conditions of (300a-d) is considered to be
close to the speaker/hearer.
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(300)

Information which is considered to be close to the speaker/hearer in the case of
Japanese
a. information obtained through the speaker’s/hearer’s internal direct experience
b. information embodying detailed knowledge which falls into the range of the
speaker’s/hearer’s professional or other expertise
c. information obtained through the speaker’s/hearer’s external direct experience
d. information about persons, objects, events and facts close to the speaker/hearer
including such information about the speaker/hearer him/herself
(Kamio 1997a:39(1))

Here, ‘internal direct experience’ means internal feelings like emotion and other mental activities
such as memory and belief. In contrast, ‘external direct experience’ means experience obtained
using the five senses. Information (300d) includes, for example, the speaker’s/hearer’s plans,
behavior, and geographical locations. It is “personal data in a broad sense” (Kamio 1997a:18).
In addition to (300), Kamio proposes the following meta-conditions.

(301)

Conditions which determine closeness of information to the speaker/hearer in the
case of Japanese
a. information subject to condition [(300b)] and [(300d)] is considered less close to the
speaker/hearer if he/she does not have an adequate basis for asserting it.
b. information which is difficult for the speaker/hearer to have access to is considered less
close to him/her.
c. new information conveyed to the speaker is generally considered less close to him/her
until considerable processing has taken place.
(Kamio 1997a: 41(4))
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Kamio claims that utterance forms used by a speaker reflect the speaker’s assumption of
the psychological closeness of the conveyed information to the speaker and the hearer. His
proposal is summarized as follows.

Table 2. Cases and utterance forms (Japanese) (Kamio 1997a: 42, table 2)
Case
A
B
BC
CB
C
D

Definition of case
1=Speaker>Hearer<n
1=H≥S>n
1=S>H>n
H>S>n
1=H>S<n
n>S≥H

Utterance form
direct form
direct-ne form
daroo form
daroo form
indirect-ne form
indirect form

For example, in Case A, a speaker assumes that he knows a piece of information ‘completely’
(see (298a)) and the information is within his territory of information, but it is not within the
hearer’s territory of information. In this case, the speaker uses a direct form (i.e., the unmarked
form, in which no modal, evidential, or other hedging expressions are used) to convey the
information. Contrastively, in Case D, a speaker assumes that a piece of information is not within
the speaker’s or hearer’s territory of information and is not psychologically closer to the hearer
than to the speaker. In this case, the speaker uses an indirect form (a sentence with a modal or
evidential, or other hedging elements which “attenuate the directness of the direct form” (Kamio
1997a:6)).
For illustration, let us consider (302) and (303). In the case of (302), the information that
the speaker’s sister made a cake yesterday is obtained by the speaker’s seeing the situation, so it
is close to the speaker (see condition (300a)). But (the speaker assumes that) it is not close to the
hearer, namely that the hearer does not know the information. Therefore, the direct form is used
in (302).
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(302)

(Context: The speaker saw his sister made a cake yesterday. The speaker assumes that
the hearer does not know that.)
boku-no imôto-ga
I-Gen

kinô

kêki-o

tukut-ta

yo.

sister-Nom yesterday cake-Acc make-Past SFP

‘My sister made a cake yesterday.’

In the case of (303), the information that Taro returned back yesterday is not closer to the hearer
than to the speaker, but it is not within the speaker’s territory of information (or the hearer’s).
Therefore, the speaker uses an evidential marker sôda to make a sentence in the indirect form.

(303)

(Context: The speaker heard that Taro returned back yesterday, and he thinks that it is
plausible. The speaker assumes that the hearer does not know the information.)
Tarô-ga

kinô

kaet-te

ki-ta

sôda

yo.

Taro-Nom yesterday return-Conn come-Past Hearsay SFP
‘I heard that Taro returned back yesterday.’

6.2.2 Analysis of the Experiencer restriction in the theory of territory of information
This section first presents the explanation of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in
the theory of territory of information, following Kamio (1995, 1997a), and then looks at a
difficulty of this approach to the Experiencer restriction.
According to the theory of territory of information, information of internal feelings of a
speaker is within the speaker’s territory of information, but not in the hearer’s territory of
information. Therefore, a speaker uses the direct form to convey information of his internal
feelings, as in (304).
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(304)

boku-wa samu-k-at-ta
I-Top

yo.

cold-Pred-be-Past SFP

‘I was cold.’

On the other hand, information of internal feelings of a third person is not within the speaker’s or
the hearer’s territory of information. Hence, the direct form is not natural, as in (305).

(305)

Tarô-wa samu-k-at-ta

{#/sooda}

yo.

Taro-Top cold-Pred-be-Pres {#/Hearsay} SFP
‘{#/I heard that} Taro was cold.’

This is Kamio’s explanation of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses.
This approach to the Experiencer restriction works for root clauses, but is insufficient to
account for (the absence or presence of) the Experiencer restriction in non-root clauses (Tenny
2006:280). It is because the theory of territory of information given in Kamio (1990, 1995,
1997a,b, 2002) explains only the forms of the matrix clause and does not treat non-root clauses
such as relative clauses. Kamio himself (1995: 251f n.13) acknowledges that a comprehensive
explanation of the Experiencer restriction “must await much further research”.

6.3 Analysis using checking of features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] (Tenny
2006)
Tenny (2006) aims to account for the Experiencer restriction not only in root clauses but
also in non-root ones, based on Speas and Tenny’s (2003) proposal of syntax of sentience and
checking of morphosyntactic features relevant to it, [+sentient] and [+discourse participant]. In

187

section 6.3.1, I present a review of the analysis, and then in section 6.3.2 I point out a serious
problem which the analysis bears.

6.3.1 A feature-driven analysis
To account for the Experiencer restriction, Tenny (2006) proposes that (i) Experiencer
adjectives lexically mark their Experiencer argument with two morphosyntactic features, (ii)
those features are checked at specifier positions of higher projections in the left periphery, and
(iii) the Experiencer raised to the specifier position of the higher projection, which is the place
associated with feature [+speaker], is required to be the speaker.
First, let us see the idea on morphosyntactic features behind Tenny’s proposal. Based on
cross-linguistic research, Harley and Ritter (2002) claim that first person, second person, and
third person pronouns are characterized by two types of morphosyntactic features (for discourse
participants and for speaker/addressee distinction). Tenny proposes to add a feature for sentient
individuals to their picture, as in (306).121 The feature [+sentient] means that the bearer can have
epistemic states. She attributes the introduction of the sentience feature to personal
communication with Ritter on Harley and Ritter’s work and Hanson (2003).

121

Harley and Ritter (2002) assume that features are monovalent (p.485), but Tenny tacitly assumes that
they are bivalent.
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(306)

Adaptation of Harley and Ritter (left branch only) (Tenny 2006: 264(50))
Referring Expression (pronoun)

+Sentient
−Sentient
 
it
+Discourse Participant
−Discourse Participant

he, she
+Speaker
−Speaker (+Addressee)
I
you

Second, let us look at the idea of Sentience/Evidentiality projection. As seen in the
previous chapters, it has been claimed that there is a Speech Act projection at the top of the left
periphery, which encodes illocutionary force (Rizzi 1997, 1999, Cinque 1999 among others).
Based on cross-linguistic study, Cinque (1999) and Speas and Tenny (2003) propose that there is
a projection in the left periphery for evidentiality. Tenny calls it Sentience/Evidentiality Phrase.
Concretely, Tenny bases her analysis on Speas and Tenny’s (2003) syntax of sentience: Different
from Rizzi and others, Speas and Tenny (2003) propose that the Speech Act projection, the
speaker, and the addressee are configurationally related as the VP and thematic roles are (cf. Hale
and Keyser 1993, 1998, 1999). In their proposal, the Speech Act projection has inner and outer
(starred) projections as Larson (1988) proposes for VPs, and the positions for the speaker and the
addressee are supposed as in (307):

(307)

The Speech Act Projection in declaratives (based on Tenny 2006: 260(41))
sa*P

sa*
speaker

sa
speech act*

sa
utterance content
 
addressee
speech act
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The structure given in (307) is for declarative clauses. In the case of interrogatives, Speas and
Tenny assume that a process similar to passivization occurs, in which the addressee argument is
raised to the specifier position of the Speech Act projection, as in (308).122 What is important is
that the addressee is closer than the speaker to utterance context in this structure.

(308)

The Speech Act Projection in interrogatives (based on Tenny 2006: 263(49))
sa*P

sa*
speaker

sa
speech act*

sa
addressee

sa
utterance content
 
t
speech act head

As for the ‘utterance content’ in (307) and (308), Speas and Tenny propose that it is realized as a
Sentience/Evidentiality projection123. It also has inner and outer projections, as in (309).

122

I do not go into the detail, because it does not matter in the following arguments.
The terms, ‘Sentience/Evidentiality projection’, ‘Evidentiality projection’, and ‘Sentience Projection’
are interchangeably used in the following.
123
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(309)

The Evidentiality Projection (Tenny 2006: 261(42))
Sentience Phrase (sen*P)
(=Evidentiality Phrase)

Sen*
seat of knowledge

sen
Sen*

sen
proposition

⁞
context
sentience head
⁞
CP/IP

Here, the ‘seat of knowledge’ is the individual who is “responsible for evaluating the truth of a
proposition based on some kind of evidence, or who holds the evidence for the truth of the
proposition in their head” (Tenny 2006:259). Combining the Speech Act projection and the
Sentience/Evidentiality projection, we obtain the following structure for declarative sentences.

(310)

Declarative (based on Tenny 2006: 263(48))
sa*P

sa*
speaker
[+disc.part.]
sa
sa* [+speaker]

sa
SenP
 
addressee
sa
sen*
seat of knowledge
[+disc.part.] 
[−speaker]
sen
 

sen
IP


Third, let us look at the idea of a feature-driven minimalist syntax. In Chomsky (1995)
and others, movement is associated with checking of features. An element (Probe) with an
uninterpretable feature seeks an element (Goal) with a feature which matches the Probe’s feature
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which is the closest to the Probe in the Probe’s c-commanding domain. If the Probe finds a Goal,
the Goal moves to the specifier position of the projection of the Probe and checking of features
(matching and deletion, if possible) occurs.124
Based on these ideas, Tenny (2006) makes the following proposal.

(311) (i) Experiencer predicates lexically mark their experiencer argument with features
[+sentient] and [+discourse participant].
(ii) The [+sentient] feature is checked at the specifier of the Sentience/Evidentiality
Projection and the [+discourse participant] feature is checked at the specifier of the
Speech Act Projection.

In her analysis, Experiencer adjectives such as samu-i ‘be cold’ and uresi-i ‘be glad’ assign
features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] to their Experiencer argument. The Experiencer
NP with [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] raises to [Spec,Sen/EvidP] to check the feature
[+sentient], and further raises to the closest [Spec,SAP] to check the feature [+discourse
participant], if possible. (Here, I use SAP to collectively denote saP and sa*P.) The specifier
position of SAP which is closest to Sen/EvidP is the position for the speaker in declaratives and
the hearer in interrogatives (see (307) and (308)), and so the Experiencer restriction emerges.
Let us see how this proposal accounts for the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in
reportive style. For example, let us consider (312).

(312)

(Situation: Yoshio says to Hanako as follows.)

124

The details differ among analyses. In recent analyses such as Chomsky (2000, 2001), instead of the
notion of the checking domain, the EPP-feature is supposed to be the cause of movement. In either
analysis, what triggers movement is feature-checking.
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a. boku-wa samu-i
I-Top

yo.

cold-Pred.be.Pres SFP

‘I am cold.’
b. #Tarô-wa samu-i

yo.

Taro-Top cold-Pred.be.Pres SFP
(Intended:) ‘Taro is cold.’

The Experiencer adjective samu-i assigns features [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] to the
experiencer arguments boku and Tarô in (312a,b), respectively. For checking of the [+sentient]
feature, the Experiencer NP raises to [Spec, Sen/EvidP]. Then, for checking of the [+discourse
participant] feature, the Experiencer NP raises to the closest [Spec,SAP], as in (313).

(313)

sa*P

sa*
speaker
 [+disc.part.]
sa
sa*
[+speaker]
 

sa
SenP
yo125
 
addressee
sa
sen*
seat of knowledge
[+disc.part.]
[+sentient]
[−speaker]
sen
 

sen
IP

Exp-wa samu-i
[+sentient]
[+disc.part.]
(based on Tenny 2006:269(64))

125

Tenny supposes that sentence-final particle yo is a head of sa*. It is based on Kuroda’s (1973)
observation that yo is acceptable only in reportive style.
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In the case of declarative clauses, the closest specifier position of SAP is the position of the
speaker as shown in (313), so boku ‘I’ is legitimate, but Tarô is not. This is why in declarative
root clauses in reportive style only the speaker is allowed as an Experiencer.

6.3.2 A problem on assignment of [+discourse participant] to the Experiencer argument
In the previous section, we saw that in Tenny’s analysis the Experiencer is restricted to
the speaker as a result of assignment of the morphosyntactic feature [+discourse participant] to
the Experiencer by Experiencer adjectives. I presented an example of a declarative root clause in
reportive style to show how her analysis works. The use of the feature [+discourse participant],
however, has a serious problem: as we will see in this section, it works well only with clauses in
which the Experiencer is restricted to a speaker or addressee.
As reviewed in the previous section, Tenny makes the following claim.

(314)

Experiencer predicates lexically mark their experiencer argument with the
morphosyntactic features [+sentient, +discourse participant].

Tenny claims that the Experiencer restriction is lifted if the Experiencer does not raise to [Spec,
SAP] to check the feature [+discourse participant] (I present her argument below). However, her
proposal that Experiencer adjectives assign the feature [+discourse participant] to their
Experiencer argument actually makes a different prediction: Experiencer arguments must be first
person or second person whether feature-checking occurs or not. It is because pronouns which
have the feature [+discourse participant] are first and second person pronouns (see (306)). Third
person pronouns have a feature [−discourse participant], so they cannot bear the feature
[+discourse participant].
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Can third person pronouns be Experiencer arguments? Yes, in many cases. For example,
let us consider no-complement clauses of a verb of knowing. As seen in previous chapters, the
Experiencer restriction is lifted in the environment. As in (315), a third person Experiencer is
allowed in such a no-complement clause.

(315)

Hanako-wa [kare-ga uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

sit-tei-ru.

Hanako-Top [he-Nom glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres
‘Hanako knows that he was glad.’

The third person pronoun kare has feature [−discourse participant], so the Experiencer adjective
uresi-i ‘be glad’ cannot mark it with feature [+discourse participant]. Therefore, according to
proposal (314), sentence (315) should be unacceptable, contrary to the fact. Clearly, this kind of
reasoning applies to all environments where the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
Let us look at Tenny’s explanation of sentences in which third-person Experiencer
arguments appear. Let us consider a declarative root clause in nonreportive style, (316).

(316)

kare wa samui
He Top cold-Pres
‘He is cold’ (non-reportive)

(Tenny 2006: 271(66))

In this sentence, the Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjective samu-i ‘be cold’ is a thirdperson pronoun, kare ‘he’. Tenny’s own explanation of the acceptability of (316) is as follows
(p.270).

Kuroda (1973) noted that the person constraint on samui holds in the reportive mode but not
in the non-reportive mode. We analyze a sentence in the non-reportive mode as having no
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First/Second Person Phrase [= SAP]. The experiencer NP that bears the features [+sentience,
+discourse participant] assigned by samui can raise to the Sentience/Evidentiality projection
but cannot raise from there to a Speech Act projection. The [+discourse participant] feature
cannot be activated, which means the person constraint cannot be activated.

It is not clear what is meant by the last sentence. It seems that Tenny supposes that the feature
[+discourse participant] “cannot be activated” unless the Experiencer NP raises to [Spec,SAP] to
check it. But what does ‘activation’ here mean? Note that the feature [+discourse participant] on
an NP is interpretable (which restricts the referent of the NP to discourse participants, namely a
speaker or an addressee), and in general, interpretable features need no checking for their
interpretability in minimalist syntax. Therefore, whether checking of the feature [+discourse
participant] happens or not, the Experiencer should be restricted to the speaker or the addressee in
her system.
In a nutshell, assignment of the morphosyntactic feature [+discourse participant] to an
Experiencer argument by Experiencer adjectives leads to the restriction of the Experiencer to a
speaker or an addressee. Such a proposal can explain the Experiencer restriction in root clauses in
reportive style, where the Experiencer is restricted to a speaker (in the case of declaratives) or an
addressee (in the case of interrogatives). In other environments, however, the Experiencer may be
a non-discourse participant, and the proposal fails.
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6.4 The reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives (Fujii 2006, 2007)
This section considers a unified analysis of the Experiencer restriction and exceptional
Case-marking (ECM) of the Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives126,127 in to-complement
clauses of verbs of thinking and feeling proposed by Fujii (2006, 2007).
A Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives, if present, is usually marked only with a
Nominative Case marker (and I considered only such a case in the previous chapters). But it is
marked with a Nominative Case marker or an Accusative Case marker in to-complement clauses
of omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’. Fujii (2006, 2007) argues that the Experiencer argument of
Experiencer adjectives128 in these to-complement clauses are obligatorily controlled (OC) PRO (if
an accusative-marked Theme argument is present), or reflexive zibun ‘self’ or its phonetically
null counterpart (if Nominative-marked Theme argument is present).129 Extending this finding, he
makes the following proposal (he calls it the ‘reflexive subject requirement for SubjExp
predicates’):

(317)

Reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives
Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer argument
(i) OC PRO,

(ii) reflexive zibun, or
(iii) the null counterpart of zibun
126

A terminological note: As in the previous sections, I use the term ‘Experiencer adjectives’ in this
section. However, Fujii himself uses the term ‘Subject Experiencer (SubjExp) adjectives’ in his papers,
borrowing it from Pesetsky (1995). Both terms ‘Experiencer adjectives’ and ‘SubjExp adjectives’ refer to
the same class of adjectives.
127
Many Experiencer adjectives (e.g., urayamasi-i ‘be envious of’, uresi-i ‘be glad’) are ambiguous
between intransitive and transitive adjectives.
128
A terminological note: In the following, I use the term Experiencer adjectives, as in the previous
sections, but Fujii himself uses the term ‘Subject Experiencer (SubjExp) adjectives’ in his papers,
borrowing it from Pesetsky (1995). Both terms refer to the same class of adjectives.
129
I do not agree with his judgment on the non-ECM case, but the difference is left aside to avoid irrelevant
complications.
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And he claims that it explains not only the Experiencer restriction in the to-complement clauses
of omo-u and kanzi-ru, but also the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and to-complement
clauses of verbs of saying and asking.
In the following, I first present his analysis in sections 6.4.1-6.4.4. Then, in section 6.4.5,
I argue that the reflexive subject requirement, (317), is not consistent with the fact that overt nonreflexive Experiencer is available in, for example, root clauses and no-complement clauses of
verbs of believing and knowing. Also I argue that the claim that (317) explains the Experiencer
restriction in root clauses is problematic because the explanation predicts that the Experiencer in
no-complement clauses of verbs of believing and knowing is also restricted, contrary to the fact.
These problems suggest that Experiencer adjectives do not have the selectional property proposed
in (317). Finally, in section 6.4.6, I consider the data on the Experiencer restriction discussed in
sections 6.4.1-6.4.5 with the situation-based and feature-checking analyses.

6.4.1 Case-marking of the Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives
This section shows that a Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives, if present, is
usually not marked with an Accusative Case marker, but it can be so in to-complement clauses of
omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’.
Adjectives in Japanese cannot mark their object with an accusative Case (Kuno 1973130
and others). In root clauses (318a-d), the Theme argument of Experiencer adjectives is marked
with a Nominative Case marker.

130

Kuno (1973:81) claims that all transitive adjectives mark their object with ga (the Nominative Case
marker in Japanese). However, as the following example shows, a transitive adjective kuwasi-i ‘be
knowledgeable (about)’ marks its object with a Dative Case.
(i) kare-wa kodaisi-ni
kuwasi-i.
he-Top ancient.history-Dat knowledgeable-Pred.be.Pres
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(318) a. watasi-wa watasi-no tomodati-{ga/*o}
I-Top

I-Gen

urayamasi-i.

friend-{Nom/*Acc} envious-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am envious of my friend.’
b. watasi-wa Hiroshima-{ga/*o}
I-Top

natukasi-i.

Hiroshima-{Nom/*Acc} nostalgic-Pred.be.Pres

‘I miss Hiroshima.’
c. watasi-wa Mari-{ga/*o}
I-Top

nikurasi-i.

Mari-{Nom/*Acc} hateAdj-Pred.be.Pres

‘I hate Mari.’
d. watasi-wa Hanako-no koto-{ga/*o}
I-Top

uresi-i.

Hanako-Gen event-{Nom/*Acc} glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am glad about Hanako’s news (good fortune, success, ..).’

Similarly, the Theme argument is marked with a Nominative Case in to-complement clauses of
verbs of saying and knowing:

(319) a. Hanakoi-wa [ ei
Hanakoi-Top [ ei

watasi-no koto-{ga/*o}
I-Gen

uresi-i-to]

it-tei-ta.

event-{Nom/*Acc} glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] say-Perf-Past

‘Hanakoi said that shei was glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’
b. Hanako-wa [watasi-ga Mari-{ga/*o}
Hanako-Top [I-Nom

nikurasi-i-to]

sit-tei-ta.

Mari-{Nom/*Acc} hateAdj-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] know-Perf-Past

‘Hanako knew that I hated Mari.’

‘He is knowledgeable about ancient history.’
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However, it is marked with a Nominative or an Accusative Case marker in to-complement
clauses of omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’, as shown in (320).

(320) a. Hiroshii-wa [Δi Mari-{ga/o}

nikurasi-i-to]

{omot/kanzi}-tei-ta

Hiroshii-Top [Δi Mari-{Nom/Acc} hateAdj-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] {think/feel}-Perf-Past
‘Hiroshii {thought/felt} that hei hates Mari.’
b. Hanakoi-wa [ Δi watasi-no koto-{ga/o}
Hanakoi-Top [ Δi I-Gen

(based on Fujii 2007: 1(1b,c))
uresi-i-to]

omot-tei-ta.

event-{Nom/Acc} glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep] think-Perf-Past

‘Hanakoi thought that shei was glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’

In the following, I call the construction in which a Theme argument of an Experiencer
adjective in a to-complement clause of omo-u ‘think’ or kanzi-ru ‘feel’ is marked with a nonAccusative Case marker the ‘non-exceptionally Case marked to-omou/kanziru construction (nonECM TO/KC)’, and the construction in which a Theme argument of an Experiencer adjective in a
to-complement clause of omo-u or kanzi-ru is marked with an Accusative Case marker the ‘longdistance ECM construction’131. They are schematically represented in (321).

(321) a. the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction (non-ECM TO/KC)
Subj [ Exp-Nom Theme-Nom ExpAdj to ] {think/feel}
b. the long-distance ECM construction
Subj [ Exp132

Theme-Acc ExpAdj to ] {think/feel}

131

The term, ‘long-distance ECM’, is borrowed from Fujii.
The Case marker of this Experiencer argument is not shown here because the argument is always
phonetically null.
132
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6.4.2 The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction
This section presents Fujii’s analysis of the Experiencer argument in the long-distance
ECM construction.

6.4.2.1 The Experiencer restriction in the long-distance ECM construction
The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is restricted in an
interesting way: it must be bound to the subject of the verb of thinking/feeling, namely the
attitude holder, and must be phonetically null. Let us look at (322a,b) for illustration. They
contain an accusative-marked Theme, so they are examples of the long-distance ECM
construction. (322a) shows that the Experiencer must be bound to the subject to the matrix verb,
Hanako. (322b) shows that the binding relation is insufficient to license the long-distance ECM
construction. The Experiencer needs to be phonetically null.

(322) a. Hanakoi-wa [{∆i/*j/*Tarô-ga}

watasi-no koto-o

Hanakoi-Top [{∆i/*j/*Taro-Nom} I-Gen

uresi-i-to]

event-Acc glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep]

omot-tei-ru.
think-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi thinks that {shei/*j/*Taro} is glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’
b. Atsukoi-wa [{∆i/?*zibuni-ga/*kanozyoi-ga}
Atsuko-Top
urayamasi-i
envious

self-Nom she

watasi-no tomodati-o

-Nom my

friend-Acc

-to] omotte ita

-Prs -C thinking was

‘Atsukoi thought that {∆i, ?*selfi, *shei} was envious of my friend.’
(Fujii 2007: 4(6a))
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6.4.2.2 The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is OC PRO
Why is the Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction restricted as
exemplified in (322)? Fujii (2006, 2007) claims as follows.

(323)

The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is always OC PRO.

It explains not only the binding by the subject of the verb of thinking/feeling but also the
long-distance ECM: if OC PRO is invisible for Minimality (Bhatt 2005), the little v in the matrix
clause can mark the Theme argument in the to-complement clause, as in (324).

(324)

Case assignment in the long-distance ECM construction (in the head-initial word
order)
Subj T v {think/feel} [ PROExp T[−finite] ExpAdj Theme-Acc ]
(invisible)

As shown in (324), the embedded tense in the long-distance ECM construction is T[−finite],
so it does not assign the Theme or the Experiencer argument the Nominative Case (it is argued
that Nominative Case is assigned by T[+finite] (Takezawa 1987, Koizumi 1995)).133 That the
embedded clause in the long-distance ECM construction does not contain T[+finite] is consistent
with the fact that the predicate in the embedded clause in the long-distance ECM construction
does not show inflection in tense, as the following contrasting pair indicates:

(325) a. the long-distance ECM construction
133

Another possibility is that the embedded clause does not contain TP and so Nominative Case is not
assigned within the clause.
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Hiroshii-wa [ Δi boku-no kazoku-o
Hiroshi-Top [ Δi I-Gen

nikurasi-{i/*k-at-ta}-to]

family-Acc hateAdj-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}-Rep]

omot-tei -ru
think-Perf-Pres
‘Hiroshi thinks that he {hates/*hated} my family.’

b. the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction
Hiroshii-wa [ Δi boku-no kazoku-ni kuwasi-{i/kat-ta}-to]
Hiroshi-Top [ Δi I-Gen

family-Dat familiar-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}-Rep]

omot-tei-ru
think-Perf-Pres
‘Hiroshi thinks that he {is/was} knowledgeable about my family.’

As (325) shows, the long-distance ECM construction does not allow the past tense form. It
suggests that the long-distance ECM construction does not have T[+finite]. The fact that i-ending
(it is glossed as Pred.be.Pres throughout this dissertation) is allowed in this environment does not
contradict with this supposition. It is because Japanese tense infection is impoverished and the
present tense form and the nonfinite or tenseless form are the same for these adjectives (both
are -i) (see e.g., Kusumoto 1999, Kawai 2006a).
In the next section, let us look at some pieces of evidence that the Experiencer argument
is OC PRO which Fujii provides.

6.4.2.3 Evidence for the claim that the Experiencer argument is OC PRO
To illustrate that the Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is OC
PRO, let us compare the Experiencer subject of Experiencer adjectives in the long-distance ECM
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construction and a phonetically null pronoun pro which is a non-Experiencer subject of a nonExperiencer adjective. In the following, Δ and  represent the Experiencer argument in the longdistance ECM construction and a phonetically null pronoun, respectively.
First, ∆ must be c-commanded by its antecedent, while  does not have to be
c-commanded by its antecedent. For example, let us look at sentences (326a,b). (326a) and (326b)
embed a non-Experiencer adjective kibisi-i ‘be hard’ and an Experiencer predicate nikurasi-i ‘be
envious of’, respectively. In these sentences, the NP Hiroshi in the matrix subject Hiroshi-no
zyosyu ‘Hiroshi’s assistant’ does not c-command the embedded subject. Sentence (326a)
illustrates that Hiroshi can be the antecedent of , while sentence (326b) illustrates that Hiroshi
cannot be the antecedent of ∆.

(326) a. Hiroshii-no zyosyuj-wa [i/j Atsuko-ni
Hiroshi’s

assistant-Top

kibisi-i-to] omotta.

Atsuko-Dat hard-Prs-C thought

‘Hiroshii’s assistantj found that {Hiroshii, Hiroshi’s assistantj} was hard on Atsuko.’
b. Hiroshii-no zyosyuj-wa [∆*i/j Atsuko-o
Hiroshi’s

assistant-Top

nikurasi-i-to] omotta.

Atsuko-Acc hard-Prs-C

thought

‘Hiroshii’s assistantj found that {Hiroshii, Hiroshi’s assistantj} hated Atsuko.’
(Fujii 2006: 161 (8a,b))

Second,  can be bound by a non-local antecedent, whereas ∆ cannot. Let us look at
sentences (327a,b), that deeply embed a non-Experiencer adjective kuwasi-i ‘be familiar’ and an
Experiencer adjective natukasi-i ‘be nostalgic’, respectively. The subject of the non-Experiencer
adjective in (327a), , allows a non-local antecedent Mari, as shown in (327a), while the subject
of the Experiencer adjective in (327a), ∆, does not, as shown in (327b).
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(327) a. Marii-wa Hiroshij-ni [i/j ano mati-ni
Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat

kuwasi-i-to]

omotte hosikatta

that town-Dat familiar-Prs-C to.think wanted

‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} knew a lot about that town.’
b. Marii-wa Hiroshij-ni [∆*i/j ano mati-o
Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat

natukasi-i-to]

omotte hosikatta

that town-Acc nostalgic-Prs-C to.think wanted

‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {*shei, hej} missed that town.’
(Fujii 2006: 161f (9a,b))

It is expected if ∆ and  are OC PRO and pro, respectively.
Third, look at sentences (328a,b) in which an NP of the form NP-dake ‘only NP’ is the
antecedent of ∆ and . As they show, ∆ must be interpreted covariantly (i.e., as in interpretation
(i)), while  can be interpreted covariantly and invariantly (i.e., as in interpretation (ii)).

(328) a. Hiroshii-dake-ga
Hiroshi-only-Nom

[∆i Mari-no

koto-o

nikurasi-i-to] omot-tei-ru

Mari-Gen thing-Acc hate-Prs-C

think-Asp-Prs

‘Only Hiroshii thinks that [∆i hates Mari].’
i. Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks that x hates Mari.
ii. *Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks Hiroshi hates Mari.
b. Hiroshii-dake-ga
Hiroshi-only-Nom

[i Mari-no

koto-ni

kuwasi-i -to]

omot-tei-ru

Mari-Gen thing-Dat familiar-Prs-C think-Asp-Prs

‘Only Hiroshii thinks that [∆i hates Mari].’
i. Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks that x knows a lot about Mari.
ii. Only Hiroshi is an x such that x thinks Hiroshi knows a lot about Mari.
(Fujii 2006: 162 (11a,b))
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This indicates that ∆ must be interpreted as a bound variable, while  not. It is consistent with the
claim that Δ is OC PRO while  is pro.
Fourth, ∆ must be interpreted de se, while  does not have to be so. For example,
sentence (329a) is felicitous only if Mari had a thought de se, while sentence (329b) is felicitous
even if Mari had a thought which is not de se.

(329) a. Marii-wa [∆i Taro-o
Mari-Top

nikurasi-i-to] omotta

Taro-Acc hat-Prs-C

thought

‘Marii thought that [∆i hated Taro].’
b. Marii-wa [i Taro-ni
Mari-Top

kibisi-i-to] omotta

Taro-Dat hard-Prs-C thought

‘Marii thought that [i was hard on Taro].’
(Fujii 2006: 162 (12a,b))

This is expected if ∆ is OC PRO, since OC PRO is interpreted de se (Chierchia 1989).
Based on these pieces of evidence, Fujii identifies ∆ as OC PRO.

6.4.3 The Experiencer restriction in the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction
Fujii claims that the Experiencer is restricted also in the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru
construction. I do not agree with him in this respect (see the previous chapters), but I follow his
judgment in this section for the sake of presentation.
Let us look at (330). The Nominative Case marking on the Theme argument Nagoya
shows that it is an example of the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction.
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(330)

Marii-wa [Hiroshij-ni [ zibuni/j-ga Nagoya-ga
Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat

natukasi-i-to]

omotte] hosikatta

self-Nom Nagoya-Nom nostalgic-Prs-C to.think wanted

‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’
(Fujii 2007: 15(36))

The goodness of (330) shows that the Experiencer argument of the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru
construction can be the reflexive zibun ‘self’.
Next, let us compare (331) and (332), in which the Experiencer arguments are
phonetically null.

(331)

Non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction
Marii-wa [Hiroshij-ni [ ei/j Nagoya-ga
Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat

natukasi-i-to]

omotte] hosikatta

Nagoya-Nom nostalgic-Prs-C to.think wanted

‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’
(Fujii 2007: 15(34))

(332)

Long-distance ECM construction
Marii-wa [Hiroshij-ni [ Δ*i/j Nagoya-o
Mari-Top Hiroshi-Dat

natukasi-i-to]

omotte] hosikatta

Nagoya-Acc nostalgic-Prs-C to.think wanted

‘Marii wanted Hiroshij to think that {*shei, hej} missed Nagoya.’
(Fujii 2007: 15(33))

They show that the null Experiencer argument Δ in long-distance ECM example (332) does not
allow long-distance antecedents (as standard OC PRO), while the null Experiencer argument in
the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru example (331) does. The latter allows the same interpretations as
reflexive zibun (compare (331) and (330)).
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Based on these data, Fujii supposes as follows.

(333)

The Experiencer argument in the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction is zibun or
the phonetically null counterpart of zibun.

6.4.4 The reflexive subject requirement (Fujii 2007) and the Experiencer restriction
Extrapolating the above claims (323) and (333), Fujii makes the following proposal
(which he calls the ‘reflexive subject requirement’):

(334)

The reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives
Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer subject
(i) OC PRO,

(ii) reflexive zibun, or
(iii) the phonetically null counterpart of zibun

And he claims that it explains the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and to-complement
clauses of verbs of saying and thinking (in the case of the non-ECM construction), as well as the
Experiencer restriction in the long-distance ECM construction.
To account for the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and to-complement clauses of
verbs of saying and thinking, Fujii claims that the OC PRO is bound to the Speech Act head
(when there is no intervening element). Concretely, he assumes the following structures for root
clauses and to-complement clauses which contain an Experiencer adjective.

(335) a. The root clause
[SaP Sa°(+author-@)i [TP PROi T° [AP tPRO Adj …
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(Fujii 2006: 163(14))

b. The to-complement clause except in the long-distance ECM construction
(NPi says/thinks) [SaP Sa°(+author)i [TP zibuni/ei T° [AP tzibun/e Adj …
c. The to-complement clause in the long-distance ECM construction
(NPi thinks/feels) [SaP Sa°(+author)i [TP PROi T° [AP tPRO Adj …
(based on Fujii 2006: 163(13))

Here, the feature [+author] represents the attitude holder. In the case of root clauses, he/she is the
external speaker134.
One might wonder why an overt Experiencer NP in root clauses such as (336) does not
block Sa°’s binding of the OC PRO and lift the Experiencer restriction.

(336)

*Tarô-wa kanasi-i

yo

Taro-Top sad-Pred.be.Pres SFP
(Intended:) ‘Taro is sad.’

To answer this question, Fujii supposes that surface experiencers in root clauses are leftdislocated above the Speech Act projection. If it is correct, surface experiencers would not
intervene Sa°’s local binding of the OC PRO, and the Experiencer restriction would emerge.
There is a large gap between the claims that the Experiencer argument in the longdistance ECM construction is OC PRO and that the Experiencer argument in the non-ECM toomou/kanziru construction is zibun or its null counterpart and the reflexive subject requirement
(334). The former claims are about Experiencer arguments in special environments, while the
latter (the reflexive subject requirement) is about all Experiencer arguments. In the following
sections, I argue that this extrapolation and the account of the Experiencer restriction is
134

The external speaker (Sells 1987:456) is the person who utters the sentence.
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problematic: (i) this extrapolation does not fit with the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP which can
appear in root clauses and other environments, and (ii) the account of the Experiencer restriction
predicts that no-complement clauses of verbs of believing and knowing restrict the Experiencer
restriction, contrary to the fact.

6.4.5 Problems of this analysis
6.4.5.1 Root clauses
First, before showing that the reflexive subject requirement is problematic, let us revise
Fujii’s analysis of the root clause (335a), because it has another problem, which is tangential to
the correctness of the reflexive subject requirement. The point is that the Experiencer subject in
root clauses cannot be OC PRO because the tense in root clauses is [+finite], different from the
embedded tense in the long-distance ECM construction, which is [−finite]. It is clear by the fact
that root clauses allow present/past-tense inflection as in (337), different from the to-complement
clause in the long-distance ECM construction, (325a).

(337)

watasi-wa uresi-{i/k-at-ta}.
I-Top

glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}

‘I {am/was} glad.’

Therefore, the proposed structure (335a), in which the Experiencer subject is OC PRO, is not
tenable. To satisfy both the Case condition and the reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer
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adjectives, the Experiencer argument in root clauses must be zibun or its null counterpart, as in
(338).135 Here, e represents the null counterpart of zibun.

(338)

[SaP Sa°(+author-@)i [TP {zibuni/ei} T° [AP {tzibun/te} Adj …

There is a big difference between the root clause and the environments investigated in the
previous three sections, namely the long-distance ECM construction and the non-ECM toomou/kanziru construction. It is the acceptability of a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP. Note that a firstperson pronoun is acceptable as a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP, as in (339).

(339)

watasi-{wa/ga} uresi-i.
I-{Top/Nom}

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am glad.’

If analysis (338) is correct, sentences like (339) must have a null counterpart of zibun as the
Experiencer subject, and the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP must be a non-argument.

(340)

watasi-{wa/ga} e

uresi-i.

I-{Top/Nom}

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am glad.’

Can the null counterpart of zibun be bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP (as well as the Speech
Act head)? If the answer is yes, the Experiencer restriction would emerge. Let us look at (341),
for example.
135

I put aside the question of whether the reflexive raises to [Spec,TP].
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(341)

*Tarôi-{wa/ga}

ei

Taro-{Top/Nom}

uresi-i.
glad-Pred.be.Pres

(Intended:) ‘Taro is glad.’

If the null counterpart of zibun can be bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP, the sentence should
allow the interpretation that Taro is glad, contrary to the fact. Therefore, in this analysis, (342)
must hold.

(342)

The ‘surface Experiencer’ NP is not a potential binder of the null counterpart of zibun.

This analysis of root clauses with a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP is, however, problematic: it
does not account for the fact that a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP and an Experiencer subject zibun
cannot co-occur. Note that zibun and its null counterpart are interchangeable in to-complement
clauses of the non-ECM to-omou/kanziru construction, as shown in (330) and (331). If a null
counterpart of zibun is present in root clauses with a ‘surface Experiencer’ NP as in (340), it is
expected that zibun can appear in the same place as e. But the expectation is not borne out. Such a
replacement yields an unacceptable sentence, as shown in (343).

(343)

*watasi-{wa/ga} zibun-ga
I-{Top/Nom}

uresi-i.

self-Nom glad-Pred.be.Pres

(Intended:) ‘I am glad.’

It is not clear how the proposal explains the badness of sentences like (343), while keeping (340)
intact. (It should be noted that in Japanese sentences with multiple ga-marked NPs are
unexceptional (Kuno 1973, 1978, Heycock 1993, Takahashi 1994, Ura 1996, 1999, Doron and
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Heycock 1999, Akiyama 2004, Koizumi 2008, among others). So it is implausible that there is a
PF constraint which forbids multiple appearances of ga-marked NPs in a sentence.)

6.4.5.2 No-complement clauses
Another problem of the proposal is that it imposes a too severe restriction on the
Experiencer argument. Because the reflexive subject requirement is a condition on the inherent
selectional property of Experiencer adjectives, it is difficult to explain the fact that there are
environments where the Experiencer restriction is absent.136 In this section, I consider nocomplement clauses and argue that the reflexive subject requirement makes a wrong prediction.
As shown in section 2.3.2, the Experiencer restriction is absent in no-complement clauses,
as in (42) and (50), which are reproduced below.

(42)

Hanakoi-wa [(sore-o

kii-te)

kanozyo-no itoko-ga

Hanakoi-Top [(that-Acc hear-ing) shei-Gen
uresi-k-at-ta-no]-o

hontôwa

cousin-Nom actually

iw-ana-k-at-ta.

glad-Pred-be-Past-Fin]-Acc say-Neg-Pred-be-Past
‘Hanakoi did not say that heri cousin was actually glad (to hear that).’

(50)

Hanakoi-wa [{zibuni/kanozyoi-no itoko}-ga
Hanakoi-Top [{selfi /shei-Gen

uresi-k-at-ta

no]-o

cousin}-Nom glad-Pred-be-Pres Fin]-Acc

sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi knows that {shei/heri cousin} was glad.’
136

Fujii mentions but does not analyze such environments as relative and nominalized clauses. See his
footnote 2 (Fujii 2006:163n2).
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Let us consider the following example, which shows that the embedded tense of the nocomplement clause is [+finite], namely that there is a distinction between present and past tense.

(344)

Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-no itoko-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

uresi-{i/k-at-ta}

no]-o

cousin-Nom glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past} Fin]-Acc

sit-tei-ru.
know-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi knows that heri cousin {is/was} glad.’

Because the tense is [+finite], if the reflexive subject requirement is correct, (344) must have a
null counterpart of zibun as the Experiencer subject, which is bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’
NP kanozyo-no itoko ‘her cousin’, as in (345).

(345)

Hanakoi-wa [[kanozyoi-no itoko]j-ga
Hanakoi-Top [[shei-Gen
no]-o

ej uresi-{i/k-at-ta}

cousin]j-Nom ej glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}

sit-tei-ru.

Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi knows that heri cousin {is/was} glad.’

This analysis has at least two problems.
First, an overt reflexive zibun cannot appear in place of the supposed null reflexive, as
exemplified in (346). It is not clear how this fact is explained in this analysis.

(346)

*Hanakoi-wa [kanozyoi-no itoko-ga
Hanakoi-Top [shei-Gen

zibun-ga uresi-{i/k-at-ta}

cousin-Nom self-Nom glad-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}
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no]-o

sit-tei-ru.

Fin]-Acc know-Perf-Pres
(Intended:) ‘Hanakoi knows that heri cousin {is/was} glad.’

Second, the analysis that the null counterpart of zibun can be bound to the ‘surface
Experiencer’ NP is not compatible with this analysis’s explanation of the Experiencer restriction
in root clauses. As stated in (342) in the previous section, the analysis of the Experiencer
restriction in root clauses requires the ‘surface Experiencer’ NP is not a potential binder of the
null counterpart of zibun. The point is this: In this analysis, the Experiencer restriction in root
clauses is supposed to be due to the binding of the Experiencer reflexive argument by the Speech
Act head. To suppose that the null Experiencer reflexive can be bound to the ‘surface Experiencer’
NP undermines this analysis.

6.4.6 Discussion
In this section, let us consider the above data and arguments from the perspective of the
situation-based analysis and the feature-checking analysis.
First, let us reconsider the contrast between (340) and (343), which are reproduced below.

(340)

watasi-{wa/ga} e

uresi-i.

I-{Top/Nom}

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am glad.’

(343)

*watasi-{wa/ga} zibun-ga
I-{Top/Nom}

uresi-i.

self-Nom glad-Pred.be.Pres

(Intended:) ‘I am glad.’
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This contrast is a mystery under the reflexive subject requirement. However, in the situationbased and feature-checking analyses, which do not suppose the reflexive subject requirement, the
difference between (340) and (343) in acceptability is not a mystery. In these analyses, the NP
watasi-{wa/ga} is simply the Experiencer argument, and so (339), which is indistinguishable with
(340) in sound, is fine, but (343) is ungrammatical because the reflexive zibun-ga is assigned no
thematic role and violates the theta criterion.

(339)

watasi-{wa/ga} uresi-i.
I-{Top/Nom}

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am glad.’

Second, as for the presence of the Experiencer restriction in root clauses and the absence
of it in some no-complement clauses, it was shown that the situation-based analysis and the
feature-checking analysis are both viable from Chapter 3 to Chapter 5.
Third, the Experiencer restriction in the long-distance ECM construction, which was not
discussed in the previous chapters, is accounted for by Fujii’s claim (323) (reproduced below).

(323)

The Experiencer argument in the long-distance ECM construction is always OC PRO.

To account for the Experiencer restriction, (323) can be simply added to the situation-based and
feature-checking analyses without modifying them.
A more satisfactory move is to derive (323) from independently motivated principles. In
Fujii’s proposal, (323) is supposed to be a consequence of the reflexive subject requirement,
(334):
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(334)

The reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives
Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer subject
(i) OC PRO,

(ii) reflexive zibun, or
(iii) the phonetically null counterpart of zibun

However, I argued in the previous section that the reflexive subject requirement is problematic. I
would like to claim that (323) is a consequence of the Case theory, instead of the reflexive subject
requirement.
My explanation of (323) begins with the fact mentioned in section 6.4.2.2 that i-ending of
adjectives is ambiguous between an element which contains T[+finite] and one which doesn’t.
When i-ending contains T[+finite], a Theme argument of transitive Experiencer adjectives is
assigned a Nominative Case by it, and the non-ECM construction is produced. When i-ending
does not contain T[+finite], however, a Theme argument of transitive Experiencer adjectives is
not assigned a Case by i-ending (because T[+finite], not T[−finite], has the ability to assign a
Nominative Case (Takezawa 1987, Koizumi 1995)). In this case, only if the Experiencer
argument is OC PRO, the Theme argument of transitive Experiencer adjectives is assigned a Case.
It is because OC PRO is invisible for the purpose of Minimality (Bhatt 2005) and so the little v of
the matrix clause can assign an Accusative Case to the Theme argument, as in (324), reproduced
below.

(324)

Case assignment in the long-distance ECM construction (in the head-initial word
order)
Subj T v {think/feel} [ PROExp T[−finite] ExpAdj Theme-Acc ]
(invisible)
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If the Experiencer argument is not OC PRO, the Theme argument is not assigned a Case, and so
the sentence is ungrammatical: It is a violation of the Case filter.
One puzzle which remains in this explanation is what differentiates Experiencer
adjectives and non-Experiencer adjectives with respect to availability of long-distance ECM
construction. Fujii (2006, 2007) notes that the long-distance ECM construction is not possible for
non-Experiencer adjectives, as shown in (347).

(347)

Taroi-wa [Δi/j yakyuu-{ga/*o}
Taro-Top

uma

-i

-to] omotta

baseball-{Nom/Acc} skillful -Prs-C

thought

‘Taro thought that {he, someone else} was good at baseball.’ (Fujii 2006: 165(23))

He suggests that the difference is due to a constraint that an embedded T which is combined with
an Experiencer adjectival root cannot have a tense feature, while an embedded T which is
combined with a non-Experiencer adjectival root can. However, the suggestion is not tenable
because an embedded T which is combined with an Experiencer adjectival root shows tense
inflection, as exemplified in (348).

(348)

Hiroshii-wa [ Δi boku-no kazoku-ga nikurasi-{i/k-at-ta}-to]
Hiroshi-Top [ Δi I-Gen family-Nom hateAdj-{Pred.be.Pres/Pred-be-Past}-Rep]
omot-tei -ru
think-Perf-Pres
‘Hiroshi thinks that he {hates/hated} my family.’

At present, I do not have a solution for this problem which keeps assumption (323), namely that
Experiencer arguments in the long-distance ECM construction are PRO.
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Therefore, instead of keeping (323), I would like to propose that the adjectival complex
‘Adj-i-to’137 modifies the matrix verb omo-u ‘think’/kanzi-ru ‘feel’, only if the adjective takes
Theme and Experiencer arguments, as omo-u and kanzi-ru do (cf. Kawai 2008138).139,140 In this

137

This is the case of adjectives which take i-ending. For adjectives which take da-ending, the complex has
the form, ‘Adj-da-to’. In the following, I use only -i just for simplicity.
138
Kawai (2008) proposes a similar analysis for ‘NP-ga NP-o Adj-ku omo-u’ sentences, in line with
Koizumi (2006). According to his proposal, Adj-ku in such sentences is an adverbial which modifies omou, and the construction is possible only if the adjective takes Theme and Experiencer arguments, as omo-u
does.
139
This analysis is due to personal communication with Rajesh Bhatt.
140
There is another possible analysis which does not keep the PRO requirement on Experiencer arguments
in the long-distance ECM construction. Let us suppose that the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction actually
does not contain an Experiencer argument. Precisely, let us assume (i).
(i)

a. The Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives can be syntactically unrealized.
b. If unrealized, the Experiencer is interpreted to be the attitude holder.

What is good about this proposal? The key is that there is a generalization (‘Kuno’s generalization’) that
only one-place adjectives are allowed in the ECM complement in Japanese (Kuno 1976, Kitagawa 1986,
Kawai 2006a). If the generalization is applicable to adjectives with PRO arguments, then the ‘long-distance
ECM’ is impossible for any transitive adjectives, whether Experiencer adjectives or non-Experiencer
adjectives. In this analysis, the reason why Experiencer adjectives seem to allow long-distance ECM on
the Theme argument is that the prima facie long-distance ECM construction actually contains an
intransitive adjective which lacks an Experiencer argument. Here, what divides transitive non-Experiencer
adjectives and Experiencer adjectives is that the Experiencer argument of Experiencer adjectives can be
syntactically unrealized.
Under the proposal (i), the Experiencer restriction found in section 6.4.2, which Fujii accounts for
by the reflexive subject requirement, is accounted for by the condition that only one-place adjectives are
allowed in ECM complements. Let us reconsider examples (322a,b), for illustration.
(322)

a. Hanakoi-wa [{∆i/*j/*Tarô-ga} watasi-no koto-o
uresi-i-to]
Hanakoi-Top [{∆i/*j/*Taro-Nom} I-Gen
event-Acc glad-Pred.be.Pres-Rep]
omot-tei-ru.
think-Perf-Pres
‘Hanakoi thinks that {shei/*j/*Taro} is glad about my news (good fortune, success, ..).’
b. Atsukoi-wa [{∆i/?*zibuni-ga/*kanozyoi-ga} watasi-no tomodati-o
Atsuko-Top
self-Nom she
-Nom my
friend-Acc
urayamasi-i -to] omotte ita
envious -Prs -C thinking was
‘Atsukoi thought that {∆i, ?*selfi, *shei} was envious of my friend.’
(Fujii 2007: 4(6a))

In these examples, the embedded Theme arguments are marked with accusative Case. Because of the
condition that only one-place adjectives are allowed in ECM complements, the Experiencer argument must
be syntactically unrealized. Therefore, overt Experiencers are unacceptable in these examples. The
interpretation of the unrealized Experiencer is consistent with (i.b).
This analysis, however, has some problems. It is not clear how the generalization that only oneplace adjectives are allowed is explained theoretically. Furthermore, the generalization is more complicated
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analysis, the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction does not involve ECM and is a simple clause with
the following structure, (349).

(349)

Subj-{Top/Nom} Obj-Acc [Adv Adj-i-to] {omo-/kanzi-} v [T {-u/ru}]
Assignment of Acc Case

The accusative Case of the object NP is assigned by the matrix v, with no argument between them.
This analysis solves the above problem: the observation that transitive non-Experiencer adjectives
cannot be in the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction is now connected with the fact that they do not
than stated above (Tanaka 1992, 2006), and under close scrutiny, acceptability of the ‘long-distance ECM’
construction does not accord with the generalization. For illustration, let us consider the following pair. It
shows that by adding an adjunct, a bad sentence which violates the generalization becomes acceptable.
(ii) a. *?John-wa kono daigaku-o
kyampasu-ga ookii to
sinziteiru.
John-Top this university-Acc campus-Nom large Quote believes
‘John believes this university to have a large campus.’ (Kawai 2006a: 335(13b))
b. John-wa kono daigaku-o
kyampasu-ga hoka-no dono-daigaku-yori
John-Top this university-Acc campus-Nom other-Gen any university-than
ookii-to
sinziteiru.
large-Comp believes
‘John believes this university to have a larger campus than any other universities.’
(Tanaka 2006: 9(15))
Tanaka claims that “a predicate must have some arguments or adjuncts within its projection” (Tanaka
2006:8) if there are two or more arguments within the complement clause. With his generalization in mind,
let us add an adjunct to an unacceptable ‘long-distance ECM’ sentence with a transitive non-Experiencer
adjective. If the badness is due to the generalization, it is expected that the sentence becomes better by the
addition of an adjunct. However, this expectation is not borne out. Let us consider the following pair.
(iii) a. Taroi-wa [Δi/j yakyuu-{ga/*o}
uma -i -to] omotta
Taro-Top
baseball-{Nom/Acc} skillful -Prs-C thought
‘Taro thought that {he, someone else} was good at baseball.’
(Fujii 2006: 165(23))
b. Taro-wa [ Δi/j yakyû-{ga/*o}
hoka-no dono-ko-yori uma-i-to]
omotta
Taro-Top
baseball-{Nom/Acc} other-Gen any-child-than skillful -Prs-C thought
‘Taro thought that {he, someone else} was better at baseball than any other children.’
(iii.b) is made by adding an adjunct, hoka-no dono-ko-yori ‘than any other children’, to (iii.a), as in pair
(ii.a,b). Note that accusative marking on the Theme NP is bad in both sentences. This observation suggests
that the generalization by Kuno and Tanaka is not the source of the badness of the ‘long-distance ECM’
with transitive non-Experiencer adjectives.
Another problem is that the ‘long-distance ECM’ construction and the ordinary ECM construction
have somewhat different properties, so it is doubtful that they can be treated in a unified way. See the main
text below for the differences.
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take Theme and Experiencer arguments. Because the θ-grids of transitive non-Experiencer
adjectives are different from those of omo-u and kanzi-ru (especially, omo-u and kanzi-ru take an
Experiencer argument), non-Experiencer adjectives are not licensed in the ‘long-distance ECM’
construction. A supportive fact for this analysis is that -to can be used to modify verbs in other
sentences, as in (350). Gôn and karan are onomatopoeias and (350) shows that gôn-to and karanto can modify a verb (or a verb phrase).

(350) a. kane-ga

gôn-to

nat-ta.

bell-Nom bong-quot ring-Past
‘A bell rang with a sound, ‘bong.’’ (‘A bell bonged.’)
b. itakire-ga

karan-to oto-o

tate-ta.

small board-Nom clop-quot sound-Acc make-Past
‘Small boards made “clop” sounds.

It should be noted that in this analysis, there are two mechanisms to produce the surface
form, ‘NP-{Top/Nom} NP-Acc Adj-i-to omo-u.’ One mechanism is the one proposed above. The
other mechanism is the one which produces sentences such as (351). As for the second
mechanism, I have little to add to the previous studies (Kuno 1976, Kaneko 1988, Ueda 1988,
Tanaka 1992, 2002, 2006, Sakai 1996, 1998, Ohta 1997, Bruening 2001, Kawai 2006a, among
others), where these sentences are analyzed to involve Raising-to-Object or ECM as in English.

(351)

Tarô-wa sora-o

aka-i-to

omot-tei-ru.

Taro-Top sky-Acc red-Pred.be.Pres-Quot think-Perf-Pres
‘Taro thinks the sky to be red.’
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There are some differences between sentences produced by the first mechanism and ones
produced by the second mechanism. One difference is that in the latter sentences, the embedded
adjective need not take an Experiencer argument. For example, in (351), the embedded adjective
aka-i ‘be red’ takes a Theme, but no Experiencer. On the other hand, in the former sentences, the
embedded adjective’s θ-grid must accord with the θ-grid of the matrix verb. It means, in
particular, that the θ-grid contains an Experiencer.
Another difference is the selection of the matrix verb. The matrix verb of sentences
produced by the first mechanism can be only omo-u ‘think’ and kanzi-ru ‘feel’ (as observed by
Fujii), which have rather bleached meaning. On the other hand, the matrix verb of sentences
produced by the second mechanism is not so limited. Epistemic verbs (which is called ‘b-type’ by
Postal 1974) such as sinzi-ru ‘believe’ and omoikom-u ‘assume, convinced oneself’ can form the
construction (e.g., Kawai 2006a), as in (352).

(352) a. Tarô-wa sono nyûsu-o uresi-i-to
Taro-Top that news-Acc glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot
{omot-tei/*sinzi-tei/*omoikon-dei}-ru.
{think-Perf/*believe-Perf/*assume-Perf}-Pres
‘Taroi {thinks/*believes/*assumes} that hei is glad about the news.’

b. Tarô-wa sora-o

aka-i-to

Taro-Top sky-Acc red-Pred.be.Pres-Quot
{omot-tei/sinzi-tei/omoikon-dei}-ru.
{think-Perf/believe-Perf/assume-Perf}-Pres
‘Taro {thinks/believes/assumes} the sky to be red.’
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Yet another difference is that the embedded complement in the sentences made by the
second mechanism must represent an individual-level predicate (e.g., Kawai 2006a), while that in
the sentences made by the first mechanism need not. For example, (351) cannot be used if Taro
thinks that the sky is temporarily red (say, with the setting sun). In such a situation, sora ‘sky’
must be marked with a nominative Case, as in (353).

(353)

Tarô-wa sora-ga

aka-i-to

omot-tei-ru.

Taro-Top sky-Nom red-Pred.be.Pres-Quot think-Perf-Pres
‘Taro thinks that the sky is red.’

This applies to Experiencer adjectives also. For example, uresi-i ‘be glad’ represents a stage-level
property, so it can be embedded with a nominative Experiencer, but it cannot be with an
accusative Experiencer:

(354) a. Tarô-wa Hanako-ga

uresi-i-to

omot-tei-ru.

Taro-Top Hanako-Nom glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot think-Perf-Pres
‘Taro thinks that Hanako is glad.’
b. *Tarô-wa Hanako-o

uresi-i-to

omot-tei-ru.

Taro-Top Hanako-Acc glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot think-Perf-Pres
(Intended:) ‘Taro thinks Hanako to be glad.’

Now, sentences produced by the first mechanism do not show this restriction, as exemplified by
the goodness of the following example.

(355)

Tarô-wa

sono nyûsu-o

uresi-i-to

omot-tei-ru.

Taro-Top that news-Acc glad-Pred.be.Pres-Quot think-Perf-Pres

223

‘Taroi thinks that hei is glad about the news.’

The existence of these differences is not a surprise if there are two different mechanisms
which make sentences of the form, ‘NP-{Top/Nom} NP-Acc Adj-i-to omo-u’.

6.5 Summary
This section reviewed three previous analyses of the Experiencer restriction. First,
Kamio’s analysis, which is based on his theory of territory of information, can explain the
Experiencer restriction in root clauses. But it is not clear how it accounts for the behavior of the
Experiencer in non-root clauses because the theory of territory of information at present treats
only root clauses. Second, the feature-checking analysis by Tenny (2006) also can explain the
Experiencer restriction in root clauses. The proposal, however, boils down to a too severe
constraint on the Experiencer argument: Experiencer adjectives lexically select an Experiencer
who is a speaker or an addressee. It is because of the claim that Experiencer adjectives assign a
morphosyntactic feature [+discourse participant] to their Experiencer argument. The prediction
that Experiencers are a speaker or an addressee does not fit with the empirical data. In fact, there
are many environments where the Experiencer restriction is lifted. I used no-complement clauses
of a verb of knowing for illustration of such an environment. Third, the reflexive subject
requirement for Experiencer adjectives (Fujii 2006, 2007) is based on the Experiencer restriction
found in clauses with an exceptionally Case-marked Theme argument, which was not discussed
in the previous chapters. I argued that the requirement is inconsistent with the availability of overt
non-reflexive Experiencer NPs in (at least) root clauses and no-complement clauses of verbs of
believing and knowing. Also, I showed that the requirement does not account for the Experiencer
restriction in root clauses and the absence of the restriction in no-complement clauses of verbs of
believing and knowing in the same breath. Finally, I gave some possible accounts of the
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Experiencer restriction in clauses with an accusative Case-marked Theme argument which can be
incorporated into the situation-based and feature checking analyses developed in the previous
chapters.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has analyzed the restrictions on the Experiencer argument of adjectives
of emotions and sensations in Japanese. In Chapter 1, after introduction of the Experiencer
restriction, I reviewed those analyses which preceded development of the cartographic approach
to the left (right)-periphery. Many of them account for the restriction in some environments, but
each fails to account for it in some other environments.
In Chapter 2, I first explained the background data and theoretical hypotheses which I use
to analyze the Experiencer restriction, and then presented the basic data of the Experiencer
restriction.
In many embedded clauses, emergence of the Experiencer restriction is dependent on the
choice of the complementizer. To treat complementizers, I follow the cartographic approach to
the left(/right)-periphery of clauses, and suppose the fine-structure of the Japanese right-periphery
as in (20), based on the work by Saito and Haraguchi (2013) and others.

(20)

[[[[[ TP ] Fin ] … ] Force ]

(SA)

] (Report) ]

(ka) (wa, yo, ne, sa, …)

(to)

(ASSERT)
(INTERROG)

In matrix clauses and some embedded clauses, emergence of the Experiencer restriction
is dependent on the speech act. If a sentence is asserted in conversation (or in ‘reportive style’),
the Experiencer restriction is active. But, if a sentence is uttered in third-person narrative (or in
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‘non-reportive style’), the Experiencer restriction is lifted. Based on the fact that sentence-final
particles can appear in conversation but not in third-person narrative, it was supposed that
sentences which are asserted in conversation have a speech act projection (SAP), while sentences
which are uttered in third-person narrative do not, as in Tenny (2006).
The distribution of the Experiencer restriction is summarized in (62).

(62)

a. In a root clause in reportive style, the Experiencer of an Experiencer adjective must be
the speaker.
b. In a to-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer must be the local speaker. In a
no-clause under a verb of saying, the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
c. In a clause under an epistemic modal, an evidential, or a non-communicational attitude
predicate (except vivid memory report), the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
d. In a clause under a vivid memory report verb, an Experiencer must be the subject of the
memory verb, namely the de se individual in the clause.
e. In a restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
f. In a non-restrictive relative clause, the Experiencer is restricted to the speaker.

Chapter 3 presented a possibilistic situation semantic analysis which was inspired by the
conceptual-structural analysis of Experiencers by Jackendoff (1990) and the locative syntax of
Experiencers claimed by Landau (2010) and others. In my analysis, Experiencer adjectives like
uresi- ‘glad’ have a presupposition as in (99). Here, l is a location function which maps a
situation to its location, and μ is a function which maps a sentient individual a to his mental
location, which is called a’s mind.

(99)

[[ uresi- ]] = λx.λs: l(s) = μ(x). gladness is at s
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This entry means that, for example, Tarô-wa uresi-i ‘Taro is glad’ means ‘gladness is at s’ if the
location of s is Taro’s mind, and has no truth-value otherwise. The Japanese assertive speech act
requires the location of the topic situation, if it is mental, to be the speaker’s mind, as in (103).

(103)

[[ Assert ]]g,c = λp.λs: l(s) Dph  {μ(speaker(c))}. p(s)

The combination of the presuppositions on Experiencer adjectives and the speech act yields the
Experiencer restriction. English assertion does not have requirement (103), so English does not
show the Experiencer restriction.
In Chapter 4, I analyzed the appearance and disappearance of the Experiencer restriction
in non-restrictive relative clauses. First, it was argued that the semantics of Japanese nonrestrictive relative clauses is similar to the one proposed by Schlenker (2010, 2013a,b) for French
and English non-restrictive relative clauses. Second, it was shown that an Experiencer in a nonrestrictive relative clause is (i) restricted to a speaker if the non-restrictive relative clause is not in
the scope of an attitude predicate, (ii) restricted to a local speaker if the non-restrictive relative
clause is in the scope of a verb of saying, and (iii) not restricted if the non-restricted relative
clause is in the scope of a non-communicational verb. Third, it was shown that the situation-based
analysis proposed in Chapter 3 can account for this pattern.
Chapter 5 presented another analysis of the Experiencer restriction, which employs a
feature [sen] and a semantic parameter h. In this analysis, Experiencer adjectives assign the
feature [sen] to their Experiencer argument, and Mod also has the feature [sen]. When checking
of the feature [sen] occurs at ModP which is headed by a phonetically null Mod Mod, the referent
of the Experiencer NP is fixed to h. Supposing that assertion sets the value of h at a SAP to the
speaker, it was shown that this mechanism leads to the Experiencer restrictions in various
environments correctly. The supposition that assertion sets the value of h is the norm of assertion
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proposed by Stephenson (2007b) for English. In the feature-checking analysis, what differentiates
Japanese and English is the presence/absence of checking between an Experiencer NP and a Mod.
This mechanism, however, cannot be involved in the Experiencer restriction in no-clauses under
verbs of vivid memory because no-clauses do not contain ModP (no-clauses are FinP, and FinP
are smaller than ModP). Thus, if this analysis is correct, there are at least two kinds of
Experiencer restrictions whose derivations are different. And so the principle of parsimony favors
the situation-based analysis over the feature-checking analysis.
In Chapter 6, I reviewed previous formal analyses of the Experiencer restriction. Kamio’s
(1995, 1997a,b) analysis based on the theory of territory of information explains the Experiencer
restriction in root clauses, but it is not clear how the account can be extended to cover the
Experiencer restriction in embedded clauses. In Tenny’s (2006) feature-checking analysis,
Experiencer adjectives assign two features, [+sentient] and [+discourse participant] to their
Experiencer argument. The feature [+sentient] is checked at a Sentience/EvidentialP, and the
feature [+discourse participant] is checked at a Speech Act projection. A difference between this
analysis and the analysis proposed in Chapter 5 is the use of the feature [+discourse participant]. I
argued that the use of the feature [+discourse participant] is problematic because the assignment
of [+discourse participant] to the Experiencer argument means that the Experiencer is non-thirdperson in any environment, which does not fit the data. Fujii (2006, 2007) proposes the “reflexive
subject requirement” for SubjExp predicates (SubjExp predicates include Experiencer adjectives).
According to his proposal, Experiencer adjectives lexically select as their Experiencer argument
(i) OC PRO, (ii) reflexive zibun, or (iii) the null counterpart of zibun. A problem of this analysis
is that it does not account for the (un)grammaticality of the following pair of sentences.

(339)

watasi-{wa/ga} uresi-i.
I-{Top/Nom}

glad-Pred.be.Pres

‘I am glad.’
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(343)

*watasi-{wa/ga} zibun-ga
I-{Top/Nom}

uresi-i.

self-Nom glad-Pred.be.Pres

(Intended:) ‘I am glad.’

Suppose that the reflexive subject requirement for Experiencer adjectives is correct. Then, the
grammaticality of sentence (339) indicates that the Experiencer NP in (339) is the null
counterpart of reflexive zibun (note that the Experiencer NP in (339) cannot be OC PRO for Case
reasons). But if so, it is not clear why (343) is ungrammatical, for the difference of (339) and
(343) is whether the Experiencer NP, the reflexive zibun, is pronounced or not. Another problem
is that it is not clear how it can treat the cases where the Experiencer restriction is lifted.
In this dissertation, I presented a situation semantic analysis which supposes that
Experiencers have a locative semantics and a feature-checking analysis which supposes that the
Experiencer restriction involves a feature [sen] and a semantic parameter h. As mentioned above,
I argued that the principle of parsimony favors the situation-based analysis over the featurechecking analysis. However, it is important to find empirical data which differentiates the two
analyses. It is not done in this dissertation, but I am going to return to it in future work.

230

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrusán, Márta. (2011) “Presuppositional and negative islands: a semantic account.” Natural
Language Semantics 19: 257-321.
Akatsuka McCawley, Noriko. (1978) “Epistemology and Japanese syntax: Complementizer
choice.” In Donka Farkas, Wesley M. Jacobsen, and Karol W. Todrys, eds., Papers from
the Fourteenth Regional Meeting Chicago Linguistic Society, 272-284. Chicago, IL:
Chicago Linguistic Society.
Akmajian, Adrian and Chisato Kitagawa. (1981) “AUX in Japanese.” In Susan Steele with
Adrian Akmajian, Richard Demers, Eloise Jelinek, Chisato Kitagawa, Richard Oehrle,
and Thomas Wasow, An Encyclopedia of AUX: A Study in Cross-Linguistic Equivalence,
97- 114. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Alexiadou, Artemis and Elena Anagnostopoulou. (1998) “Parametrizing AGR: Word order, Vmovement and EPP-checking.” Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 16: 491-539.
Amaral, Patricia, Craige Roberts, and E. Allyn Smith. (2007) “Review of The Logic of
Conventional Implicatures by Chris Potts.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 707-749.
Anand, Pranav. (2006) De De se. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.
Anand, Pranav. (2007) “Re-expressing judgment.” Theoretical Linguistics 33: 199-208.
Anand, Pranav and Andrew Nevins. (2004) “Shifty operators in changing contexts.” In Robert B.
Young, ed., SALT XIV, 20-37. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Aoki, Haruo. (1986) “Evidentials in Japanese.” In Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols, eds.,
Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 223-238. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Arad, Maya. (1998) VP-Structure and the Syntax-Lexicon Interface. MIT Occasional Papers in
Linguistics 16. MIT.
Asher, Nicholas and Alex Lascarides. (2003) Logics of Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Azuma, Hiroko. (1992) “Kanjōkeiyōshi jutsugobun ni okeru kanjōshu no ninshōseigen: Jojutsu
no tachiba kara [Person restriction on the Experiencer: from the standpoint of narration].”
In Ikudō Tajima and Kazuya Niwa, eds., Nihongo Ronkyū 3, Gendai Nihongo no kenkyū,
45-68. Osaka: Izumi Shoin.
Azuma, Hiroko. (1993) “Tôziteki tokutyo-niyoru kanzyokeiyôshi-no imikizyutsu [Description of
the meaning of adjectives of feelings by syntactic features].” Nagoya Daigaku Kokugo
Kokubungaku 72: 58-72.
Azuma, Hiroko. (1997a) “Nihongo ni okeru ninshō to mūdo no itchi [Agreement of person and
mood in Japanese].” Nanzan Kokubun Ronshu 21: 7-25.

231

Azuma, Hiroko. (1997b) Gendai Nihongo ni okeru kanjōkeiyōshibun o meguru tōgogenshō:
kanjōshu no ninshō no seiyakugenshō o chūshin ni [Syntactic Phenomena of Sentences
with Adjectives of Feeling in Modern Japanese: Mainly on the Person Restriction
Phenomena of Experiencers]. Ph.D. dissertation, Nagoya University. URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/2237/16775
Banfield, Ann. (1982) Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of
Fiction. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Barwise, Jon. (1981) “Scenes and other situations.” Journal of Philosophy 59: 369-396.
Belletti, Adriana and Luigi Rizzi. (1988) “Psych-verbs and θ-theory.” Natural Language and
Linguistic Theory 6: 291-352.
Benveniste, Émile. (1959) “Les Relations de temps dans le verbe Français.” Bulletin de la Société
de Linguistique de Paris 54: 46-68. Reprinted in Émile Benveniste (1966) Problèmes de
linguistique générale, 237-250. Éditions Gallimard; English translation by Mary
Elizabeth Meek, “The correlations of tense in the French verb.” In Emile Benveniste
(1971) Problems in General Linguistics, 205-215. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami
Press.
Bhatt, Rajesh. (2005) “Long distance agreement in Hindi-Urdu.” Natural Language & Linguistic
Theory 23: 757-807.
Bouchard, Denis. (1995) The Semantics of Syntax: A Minimalist Approach to Grammar. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Bowers, John. (1993) “The syntax of predication.” Linguistic Inquiry 24: 591–656.
Bruening, Benjamin. (2001) “Raising to object and proper movement.” Ms., University of
Delaware, Newark.
Büring, Daniel. (2005) Binding Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1967) “Indicators and quasi-indicators.” American Philosophical
Quarterly 4: 85-100.
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1987) “Self-consciousness, demonstrative reference, and the selfascription view of believing.” Philosophical Perspectives 1: 405-454.
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1989) Thinking, Language, and Experience. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Chierchia, Gennaro. (1989) “Anaphora and attitudes de se.” In Renate Bartsch, Johan van
Benthem, and Peter van Emde Boas, eds., Semantics and Contextual Expression, 1-31.
Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
Chierchia, Gennaro and Sally McConnell-Ginet. (2000) Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction
to Semantics, Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

232

Chomsky, Noam. (1995) The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. (2000) “Minimalist inquiries: The framework.” In Roger Martin, David
Michaels, and Juan Uriagereka, eds., Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honor
of Howard Lasnik. 89-155. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. (2001) “Derivation by phase.” In Michael Kenstowicz, ed., Ken Hale: A Life in
Language, 1-52. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cinque, Guglielmo. (1999) Adverbs and Functional Heads: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Constant, Noah. (2011) “Re-diagnosing appositivity: Evidence for Prenominal Appositives from
Mandarin.” To appear in Carissa Abrego-Collier, Arum Kang, Martina Martinović and
Chieu Nguyen, eds., Proceedings of Chicago Linguistics Society (CLS) 47.
Cooper, Robin. (1983) Quantification and Syntactic Theory. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Cresswell, M. J. (1990) Entities and Indices. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Deal, Amy Rose. (2008) “Events in space.” In Tova Friedman and Satoshi Ito, eds., Proceedings
of SALT 18, 230-247. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Del Gobbo, Francesca. (2003) Appositives at the Interface. Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Irvine.
Doron, Edit and Caroline Heycock. (1999) “Filling and licensing multiple specifiers.” In David
Adger, Susan Pintzuk, Bernadette Plunkett, and George Tsoulas, eds., Specifiers:
Minimalist Approaches, 69-89. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dowty, David and Paul Jacobson. (1989) “Agreement as a semantic phenomenon.” In Joyce
Powers and Kenneth de Jong, eds., Proceedings of Eastern States Conference on
Linguistics (ESCOL) 1988, 95-101. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, CLC Publications.
Endo, Yoshio. (2010) “Shûjoshi-no kâtogurafî [Cartography of sentence-final particles].” In
Nobuko Hasegawa, ed., New Developments of Syntax and Japanese Linguistics: Beyond
Propositions, 67-94. Tokyo: Kaitakusha.
von Fintel, Kai. (1994) Restrictions on Quantifier Domains. Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
von Fintel, Kai and Anthony S. Gillies (2011) “‘Might’ made right.” In Andy Egan & Brian
Weatherson, eds., Epistemic Modality, 108–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Fintel, Kai and Irene Heim. (2007) Intensional Semantics. Spring 2007 edition. Ms., MIT.
Fujii, Tomohiro. (2006) “Evidentiality and the distribution of OC PRO.” In Donald Baumer,
David Montero, and Michael Scanlon, eds., Proceedings of the 25th West Coast
Conference on Formal Linguistics, 159-167. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings
Project.

233

Fujii, Tomohiro. (2007) “Controlling Japanese experiencer.” Nanzan Linguistics: Special Issue 1,
Vol. 2, 1-17.
Fukui, Naoki. (1995) Theory of Projection in Syntax. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Gajewski, Jon. (2002) “On analyticity in natural language.” Ms., MIT.
Gajewski, Jon. (2009) “L-triviality and grammar.” Handout. University of Connecticut. URL:
http://gajewski.uconn.edu/papers/Logic.pdf
Garrett, Edward John. (2001) Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan. Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Los Angeles.
Giorgi, Alessandra, and Fabio Pianesi. (1998) Tense and Aspect: From Semantics to
Morphosyntax. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Groenendijk, Jeroen, and Martin Stokhof. (1982) “Semantic Analysis of Wh-Complements.”
Linguistics and Philosophy 5: 175–233.
Hamblin, C. L. (1973) “Questions in Montague Grammar.” Foundations of Language 10: 41-53.
Hara, Yurie and Christopher Davis. (2013) “Darou as a deictic context shifter.” In Proceedings of
FAJL 6.
Hara, Yurie, Youngju Kim, Hiromu Sakai, and Sanae Tamura. (2013) “Projections of events and
propositions in Japanese: A case study of Koto-nominalized clauses in causal relations.”
Lingua 133: 262-288.
Harada, S.I. (1973) “Counter Equi NP deletion.” Annual Bulletin 7: 113-147. Tokyo: University
of Tokyo, Research Institute of Logopedics and Phoniatrics.
Harris, Jesse A. and Christopher Potts. (2009) “Perspective-shifting with appositives and
expressives.” Linguistics and Philosophy 32: 523-552.
Harris, Jesse A. and Christopher Potts. (2009) “Predicting perspectival orientation for appositives.”
In Ryan Bochnak, Nassira Nicola, Peet Klecha, Jasmin Urban, Alice Lemieux and
Christina Weaver, eds., Proceedings of CLS 45, Number 1: The Main Session, 207-221.
Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Heim, Irene. (2008) “Features on bound pronouns.” In Daniel Harbour, David Adger, and Susana
Béjar, eds., Phi Theory: Phi-Features across Modules and Interfaces, 35-56. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer. (1998) Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heycock, Caroline. (1993) “Syntactic predication in Japanese.” Journal of East Asian Linguistics
2: 167-211.
Higginbotham, James and Robert May. (1981). “Questions, quantifiers, and crossing.” The
Linguistic Review 1: 41-80.

234

Hiraiwa, Ken. (2010) “Spelling out the Double-o Constraint.” Natural Language and Linguistic
Theory 28: 723-770.
Hiraiwa, Ken and Shinichiro Ishihara. (2002) “Missing links: cleft, sluicing, and ‘no da’
construction in Japanese.” In Proceedings of Humit 2001, MIT Working Papers in
Linguistics 43, 35-54.
Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey K. Pullum. (2002) The Cambridge Grammar of the English
Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huemer, Michael. (2011) “Sense-data.” In Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). URL:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/sense-data/
Inoue, Kazuko. (1976) Henkei Bunpô to Nihongo, Jô [Transformational Grammar and Japanese,
Volume 1]. Tokyo: Taishukan.
Inoue, Kazuko. (2007) “Nihongo-no môdaru-no tokutyô saikô [Reconsideration of the characters
of Japanese modals].” In Nobuko Hasegawa, ed., Nihongo-no Syubun Gensyô: Tôgokôzôto Modaritî [Main Clause Phenomena in Japanese: Syntactic Structure and Modality],
227-260. Tokyo: Hituzi Shobo.
Jackendoff, Ray. (1990) Semantic Structures, Linguistic Inquiry Monograph 18. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Jayaseelan, K. A. (2008) “Topic, focus and adverb positions in clause structure.” Nanzan
Linguistics 4: 43-68.
Jayaseelan, K. A. (2014) “Coordination, relativization and finiteness in Dravidian.” Natural
Language and Linguistic Theory 32: 191-211.
Kadmon, Nirit. (2001) Formal Pragmatics: Semantics, Pragmatics, Presupposition, and Focus.
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Kamio, Akio. (1990) Jôhô-no Nawabari Riron [The Theory of Territory of Information]. Tokyo:
Taishukan Shoten.
Kamio, Akio. (1995) “Territory of Information in English and Japanese and psychological
utterances” Journal of Pragmatics 24: 235-264.
Kamio, Akio. (1997a) Territory of Information. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Kamio, Akio. (1997b) “Evidentiality and some discourse characteristics in Japanese.” In Akio
Kamio, ed., Directions in Functional Linguistics, 145- 171. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Kamio, Akio. (2002) Zoku Jôhô-no Nawabari Riron [The Theory of Territory of Information, the
Second Volume]. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten.
Kaneko, Yoshiaki. (1988) “On exceptional Case-marking in Japanese and English.” English
Linguistics 5: 271-289.

235

Kaplan, David. (1989) “Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and
epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals.” In Joseph Almog, John Perry, and
Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan, 481-563. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karttunen, Lauri. (1977) “Syntax and semantics of questions.” Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 3-44.
Kawai, Michiya. (2006a) “Raising to object in Japanese: A small clause analysis.” Linguistic
Inquiry 37: 329-339.
Kawai, Michiya. (2006b) “Verbal morphology of Japanese.” In Claire Gurski and Milica Radisic,
eds., Proceedings of the 2006 Annual Conference of the Canadian Linguistic Association,
10 pages. URL: http://westernlinguistics.ca/Publications/CLA2006/Kawai.pdf
Kawai, Michiya. (2008) “Verbal morphology of Japanese and head movement.” In Susie Jones,
ed., Proceedings of the 2008 Annual Conference of the Canadian Linguistic Association,
15 pages. URL: http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~cla-acl/actes2008/CLA2008_Kawai.pdf
Kinsui, Satoshi. (1986) “Rentai shūshoku seibun-no kinou [The function of nominal modifiers].”
In Matsumura Akira Kyōju Koki Kinenkai, ed., Matsumura Akira Kyōju koki kinen
kokugo kenkyū ronshū, 602-624. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
Kinsui, Satoshi. (1989) “‘Houkoku’ ni tuite no oboegaki [A note on ‘report’].” In Yoshio Nitta
and Takashi Masuoka, eds., Nihongo no Modariti [Modality in Japanese], 121-129.
Tokyo: Kurosio Syuppan.
Kinsui, Satoshi. (1990) “Jutsugo-no imisou-to jojutsu-no tachiba [The semantic layer of
predicates and the standpoint of narration]” Joshidai bungaku. Kokubunhen 41: 26-56.
Kishimoto, Hideki. (2011) “Setsu-no syûhenyôso: Modaritî-to daimoku [Peripheral elements of
clauses: Modality and the topic.” In Michiko Takeuchi and Hiromi Sato, eds., Hatsuwa-to
Bun-no Modaritî: Taisyôkenkyu-no Shiten-kara [Utterances and Modality of Sentences:
From the Perspective of Comparative Study], 115-137. Tokyo: Hituzi Shobo.
Kiyota, Masaru. (2008) Situation Aspect and Viewpoint Aspect: From Salish to Japanese. Ph.D.
dissertation, University of British Columbia.
Kizu, Mika. (2009) “Japanese modals at the syntax-pragmatics interface.” In Barbara Pizziconi
and Mika Kizu, eds., Japanese Modality: Exploring its Scope and Interpretation, 183204. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (1991) Syntax of Adjuncts and the Phrase Structure of Japanese. MA thesis,
The Ohio State University.
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (1993) “Modal phrase and adjuncts.” In Patricia M. Clancy, ed.,
Japanese/Korean Linguistics, Volume 2, 409-428. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (1995) Phrase Structure in Minimalist Syntax. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.
Koizumi, Masatoshi. (2006) “Control by predicate raising.” In Shosuke Haraguchi, Osamu
Fujimura, and Bohumil Palek, eds., Proceedings of LP 2002: Studies in Language,
Speech and Communication, 693-715. Prague: The Karolinum Press.

236

Koizumi, Masatoshi. (2008) “Nominative object.” In Shigeru Miyagawa and Mamoru Saito, eds.,
The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Linguistics, 141-167. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Koyama, Atsuko. (1966) “No, ga, wa no tukaiwake ni tuite: tensei bunpoo riron no nihongo e no
tekiyoo [How to use the particles no, ga and wa: the transformation theory applied to the
Japanese language].” Kokugogaku [Studies in the Japanese Language] 66: 61-84.
Kratzer, Angelika. (1998a) “More structural analogies between pronouns and tenses.” In Devon
Strolovitch and Aaron Lawson, eds., //Proceedings of SALT VIII//, 92-110. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University.
Kratzer, Angelika. (1998b) “Scope or pseudoscope? Are there wide-scope indefinites?” In Susan
Rothstein, ed., Events and Grammar, 163-196. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Kratzer, Angelika. (2004) “Covert quantifier restrictions in natural languages.” Talk presented at
Palazzo Feltrinelli in Gargnano, June 11, 2004. Semantics archive.
Kratzer, Angelika. (2007) “Topic situations and other resource situations.” Lecture notes,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Kratzer, Angelika. (2009) “Making a pronoun: Fake indexicals as windows into the properties of
pronouns.” Linguistic Inquiry 40: 187-237.
Kratzer, Angelika. (2014) “Situations in natural language semantics.” In Edward N. Zalta, ed.,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). URL:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/situations-semantics/
Krifka, Manfred. (1989) “Nominal reference, temporal constitution and quantification in event
semantics.” In Renate Bartsch, Johan van Benthem and Peter van Emde Boas, eds.,
Semantics and Contextual Expression, 75-115. Dordrecht: Foris.
Krifka, Manfred. (2001) “Quantifying into question acts.” Natural Language Semantics 9: 1-40.
Krifka, Manfred. (2004) “Semantics below and above speech acts.” Handout. Talk presented at
Stanford University, April 9, 2004.
Krifka, Manfred. (2011) “Questions.” In Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn, and Paul
Portner, eds., Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning,
Volume 2, 1742-1785. Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton.
Kudo, Mayumi. (1995) The Aspect-Tense System and the Text. Tokyo: Hituzi Syobo.
Kunihiro, Tetsuya. (1965) “Nichiei ondo keiyoshi no igiso no kouzou to taikei [The structure and
system of the sememes of the English and Japanese temperature adjectives].”
Kokugogaku 60: 74-84.
Kuno, Susumu. (1973) The Structure of the Japanese Language. (Current Studies in Linguistics
Series, no.3) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

237

Kuno, Susumu. (1976) “Subject raising.” In Masayoshi Shibatani, ed., Syntax and Semantics 5:
Japanese Generative Grammar, 17-49. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Kuno, Susumu. (1978) “Theoretical perspectives on Japanese linguistics.” In John Hinds and
Irwin Howard, eds., Problems in Japanese Syntax and Semantics, 213-285. Tokyo:
Kaitakusha.
Kuno, Susumu. (1988) “Blended quasi-direct discourse in Japanese.” In William J. Poser, ed.,
Papers from the Second International Workshop on Japanese Syntax, 75-102. Stanford,
CA: CSLI.
Kuroda, Sige-Yuki. (1965) Generative Grammatical Studies in the Japanese Language. Ph.D.
dissertation, MIT.
Kuroda, S.-Y. (1973) “Where epistemology, style, and grammar meet: a case study from
Japanese.” In Stephen R. Anderson and Paul Kiparsky, eds., A Festschrift for Morris
Halle, 377-391. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Kusumoto, Kiyomi. (1999) Tense in Embedded Contexts. Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
Kusumoto, Kiyomi. (2005) “On the quantification over times in natural language.” Natural
Language Semantics 13: 317-357.
Landau, Idan. (2010) The Locative Syntax of Experiencers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lasersohn, Peter. (2005) “Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.”
Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643-686.
Lewis, David. (1979) “Attitudes de dicto and de se.” The Philosophical Review 88: 513-543.
Lewis, David. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Magri, Giorgio. (2009) “A theory of individual-level predicates based on blind mandatory scalar
implicatures.” Natural Language Semantics 17: 245-297.
Maier, Emar. (2009) “Japanese reported speech: Against a direct-indirect distinction.” In
Hiromitsu Hattori, Takahiro Kawamura, Tsuyoshi Idé, Makoto Yokoo, and Yohei
Murakami, eds., New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI 2008 Conference and
Workshops, Asahikawa, Japan, June 11-13, 2008, Revised Selected Papers (Lecture
Notes in Artificial Intelligence 5447), 133-145. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Mann, William C. and Sandra A. Thompson. (1988) “Rhetorical Structure Theory: Toward a
functional theory of text organization.” Text 8: 243-281.
Martin, Samuel Elmo. (1988) A Reference Grammar of Japanese. Revised Edition. Rutland, VT:
Charles E. Tuttle Company. Republished by the University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu,
2003.

238

Masuoka, Takashi. (1997) “Hyôgen-no syukansei [Subjectivity of expressions].” In Takubo
Yukinori, ed., Shiten-to Gengokôdô [Perspectives and Verbal Behaviors], 1-11. Tokyo:
Kurosio Syuppan.
McCloskey, James and Peter Sells. (1988) “Control and A-chains in Modern Irish.” Natural
Language and Linguistic Theory 6: 143-189.
McCready, Eric and Norry Ogata. (2007) “Evidentiality, modality and probability.” Linguistics
and Philosophy 30: 35-63.
McKenzie, Andrew Robert. (2012) The Role of Contextual Restriction in Reference-Tracking.
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Minami, Fujio. (1967) “Bun-no imi-nituite ni san-no oboegaki [Some notes on meaning of
sentences]” Kokugo Kenkyû 24: 28-46.
Minami, Fujio. (1974) Gendai Nihongo no Kôzô [The Structure of Modern Japanese]. Tokyo:
Taishukan Shoten.
Minami, Fujio. (1993) Gendai Nihongo Bunpô no Rinkaku [An Outline of the Modern Japanese
Grammar]. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten.
Miyagawa, Shigeru. (2012) “Agreements that occur mainly in the main clause.” In Lobke
Aelbrecht, Liliane Haegeman, and Rachel Nye, eds., Main Clause Phenomena: New
Horizons, 79-111. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Miyake, Tomohiro. (1995) “Nihongo-no hukugômeisiku-no kôzô: seigenteki/hiseigentekirentaisyûsyokusetu-o megutte [The structure of complex noun phrases in Japanese].”
Studies in the Modern Japanese Language 2: 49-66. Osaka: Osaka University.
Miyake, Tomohiro. (1996) “Nihongo-no shudaisosei-no shōgou-to kukōzō [Checking of the topic
feature and phrase structures in Japanese].” Gendai nihongo kenkyu [Studies in the
modern Japanese language] 3: 17-34. Osaka University.
Mohanan, K. P. and Tara Mohanan. (1990) “Dative subjects in Malayalam: Semantic information
in syntax.” In M. K. Verma and K. P. Mohanan, eds., Experiencer Subjects in South
Asian Languages, 43-57. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Moltmann, Friederike. (2010) “Relative truth and the first person.” Philosophical Studies 150:
187-220.
Motomura, Mitsue. (2003) “The thematic roles of sentential to/ko complements in
Japanese/Korean.” In Patricia M. Clancy, ed., Japanese/Korean Linguistics 11, 439-453.
Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Nakau, Minoru. (1979) “Modaritii to meidai [Modality and propositions].” In Hayashi Eiichi
Kyoju Kanreki Kinen Ronbunshu Kankou Iinkai, eds., Eigo to Nihongo to [English and
Japanese], 223-250. Tokyo: Kurosio Syuppan.

239

Newen, Albert. (1997) “The logic of indexical thoughts and the metaphysics of the ‘self’.” In
Wolfgang Künne, Albert Newen, and Martin Anduschus, eds., Direct Reference,
Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, 105-131. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Nihon Daijiten Kankōkai, ed. (1976) Nihon kokugo daijiten (Shogakkan’s Japanese Dictionary),
vol. 7. Tokyo: Shogakkan.
Ninan, Dilip. (2008) Imagination, Content, and the Self. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.
Nishio, Toraya. (1972) A Descriptive Study of the Meaning and Uses of Japanese Adjectives [in
Japanese]. The National Language Research Institute Research Report XXXXIV. Tokyo:
Syuei Syuppan.
Nishiyama, Kunio. (1999) “Adjectives and the copulas in Japanese.” Journal of East Asian
Linguistics 8: 183-222.
Nitta, Yoshio. (1991) Nihongo no Modariti to ninshō [Modalities and Persons in Japanese]
Tokyo: Hituzi Shobo.
Ohta, Kaoru. (1997) “Tense in the subject raising constructions.” In Ho-min Sohn and John Haig,
eds., Japanese/Korean Linguistics 6, 353–368. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Oshima, David Yoshikazu. (2006) Perspectives in Reported Discourse. Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University.
Pancheva, Roumyana. (2003) “The aspectual makeup of Perfect participles and the interpretations
of the Perfect.” In Artemis Alexiadou, Monika Rathert, and Arnim von Stechow, eds.,
Perfect Explorations, 277-306. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Pandharipande, Rajeshwari. (1990) “Experiencer (dative) NPs in Marathi.” In M. K. Verma and
K. P. Mohanan, eds., Experiencer Subjects in South Asian Languages, 161-179. Stanford,
CA: CSLI.
Partee, Barbara Hall. (1973) “Some structural analogies between tenses and pronouns in English.”
The Journal of Philosophy 70: 601-609.
Partee, Barbara H. (1984) “Nominal and temporal anaphora.” Linguistics and Philosophy 7: 243286.
Partee, Barbara H., Alice ter Meulen, and Robert E. Wall. (1993) Mathematical Methods in
Linguistics, Corrected First Edition. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Paul, Matthias. (1994) “Young Mozart and the Joking Woody Allen: Proper names, individuals
and parts.” In Mandy Harvey and Lynn Santelmann, eds., Proceeding of SALT 4, 268-281.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Pearson, Hazel. (2013a) “A judge-free semantics for predicates of personal taste.” Journal of
Semantics 30: 103-154.

240

Pearson, Hazel. (2013b) The Sense of Self: Topics in the Semantics of De Se Expressions. Ms.
February 2013. A lightly revised version of her Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
September 2012.
Perry, John. (1979) “The problem of the essential indexical.” Noûs 13: 3-21.
Pesetsky, David. (1995) Zero Syntax: Experiencers and Cascades. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pietroski, Paul M. (2000) “On explaining that.” The Journal of Philosophy 97: 655-662.
Postal, Paul M. (1974) On Raising. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Potts, Christopher. (2005) The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Preminger, Omar. (2010) “Failure to Agree is Not a Failure: phi-Agreement with Post-Verbal
Subjects in Hebrew.” In Jeroen Van Craenenbroeck and Johan Rooryck, eds., Linguistic
Variation Yearbook 9, 241–278. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Rizzi, Luigi. (1997) “The fine structure of the left-periphery.” In Liliane Haegeman, ed.,
Elements of Grammar: A Handbook of Generative Syntax, 281-337. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Rizzi, Luigi. (1999) “On the position “Int(errogative)” in the left periphery of the clause.” Ms.,
Università di Siena.
Ross, John Robert. (1970) “On declarative sentences.” In Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S.
Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English Transformational Grammar, 222-272. Waltham,
MA: Ginn and Company.
Ryan, Marie-Laure. (1981) “The pragmatics of personal and impersonal fiction.” Poetics 10: 517539.
Sæbø, Kjell Johan. (2011) “Appositives in modal contexts.” In Ingo Reich, et al., eds.,
Proceedings of Sinn & Bedeutung 15, 79-100. Saarbrücken: Universaar-Saarland
University Press.
Saito, Mamoru. (1985) Some Asymmetries in Japanese and Their Theoretical Implications. Ph.D.
dissertation, MIT.
Saito, Mamoru. (2010) “On the nature of the complementizer to.” Journal of Japanese Linguistics
26: 85-100.
Saito, Mamoru and Tomoko Haraguchi. (2012) “Deriving the cartography of the Japanese right
periphery: The case of sentence-final discourse particles.” Iberia 4: 104-123.
Sakai, Hiromu. (1996) “Clause reduction in Japanese.” In Masatoshi Koizumi, Masayuki Oishi,
and Uli Sauerland, eds., Formal Approaches to Japanese Linguistics 2, 193–212. MIT
Working Papers in Linguistics 29.

241

Sakai, Hiromu. (1998) “Raising asymmetry and improper movement.” In Noriko Akatsuka,
Hajime Hoji, Shoichi Iwasaki, Sung-Ock Sohn, and Susan Strauss, eds.,
Japanese/Korean Linguistics 7, 481–497. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Sato, Hiromi. (2011) “The speaker, the subject and different types of embedded clauses in
Japanese.” The Human Studies 174: 115-155. Kanagawa University. URL:
http://human.kanagawa-u.ac.jp/gakkai/publ/pdf/no174/17408.pdf
Sato, Hiromi. (2012) “On Some Differences between Restrictive and Nonrestrictive Relative
Clauses and the Parallelism between Head-Internal and Head-External Relative Clauses
in Japanese.” Kanagawa University Studies in Language 34: 1-33. URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10487/10251
Schlenker, Philippe. (1999) Propositional Attitudes and Indexicality: A Cross-Categorial
Approach. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.
Schlenker, Philippe. (2003) “A plea for monsters.” Linguistics and Philosophy 26: 29-120.
Schlenker, Philippe. (2010) “Supplements within a unidimensional semantics I: Scope.” In Maria
Aloni, Harald Bastiaanse, Tikitu de Jager, and Katrin Schulz, eds., Logic, Language and
Meaning: 17th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 16-18,
2009, Revised Selected Papers (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 6042), 74-83.
Berlin: Springer.
Schlenker, Philippe. (2013a) “Supplements within a unidimensional semantics II: Epistemic
status and projection.” In Seda Kan, Claire Moore-Cantwell, and Robert Staubs, eds.,
NELS 40: Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistic
Society, Volume Two, 167-181. Amherst, MA: GLSA.
Schlenker, Philippe. (2013b) “Supplements without bidimensionalism.” Ms., Expanded version,
February 12, 2013. Institut Jean-Nicod, CNRS; New York University.
Schwarz, Florian. (2012) “Situation pronouns in determiner phrases.” Natural Language
Semantics 20: 431-475.
Searle, J. R. (1969) Speech Acts. London: Cambridge University Press.
Sells, Peter. (1987) “Aspects of logophoricity.” Linguistic Inquiry 18: 445-479.
Shibatani, Masayoshi. (1978) Nihongo no Bunseki [Analysis of Japanese]. Tokyo: Taishukan.
Singh, Raj. (2008) “Contradiction and oddness: A note on Yalcin’s theory of epistemic modals.”
Ms., MIT. URL: http://web.mit.edu/singhr/www/singh-contradiction-oddness.pdf
Smith, Carlota S. (1997) The Parameter of Aspect (Second Edition). Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic.
Smythies, John. (2003) “Space, time and consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:
47-56.

242

Sode, Rumiko. (2002) “Japanese adjectives in small clause complements.” Journal of Japanese
Linguistics 18: 51-82.
Speas, Margaret. (1990) “Comments on the papers by James W. Gair, Yamuna Kachru, and K.
P. Mohanan and Tara Mohanan.” In M. K. Verma and K. P. Mohanan, eds., Experiencer
Subjects in South Asian Languages, 77-83. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Speas, Margaret. (2004) “Evidentiality, logophoricity and the syntactic representation of
pragmatic features.” Lingua 114: 255-276.
Speas, Peggy and Carol Tenny. (2003) “Configurational properties of point of view roles.” In
Anna Maria Di Sciullo, ed., Asymmetry in Grammar: Volume 1: Syntax and Semantics,
315-344. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Spenader, Jennifer and Emar Maier. (2009) “Contrast as denial in multi-dimensional semantics.”
Journal of Pragmatics 41: 1707-1726.
von Stechow, Arnim. (1982) “Structured propositions.” Arbeitspapier 59 des SFB 99, Universität
Konstanz.
von Stechow, Arnim. (2002) “German seit ‘since’ and the ambiguity of the German perfect.” In
Barbara Stiebels and Ingrid Kaufmann, eds., More than Words: A Festschrift for Dieter
Wunderlich, 393-432. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Stephenson, Tamina. (2006) “A parallel account of epistemic modals and predicates of personal
taste.” In E. Puig-Waldmüller, ed., Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 11, 583-597.
Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Stephenson, Tamina. (2007a) “Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal
taste.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 487-525.
Stephenson, Tamina C. (2007b) Towards a Theory of Subjective Meaning. Ph.D. dissertation,
MIT.
Stephenson, Tamina. (2010) “Vivid attitudes: Centered situations in the semantics of remember
and imagine.” In Nan Li and David Lutz, eds., Proceedings of SALT 20, 147-160. Ithaca,
NY: CLC Publications.
Stowell, Tim. (2012) “Syntax.” In Robert I. Binnick, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Tense and
Aspect, 184-211. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, P. F. (1950) “On referring.” Mind 59: 320-344.
Sun, Jackson T.-S. (1993) “Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan.” The Bulletin of the Institute of History
and Philology 63: 945-1001. Taipei.
Takezawa, Koichi. (1987) A Configurational Approach to Japanese Case-Marking. Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle.
Tanaka, Hidekazu. (1992) “Raising-to-object in English, French, and Japanese.” English
Linguistics 9: 39-60.
243

Tanaka, Hidekazu. (2002) “Raising to object out of CP.” Linguistic Inquiry 33: 637-652.
Tanaka, Hidekazu. (2006) “Categorial status of raising complements in Japanese: A reply to
Kawai (2006).” Ms., University of York.
Tenny, Carol L. (2006) “Evidentiality, experiencers, and the syntax of sentience in Japanese.”
Journal of East Asian Linguistics 15: 245-288.
Teramura, Hideo. (1971) “‘Ta’ no imi to kinō [Meaning and function of ‘ta’.” In Iwakura
Tomozane Kyōju Taishoku Kinen Ronbunshū Shuppan Kōenkai, eds., Gengogaku to
Nihongo mondai [Linguistics and Problems in Japanese], 244-289. Tokyo: Kurosio
Syuppan.
Teramura, Hideo. (1973) “Kanjōhyōgen no sintakusu [Syntax of expressions of feeling]” Gengo
2(2): 98-106. Reprinted in Hideo Teramura, (1973) Collected Papers of Teramura Hideo,
Volume II: Linguistics and Japanese Education, 3-16. Tokyo: Kurosio Syuppan.
Uchibori, Asako. (1996) “Opacity and subjunctive complements in Japanese.” In Ho-min Sohn
and John Haig, eds., Japanese/Korean Linguistics Volume 6, 399-414. Stanford, CA:
CSLI.
Uchibori, Asako. (2000) The Syntax of Subjunctive Complements. Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Connecticut.
Ueda, M. (1988) “Exceptional Case-marking in Japanese.” Sophia Linguistica 22/23: 39-46.
Ueda, Yukiko. (2007) “Nihongo no modality no toogokoozoo to ninsyoo seigen” In Nobuko
Hasegawa, ed., Nihongo no Syubun Gensyoo: Toogokoozoo to Modality (Main Clause
Phenomena in Japanese: Syntactic Structures and Modality), 261-294. Tokyo: Hituzi
Syobo.
Umbach, Carla. (2004) “On the notion of contrast in information structure and discourse
structure.” Journal of Semantics 21: 155-175.
Ura, Hiroyuki. (1996) Multiple Feature-Checking: A Theory of Grammatical Function Splitting.
Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.
Ura, Hiroyuki. (1999) “Checking theory and dative subject constructions in Japanese and Korean.”
Journal of East Asian Linguistics 8: 223-254.
Varchetta, Nicola. (2010) “Psych-verbs: A locative derivation.” University of Venice Working
Papers in Linguistics 20: 113-155.
Varchetta, Nicola. (2012) Rethinking Italian Psychological Verbs. Ph.D. dissertation, Università
Ca’ Foscari Venezia. URL: http://dspace.unive.it/handle/10579/1250
Watanabe, Akira. (1996) “Nominative-genitive conversion and agreement in Japanese: A crosslinguistic perspective.” Journal of East Asian Linguistics 5: 373–410.

244

Willett, Thomas. (1988) “A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality.”
Studies in Language 12: 51-97.
Yamanaka, Joota, (1976) Kokugo gogen jiten [A Dictionary of Japanese Etymology]. Tokyo:
Azekura shoboo.

245

